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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this report is to discuss the extent to which immigration has 
come to be perceived as a security threat by European Union (EU) policy 
makers. The manner in which immigration issues are presented by policy 
makers at the European level is assumed to have substantive implications for 
the choice of instruments in the area. A second purpose is therefore to dis-
cuss the extent to which the development towards a common EU asylum and 
immigration policy can be interpreted as security policy strategy.  
Increased immigration during the last few decades has coincided with in-
creasing unemployment and economic restructuring in Western Europe. The 
issue of immigration became increasingly sensitive in the late 1980s after the 
collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, when a tide of illegal 
immigrants was expected to inundate the West. Today, images of ships 
loaded with refugees off the shores of Italy, or of trucks filled with illegal 
immigrants crossing the English Channel, have become disturbing, but no 
longer rare features of European newspaper headlines. The impression is that 
of Europe being ‘swamped’, and unable to deal with the hordes of people 
standing outside its gates wanting in.  
Traditionally, European security studies have concentrated on military 
power and territorial defence against potential aggressors. With the end of 
the Cold War, however, a broader security agenda emerged. According to 
some scholars, external security threats are no longer only military, but lie in 
terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking, and even in mass immigration 
(Andersen & den Boer 1995, Buzan et al. 1998). Others argue against the 
widening of the security concept to include issues such as immigration, 
because it could blur the security concept and create a false image of policy 
making, whereby security policy becomes all-encompassing (Walt 1991). I 
shall argue that by explicitly linking immigration issues with the broader 
agenda of national and internal security, EU policy makers have themselves 
taken the step towards a new understanding of the security concept. Thus, 
employing a widened notion of security, and arguing that asylum and immi-
gration issues are increasingly perceived as security threats by EU policy 
makers, I am interested in examining the manner in which such an image is 
being created and sustained.  
Historically, European judicial co-operation has been closely linked to 
the nation state’s jurisdiction and what is considered one of the state’s main 
roles: the protection of its own citizens. Not even mentioned in the 1957 
Rome Treaty, asylum and immigration issues were only properly addressed 
in the EU following the Single European Act of 1986 and its call for the 
completion of the Single Market. A comprehensive strategy on asylum and 
immigration was for the first time recognised with the 1997 Amsterdam 
Treaty, incorporating asylum and immigration as a first pillar provision. At 
the same time it was recognised that increased immigration should be met 
with instruments that deal with political, human rights and development 
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issues in countries of origin and transit. Partnership with third countries con-
cerned was considered a key element for the success of such a policy, with a 
view to promoting co-development.  
Arguably then, the Amsterdam strategy on asylum and immigration con-
tains new instruments that emphasise co-operation with third countries and 
stability-inducing mechanisms in order to deal with root causes of immigra-
tion. But at the same time, efforts to develop a common EU asylum and 
immigration policy have been widely criticised for weakening the principles, 
norms and rules of international refugee protection. This is said to take place 
by establishing stricter regulations that impede the entry of asylum seekers, 
and establish a system of negative redistribution for handling asylum claims 
(den Boer 1997, Monar 2000).  
The expression of such different views suggests that fundamentally, 
migration is a question of relations: individual, institutional and internatio-
nal, to be found at the intersection between humanitarian commitments and 
economic and political confrontations. An examination of EU policies on 
asylum and immigration issues is therefore likely to highlight key aspects of 
the relationship between the dynamics of European integration and the pro-
tection of universal human rights which apply to all individuals irrespective 
of nationality. It is precisely in the intricate interplay of international interde-
pendence, human rights and national sovereignty that the legal concept of 
territorial asylum has evolved both internationally and domestically in the 
course of the twentieth century.  
1.1 Purpose and key questions 
Under the pressure of events since 1989, many scholars argue that the secur-
ity concept should be widened to encompass new security policy challenges 
that have arisen (Andersen & den Boer 1995, Sjursen 2000). The post-1989 
situation has suggested new scenarios, such as the end of bipolarity and the 
redefinition of borders. Often, economic and social imbalances, environmen-
tal problems and humanitarian disasters are considered as important, or even 
more important security challenges than military war. Thus, the point of 
departure of the analysis is the changing perception of what constitutes 
security threats, unravelled through an analysis of political discourse. 
Since the aim of this report is to examine the change that has taken place 
in European perspectives on immigration, a study of political discourse will 
enable us to deconstruct a number of justificatory domains, which are sup-
ported by the members of the European policy community. The main hypo-
thesis is that security considerations are clearly reflected in the establishment 
and development of asylum and immigration instruments following the 
Amsterdam programme. Another hypothesis is that the framing of immigra-
tion as a security threat has legitimised the introduction of objectives and 
instruments that have their origin in security policy. This is notably to be 
seen in the accession agreements with the Central and Eastern European 
applicant countries, as well in the so-called ‘partnership-agreements’ with 
immigrant countries of origin and transit. 
Having established the broader aim of this report, I propose two main and 
inter linked questions as the framework for the analysis: 
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First: To what extent has the issue of asylum and immigration come to be 
seen as a security threat, and thus as a security matter at the EU level? 
 
  Second: To what extent is the above question reflected in the objectives 
and instruments of the common EU asylum and immigration policy? Can 
the development towards a common EU asylum and immigration policy 
be called a security policy strategy?  
 
The key questions can be represented in the following model: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The background variable constitutes the foundation for the renewal of 
European strategies in the field of asylum and immigration. To understand 
the origin and development of this field of co-operation, it is necessary to 
gain an understanding of the context in which it arose. Here, the focus is pri-
marily on the dramatic changes in the world economy in the 1970s, leading 
to increased inflation and unemployment, as well as comprehensive restruc-
turing processes in many countries. Important factors relate to the ‘immigra-
tion stop’ introduced in the early 1970s, marking the beginning of more 
restrictive asylum and immigration measures in the Western European nation 
states. Attention should also be drawn to the consequences of the end of the 
Cold War on the ensuing development of the EU, the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the creation of new states. Yet another factor regards the Euro-
pean integration process, the construction of the Schengen area, and the 
deterritorialisation of markets, physical borders and identities. These factors 
are further examined in chapter 3. 
The intervening variable constitutes the perceptions of the challenges 
emanating from asylum and immigration issues in the EU. Concerns with 
possible negative effects on European economies and fear of instability are 
assumed to be the most important explanations as to why immigration 
became a securitised issue on the European agenda. In this part of the ana-
lysis I am concerned with the extent to which immigration is defined as a 
security problem as a result of European political discourse. This chapter 
thus examines the ‘securitising moves’1 of EU policy makers, and builds on 
the theoretical discussion in chapter two regarding different perceptions of 
security. These factors are further explored in chapter four.  
                                                     
1  The notion of ‘securitising move’ was introduced by Buzan et al. (1998:25) to describe a 
discourse that takes the form of presenting something as an ‘existential threat’. The 
concept is further explored in chapter two (2.3.1). 
Changed conditions
for asylum and im-
migration in Europe:
international, natio-
nal and regional fac-
tors 
Changed perception of
which elements consti-
tute policy challenges
in the EU: a widened
security perspective on
asylum and immigra-
tion 
Establishment of an
EU asylum and immi-
gration policy: identi-
fication of new objec-
tives and instruments  
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The dependent variable, and what I seek to explain, is the contents of the 
EU policy on asylum and immigration as it developed after the Amsterdam 
summit. To what extent have the securitising moves examined in chapter 
four resulted in actual politics, and thus become securitised?2 Changed 
conditions for asylum and immigration in Europe, and the changed fashion 
in which security is perceived at the European level, are assumed to have 
influenced the development of EU objectives and instruments in the field of 
asylum and immigration. By connecting immigration issues to first and 
second pillar co-operation, the EU is institutionalising relations with immi-
grant countries. The new partnership initiatives have created a security stra-
tegy aimed at normalising relationships, creating stronger predictability and 
spreading European norms and values to these countries. This is the subject 
of chapter five. 
1.2 Delimitation 
To limit the scope of the analysis, a delimitation of space and time should be 
made. Regarding time, asylum and immigration issues are seen in a broad 
historical context throughout the analysis. But the emphasis is on the deve-
lopment of a proper EU policy in the area, delimited to the events taking 
place after the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty, when asylum and immigration 
became a community matter. Before the Amsterdam summit, asylum and 
immigration issues were given little political attention (Lavenex 1999, 
Monar 2000). Foreseeing the creation of an area of freedom, security and 
justice, the Amsterdam Treaty signals the increasing importance of joint 
action in the area, as well as the development of new objectives and instru-
ments.  
Secondly, the analysis is delimited in space by precisely defining the 
understanding of the EU as a security policy actor. In order to conceptualise 
the EU I draw on the designation of the EU as a case of ‘multi-level gover-
nance’, thus rejecting the nation-state analogy of the EU (Scharpf 1994, 
Schmitter 1996). Instead I see the Union as a polity sui generis, consisting of 
frameworks of co-operation that exceed other attempts at integration both in 
depth and in width. The description of the EU as an actor of ‘multi-level 
governance’ is useful because the study of the EU’s policy on asylum and 
immigration takes place on different levels. Being an intergovernmental 
matter, asylum and immigration issues have primarily been dealt with by the 
European Council and the Union Council, delivering decisions by unanimity. 
While the area largely remains characterised by objectives and strategies 
defined at this level, the European Parliament (hereafter the Parliament) 
enjoys a right to be consulted, and the European Commission (hereafter the 
Commission) enjoys a shared right of initiative with member states, and is 
crucial in the implementation of EU measures, as well as in the co-ordination 
of the three pillars.  
                                                     
2  ‘Securitisation’ is, according to Buzan et al. (1998: 23),the move that takes politics 
beyond the established rules of the game, and frames the issue either as a special kind of 
politics or above politics. A thorough account of the process of securitisation is provided 
in chapter two, where I also explain how I intend to employ the concept in this thesis.  
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I will argue that even if asylum and immigration issues have been 
confined to intergovernmental co-operation, the logic of multi-level 
governance is to be found in implementation procedures, as well as in the 
interplay between Community institutions, and the Community and nation 
states.3 An analysis of European immigration discourse should therefore 
particularly emphasise the role of the Council, because of the unanimity 
requirement in decision-making, but also take account of the role of the 
member states as well as the other European institutions.  
The analysis is also delimited in space by defining the concept of ‘asylum 
and immigration’. The concept of ‘asylum and immigration’ incorporates a 
broad category of people. Under human rights law, refugees are defined as 
persons who are forced to leave their country of origin because their life or 
freedom is threatened. The prohibition against returning such a person to a 
place where his or her basic human rights are threatened has evolved into a 
fundamental principle of international law. This is the central difference 
between the right of asylum as an international institution and immigration 
policies as a privilege of the state: in the case of asylum seekers and 
refugees, state sovereignty is circumscribed by the universality of human 
rights norms. But although far from being a given concept, the notion of 
refugee protection has evolved constantly over time and has at all times been 
significantly shaped by developments in the economic and political context 
of international co-operation. Persons wishing to apply for refugee status and 
to formally submit an asylum claim are referred to as ‘asylum seekers’. Once 
a person has been recognised under this formal procedure and granted 
refugee status, the terms ‘recognised refugee’ or ‘person granted asylum’ are 
used. In this sense, ‘refugees’ can refer to both asylum seekers and other 
forced migrants who do not apply for the formal status determination 
procedure. The term ‘immigrants’ is used for voluntary migrants. I thus 
employ the notion ‘asylum and immigration’ as a broad category, reflecting 
the use of the terms in EU rhetoric. Immigration can be legal or illegal, 
regular or irregular, temporary or permanent. When it is of analytical 
significance to distinguish between categories therefore, a distinction will be 
made. 
1.3 Outline 
The second chapter is devoted to theory and methodological design. I will 
describe how I intend to use the different theoretical perspectives, and intro-
duce discourse analysis as the method used for gathering and analysing the 
empirical data. The third chapter deals with the background variable; with 
changes in international, national and regional conditions in Europe after the 
economic recession in the 1970s. Chapter four answers the first part of the 
key question; the extent to which a widened security perspective can be 
detected in the discourse on asylum and immigration on behalf of European 
policy actors. Can the asylum and immigration discourse be interpreted as an 
example of securitising moves by these actors? Chapter five discusses the 
                                                     
3  The EU institutions dealt with in this analysis are the European Commission, the Euro-
pean Parliament, the European Court of Justice, the European Council (heads of states and 
governments) and the Council of the European Union (Secretaries of State). 
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dependent variable; the identification of new instruments and objectives 
through the establishment of an EU asylum and immigration policy. Have 
the securitising moves identified in chapter four become securitised? Chap-
ter six sums up and presents the main findings.  
2. Theoretical and methodological 
reflections on security and regional 
integration 
One of the purposes of this chapter is to explore the ways in which asylum 
and immigration issues can be analysed employing security studies as a theo-
retical framework. This naturally requires reaching an understanding of the 
meaning of security. Probably few concepts employed in statecraft and in the 
study of international politics have as vague referents as does security. There 
is also a lacking consensus on how to define the concept in the academic 
literature. Traditionalist thinking maintains that military threats are the main 
security concerns of states. There is, however, an academic debate claiming 
that security needs to be redefined (Ullmann 1983, Buzan et al. 1998). With 
the end of the Cold War it is argued that the mix of factors affecting national 
security is changing. Challenging the central role of the state in security, the 
individual is increasingly seen as the main target of security policy, and the 
security agenda is dominated by threats such as ethno-nationalist conflict, 
migration and organised crime.  
I begin with an examination of the concept of security as it appears in 
international relations theory today (2.1). Thereafter, I discuss the widened 
security concept (2.2), and the advantages of its use to discuss how non-mili-
tary challenges like asylum and immigration can be made security concerns 
by political actors through a process of securitisation (2.3). Having estab-
lished the theoretical foundations for the discussions on security, and the 
theoretical framework to employ, I proceed with some methodological con-
siderations regarding how to answer the key questions posed in the introduc-
tion, and continue to discuss how discourse analysis becomes a means to that 
end (2.4).  
2.1 Defining security 
During the Cold War, the dominant perspective on security held by the 
majority of politicians, academics and defence planners, suggested that 
security issues were relatively straightforward. Security policy mainly con-
cerned politico-military relations between states (Waltz 1979). Because it 
has become commonplace to associate the origins of security studies with 
the twin stimuli of nuclear weaponry and the Cold War, one can easily get 
the impression that security studies was created sometime between 1945 and 
1955 (Baldwin 1995).  
In the interwar period and the first postwar decade, however, ‘security’ 
was understood as a multi-disciplinary and multidimensional problem, which 
required the application of international law, international organisation, and 
political theory to the promotion of democracy, international institutions and 
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disarmament (ibid.). Also during the Cold War there were, of course, dissi-
dents, who argued that the narrow security perspective was too limited. 
However, the so-called ‘narrow’ school of thought on security matters held 
sway. Western European security, therefore, was largely interpreted through 
the perception of threat emanating from the Soviet Union and its Warsaw 
Pact allies. The conventional rearmament debates of the 1950s, the nuclear 
strategy debates of the 1960s, and the détente debates of the 1970s, were all 
framed in NATO policy-making circles by concern over the nature of the 
‘Soviet threat’.  
The end of the Cold War led to a crumbing of these conservative determi-
nants of policy. As Communism was overthrown in Eastern Europe, and the 
Soviet Union collapsed, it was clear that capabilities had dramatically 
changed. Consequently, the understanding of security also began to change. 
Throughout the Cold War, there had been critics of the narrow school of 
thought located in, amongst others, various peace movements. There was an 
increased recognition of the reduced value and importance of military power 
in international relations in general, and between the European states in par-
ticular. The individual as opposed to the state frequently became seen as the 
main target of security policy. With reduced threat to national territories, the 
European security agenda became dominated by a series of diffuse risks and 
challenges such as ethno-nationalist conflict, nuclear proliferation and orga-
nised crime. The so-called widened security perspective thus implied that the 
state as the only referent object in security and defence was challenged as 
never before. 
2.1.1 Conceptualising security in international relations 
Realism and neorealism provide the main theoretical contributions of secur-
ity studies in the decades leading up to the end of the Cold War. A basic 
assumption was that of states as the primary actors, sharing the same ‘natio-
nal interests’ in the pursuit of security, defined in terms of military power 
(Waltz 1979). Largely ignoring the writings from previous periods, in parti-
cular Arnold Wolfers (1962:154), who rejected the essential link between 
security policy and coercive power, realist and neo-realist security analysts 
have been characterised as uni-dimensional in their attention to military 
force as the central issue of security.4 The focus on military power is perhaps 
most strongly expressed by Stephen Walt (1991:212), who argues that secur-
ity studies is about the phenomenon of war, and that it can be defined as ‘the 
study of threat, use, and control of military force’.  
To the primacy of the state and the military focus of security policy 
emphasised by neorealists such as Walt, must be added the context in which 
security can be obtained. According to these scholars, the competitive pres-
sure of an anarchic international system is a constant in history; it determines 
important types of state behaviour such as balancing. Self-reliance and 
independence thus became inherent to the notion of ‘national security’, 
especially as the term developed at the height of the Cold War.  
                                                     
4  Contributors to this literature include Thomas Schelling, Glenn Snyder, William W. 
Kaufmann, Herman Kahn, Albert Wohlstetter, Henry Kissinger and others (Baldwin 
1995: 123). 
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Neoliberalism (or neoliberal institutionalism) modifies the neorealist 
stance, arguing that international institutions provide an alternative structural 
context in which states can define their interests and co-ordinate conflicting 
policies. Robert Keohane (1984) emphasises how the institutional infrastruc-
ture of a post-hegemonic system can facilitate the co-ordination of conflict-
ing policies by lowering the transaction costs associated with co-operation. 
Still, the assumption of unified state actors and a focus on the anarchical, 
systemic context of states are common to both neorealist and neoliberalist 
theorists. Structural neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as the two 
dominant paradigms in the ‘golden age’ of security studies agree on the cen-
tral importance of international anarchy for the analysis of international poli-
tics. Both theories focus on how structures affect the instrumental rationality 
of actors. Premised upon the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and non-
intervention, these principles were consolidated with the state’s monopoly 
on the use of military force, both inside and outside its territory. 
But what scholars and policy makers consider to be national security 
issues is not fixed, but varies over time. The narrow definition of security 
tends to focus on material capabilities and the use and control of military 
force by states. However, these main perspectives on international relations 
shared with their critics the inability to foreshadow or foresee the momen-
tous international changes caused by the end of the Cold War. There is also a 
tendency for both theories to treat states’ conceptions of their interests as 
exogenous: unexplained within the terms of the theory. These points are 
elaborated by Katzenstein, when he states that: 
 
For realists, culture and identity are, at best, derivative of the distribution of 
capabilities and have no independent explanatory power. For rationalists, actors 
deploy culture and identity strategically, like any other resource, simply to 
further their own self-interest…Neorealism assumes that the international system 
has virtually no normative content. Neoliberalism takes as given actor identities 
and views and beliefs as intervening variables between assumed interests and 
behavioural outcomes (Katzenstein 1996:85). 
 
Katzenstein represents a meta-theoretical approach that has increased its 
relevance in the last decade. This approach has been called social-construc-
tivism (Adler 2002). According to Katzenstein, security interests are defined 
by actors who respond to cultural factors (Katzenstein 1996). This does not 
mean that power, conventionally understood as material capabilities, is 
unimportant for an analysis of national or regional security. States and other 
political actors undoubtedly seek material power to defend their security. 
However, the constructivist approach offers a valuable contribution to secur-
ity studies because it emphasises that norms, institutions and other cultural 
features of domestic and international environments can affect state security 
interests and policies (Jepperson et al. 1996). 
However, the widespread use of the constructivist label amongst scholars 
suggests that it warrants scrutiny. In general, recent works in International 
Relations (IR) on the importance of norms have often been cast in what is 
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termed a ‘constructivist’ analytical mode.5 The common ground of construc-
tivists is that the material world does not come classified, and that, therefore, 
the objects of our knowledge are not independent of our interpretations and 
our language (Adler 2002:95). Constructivists of all types are not interested 
in how things are, but how they became what they are (ibid.). However, 
there are widespread differences amongst the constructivist scholars. 
Modernist constructivism results from the combination of objective 
hermeneutics with a cognitive interest in understanding and explaining social 
reality.6 For the purpose of this study, the modernist constructivism 
represented by Emmanuel Adler (1997, 2002) is particularly useful, because 
he stresses that understanding social reality means uncovering the processes 
by which social facts are constituted by language and rules. 
Language is important because the manner in which social facts become 
established in the social world is relevant to the way in which they exert 
their influence (Adler 1997:339). The idea that our understanding and ideas 
about the world are introduced, shaped and reconstituted through language is 
reiterated by Wæver (1995), who stresses the use of text and discourse ana-
lysis in the study of security and international politics. The use of such inter-
pretive methods to examine European immigration discourse does not mean 
that all statements carry the same weight. Rather, such methods are used to 
uncover the validity of statements and to reveal social structures, social 
mechanisms and empirical regularities (Adler 2002:101). But in order to 
analyse the social mechanisms and empirical regularities of the EU asylum 
and immigration policy within a security framework, it is necessary to dis-
cuss the classification of asylum and immigration as a security issue. The 
debate regarding the widened security concept has the defining criteria of 
security as a starting point.  
2.2 The widened security concept 
Referring to the discussion above, I seek a definition of security that encom-
passes the changes we have witnessed during the last decade, where the tra-
ditional Westphalian model no longer seems adequate to describe the inter-
national system, and where structural constraint is understood in cognitive, 
rather than exclusively material, terms. The last decade was strongly marked 
by the end of bipolarity, the developments of globalisation, regional integra-
tion, the increase of migration flows and the fragmentation of major states. 
These events significantly affected the forms and the meanings of borders, 
individual and collective identities, and the sense and nature of state sover-
eignty and authority.  
Especially three conditions illustrate these changes: Firstly, new issues, 
such as organised crime, terrorism and illegal immigration have emerged on 
                                                     
5  Finnemore (1996:6) calls constructivism the most amorphous and least defined of the per-
spectives emphasising the causal nature of social structure. For an introduction to social 
constructivism, see Adler (2002).  
6  Adler (2002:98) makes a distinction between modernist, radical and critical constructiv-
ism. Described briefly, radical constructivism results from a combination of a radical turn 
to language, with a dissident emancipatory attitude toward knowledge in general. Critical 
constructivism results from the combination of objective hermeneutics with a dissident 
interest in the emancipatory effects of knowledge. See Adler (2002:98) for a more 
thorough explanation. 
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the international political agenda (Sjursen 2000:7). Secondly, new trans-
national, supranational, economic, political and security actors have emerged 
in addition to the state, at the international level. What many of these actors 
have in common is that they do not have a territorial base and they act with-
out reference to a specific national interest. Thirdly, the normative and legal 
dimension in the international system is strengthened through networks of 
agreements and international institutions that are not merely characterised by 
a balance of power (ibid.).  
Following such changes in the international system, the debate regarding 
a widened notion of security grew out of dissatisfaction with the narrowing 
of the field of security studies imposed by the military and nuclear obsessi-
ons of the Cold War, and its inadequacy to describe contemporary security 
challenges.7 The shared assumption of these scholars is that the narrow defi-
nition of security contrasts with the distinction of threats that affect not only 
states, but also groups and individuals, as well as other non-state actors.  
However, there has been a tendency in the academic debate to encompass 
virtually any social fact as security concerns, including poverty, environmen-
tal destruction and industrial decline. This is the main argument of the oppo-
nents of the widened security concept. 
2.2.1 Criticising the widened security concept 
One of the key arguments of opponents of a widened security concept has 
been that progressive widening endangers the intellectual coherence of 
security, putting so much into it that its essential meaning becomes void 
(Walt 1991). By including other referent objects than the state in the analy-
sis, thereby approaching security at the level of the individual, traditionalists 
argue that every question regarding threats to human well-being becomes a 
potential security problem. Such approaches, Mearsheimer (1994/95:37) 
argues, adopt an ‘anything goes’ attitude toward social science that can be 
seen as stemming from the general tendency of non-realist approaches to 
slide into pure idealism: the belief that ideas are the driving force of history 
and easily malleable. Along the same lines, Stephen Walt (1991:212) claims 
that: 
 
By this logic, issues such as pollution, disease, child abuse, or economic recessi-
ons could all be viewed as threats to “security”. Defining the field in this way 
would destroy its intellectual coherence and make it more difficult to devise 
solutions to any of these important problems.  
 
However, the so-called Copenhagen School8 has managed to reach a com-
promise between this traditionalist position and the adherents of a widened 
security concept (Rieker 2000:10). On the one hand they take seriously the 
traditionalist complaint about intellectual incoherence by claiming that an 
                                                     
7  Regarding the debate on the widened security concept, see for example Ullmann (1983); 
Buzan (1991); Walt (1991); Baldwin (1995); Bigo (1996) and Buzan et al. (1998). 
8  The so-called Copenhagen School is the name of a group of scientists at the Copenhagen 
Peace Research Institute, who have written extensively on the need to redefine security 
studies, and on non-military aspects of European security. The work of the Copenhagen 
School is more closely examined in 2.3. 
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international security issue must be understood in the same way as the tradi-
tionalist military-political understanding of security, where security about 
survival of a referent object (traditionally, but not necessarily the state), in 
face of existential threats. On the other hand they disagree with the tradition-
alists that the only or the best way to deal with such incoherence is the 
retreat into a military core. Such a retreat fails to capture the realities of pol-
icy shaping and policy making, and is therefore of limited use. 
Following this logic, immigrants and asylum seekers can easily be de-
fined as a security threat. However, critics of the widened security concept 
have resented the categorisation of immigration as a security threat, for both 
moral and factual reasons. Clearly, the transformation of migration and refu-
gee flows into a security problem is neither a neutral nor an innocent activ-
ity. If migration is located in a security logic, it enters a specific discursive-
practical space: it becomes a security drama (Huysmans 1995:54). The cre-
ation of such a security logic is sometimes regarded as an opportunist means 
of placing an issue on the political agenda: by saying ‘security’, a state 
representative declares an emergency situation, thus claiming a right to use 
whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development. 
Huysmans (2002:43) also implies that social-constructivists face a nor-
mative dilemma when treating migration as a threat. If an author values a 
securitisation of migration negatively, he or she faces the question of how to 
talk or write about the securitisation of migration without contributing to a 
further securitisation by the very production of this knowledge. The norma-
tive dilemma thus consists of how to write or speak about security when the 
security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid: that is, 
the securitisation of migration, drugs and so forth (ibid.).  
In response to this, there is no doubt that the analysis of migration as a 
security problem risks the (re)production of the security drama. This is so 
because the researcher will reproduce the security agenda when describing 
how the process of securitisation works. But since I will argue that migration 
is already highly securitised in post-Cold War Western Europe, ignoring the 
issue is not a viable strategy. On the contrary, a possible solution is to 
employ what Huysmans (1995:66) call the constructivist strategy.9 Construc-
tivists consider security as a social construct, which means that it is some-
thing produced by social practices in a particular spatial and temporal con-
text. Therefore security is not something static, but is fully embedded in the 
dynamics of social practice. The constructivist strategy does not try to under-
stand what increases and decreases an objectively given security; rather it 
wants to understand how the process of securitisation works (Wæver et al. 
1993). How is it that, in a particular context, particular issues are securitised? 
What triggers the social construction of security? According to this strategy, 
the dichotomy between natives/migrant is not reproduced because the con-
                                                     
9  Huysmans (1995) explores different ways of ‘desecuritising’ social issues (i.e. transform-
ing them from security to non-security matters).Whereas the constructivist strategy offers 
a way to avoid the normative dilemma, the desecuritisation of migration takes a step fur-
ther to devise a strategy of identity fragmentation that seeks to break through the dialectic 
of inclusion and exclusion. The principal objective here, however, is to examine the man-
ner in which asylum and immigration issues are securitised by European policy makers, 
and the process of desecuritisation therefore falls outside the scope of this thesis. For a 
thorough reading on the process of desecuritisation, see Wæver et al. (1993) and 
Huysmans (1995). 
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structivist does not think within its terms, but rather seeks to understand how 
it is produced and continued.  
Moreover, the argument that progressive widening of the security concept 
to include migration endangers the intellectual coherence of security, is 
countered by Barry Buzan (1991:19). To maintain the analytical value of the 
security concept, Buzan argues that security is mainly conditioned by factors 
in five sectors: the military, political, economic, societal and environmental 
sector. Each sector is characterised by special security dynamics and faces 
different referent objects, i.e. units that are regarded as being existentially 
threatened and carrying a legitimate claim to survival.10 Sectors also serve to 
disaggregate a whole for purposes of analysis by selecting some of its dis-
tinctive patterns of interaction. Buzan (1991:19–20) hence captures the 
spectra of different proposals concerned with widening the security concept, 
giving the following description of security sectors: 
 
Generally speaking, military security concerns the two-level interplay of the 
armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states, and states’ perceptions of 
each other’s intentions. Political security concerns the organisational stability of 
states, systems of government and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Eco-
nomic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary 
to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security con-
cerns the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional 
patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom. 
Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary 
biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises 
depend. 
 
Many of the security sectors have other referent objects than the state. This 
implies a widening of the concept to include the safety of people, perceived 
as individuals or as the international collectivity. Whereas the political sector 
is about the organisational stability of states, systems of government, and the 
ideologies that give governments and states their legitimacy, society is de-
fined as the identity, the self-conception of communities and of individuals 
identifying themselves as members of a community. Societal insecurity thus 
exists when communities of whatever kind define a development or potenti-
ality as a threat to their survival as a community, or as a threat to ‘civil soci-
ety’ (Buzan et al. 1998). For the purpose of this thesis, the analytical distinc-
tion between sectors helps organise the discussion on asylum and immigra-
tion by referring the issue mainly to the societal sector. 
2.2.2 The societal security sector 
In the case of migration, insecurity can arise with the feeling that ‘X people 
are being overrun or diluted by influences of Y people; the X community 
will not be what it used to be, because others will make up the population 
and X identity is being changed by a shift in the composition of the popula-
                                                     
10  Security action is usually taken on behalf of, and with reference to a collectivity. The refe-
rent object is that to which one can point and say, ‘it has to survive, therefore it is neces-
sary to..’ (Buzan et al. 1998:36). 
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tion’ (Buzan et al. 1998:121). Society can react to such threats in two ways: 
through activities carried out by the community itself, or by trying to move 
the issue to the political agenda. The latter situation is the focus of this ana-
lysis, largely limited to an analysis of the societal sector, not at the state 
level, but at the EU level, where the threat of immigration for example can 
be addressed through legislation and border controls.  
The introduction of the concepts of ‘society’ and ‘identity’ into the analy-
sis of international security can be seen as a transitional phase in a shift 
within the mainstream tradition from material to cognitive structural resourc-
es, and from state to human subjects of security. While Buzan acknowledges 
that the predominant form of political organisation in the contemporary 
international system is the territorial state, other state-like or state-paralleling 
political organisations like the EU can sometimes serve as securitising actors 
at the unit level.11 Wæver et al. (1993) are right to point out that the integra-
tion process not only creates some migration pressures by allowing freer 
movement for EU citizens, but it also places responsibilities for defence 
against migration away from national governments. As it is pointed out, ‘if 
the EU is not seen to provide adequate defence, then the Community itself 
could become politically vulnerable to nationalist disaffection and charges 
that it was undermining national identities both by encouraging migration 
and by promoting the homogenising forces of Europeanisation’ (Wæver et 
al. 1993:3). 
Societal security thus accords significance or autonomy to human beings 
as the referents of security, and to political organisations like the EU as 
securitising actors. But the concept of societal security has also been met 
with criticism. By recognising that society is fundamentally about identity 
and civil society, and that ‘societal security concerns the ability of a society 
to persist in its essential character under changing conditions’, both ‘society’ 
and ‘identity’ are projected as objective realities. In this way, society is 
viewed as a social agent which has independent reality, or an ‘independent 
variable’; a social fact immune to process inquiry, whose values and vulner-
abilities are as objective as those of the state (Huysmans 1995). 
It is clear that collective identity is a matter of perception. Because I want 
to avoid an objectivist view of what constitutes collective identity, and be-
cause I cannot offer a basis or criteria by which to arbitrate between compet-
ing identity claims, my approach to asylum and immigration as societal 
security issues has to be delimited. As McSweeney (1999:77) maintains; 
‘collective identity is not out there, waiting to be discovered. What is “out 
there” is identity discourse on the part of political leaders, intellectuals and 
countless others, who engage in the process of constructing, negotiating, 
manipulating or affirming a response to the demand – at times urgent, mostly 
absent – for a collective image’.  
The implication of this is that a possible way to study asylum and immi-
gration as societal security issues at the European level, is to examine the 
specific positions of policy makers that have a privileged capacity to trans-
form non-security issues into security questions. Bigo (2000) points out that 
                                                     
11 Securitising actors are actors who securitise issues by declaring something – a referent 
object – existentially threatened. I discuss the securitisation process in further detail in 
2.3. 
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these positions are located in particular sections of the bureaucracy that have 
the specific capacity to securitise issues because they are producers of pro-
fessional security knowledge.  
Notwithstanding this delimitation, a main objection raised by Jef 
Huysmans (1998:227) in the debate regarding the widening of the security 
concept, is that the discussion of the meaning of security has been too nar-
row in the widening debate, since it does not devolve enough into the ques-
tion concerning the real meaning of the concept. Huysman instead suggests 
moving away from approaching security merely as a concept, and instead 
interpret it as a ‘thick signifier’. This means bringing us to an understanding 
of how the category ‘security’ articulates a particular way of organising 
forms of life (ibid.).  
Wæver and Buzan et al.’s way of looking at security as a practice as de-
scribed above, might be considered a move in that direction (Rieker 2001). 
In their view, it is not enough to identify referent objects and threats, but an 
issue has to be articulated in a specific rhetorical structure in order to be a se-
curity issue (Wæver 1995). This rhetorical structure has been termed ‘secur-
itisation’, and is the subject of the next section.  
2.3 Securitisation and the theoretical framework of the 
Copenhagen School 
The Copenhagen School has previously been identified as the name of a 
group of scientists at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, who have 
written extensively on the need to redefine security studies. The tag ‘Copen-
hagen School’ was coined by a critic, Bill McSweeney (1996), in an article 
called ‘Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School’.12  
This section takes as a starting point the widened security concept as it 
was developed by members of the Copenhagen School. In the book Security. 
A New Framework for Analysis, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde define a theo-
retical framework that encompasses existential threats and emergency 
measures as core elements of the security concept. I start by explaining the 
concepts of ‘securitising moves’ and ‘securitisation’ as employed by the 
Copenhagen School, and the manner in which asylum and immigration 
issues can be put on the European security agenda (2.3.1). Thereafter, an 
operationalisation of these core concepts is made (2.3.2).  
2.3.1 From securitising moves to securitisation 
The term ‘securitisation’ is employed to understand when and how asylum 
and immigration becomes a security issue by European policy makers. The 
definition offered by Buzan et al. (1998:23) is that security is the move that 
takes politics beyond the established rules of the game, and frames the issue 
either as a special kind of politics or above politics. Securitisation can thus 
be seen as a more extreme version of politisation. In security discourse, an 
                                                     
12  Members of the Copenhagen School include Barry Buzan, project co-ordinator at the 
institute since 1998, and Ole Wæver. According to Huysmans (1998), there are 5 main 
texts emanating from the Copenhagen School: Jahn, Egbert, Pierre Lemaitre & Ole 
Wæver (1987); Wæver, Ole, Pierre Lemaitre & Elzbieta Tromer (eds) (1989); Buzan et al. 
(1990); Wæver et al. (1993) and Buzan et al. (1998). 
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issue is dramatised and presented as an issue of supreme priority; thus by 
labelling it as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by 
extraordinary means.  
According to the Copenhagen School, securitisation is intersubjective and 
socially constructed. It is the actor and not the analyst who decides whether 
something is to be handled as an existential threat. Hence, when a securitis-
ing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat, and thereby takes an issue out 
of ‘normal politics’, there is a case of securitisation. When the issue is pre-
sented as an existential threat, it requires emergency measures and justifying 
actions. The implication of this is that if we place the survival of collective 
units and principles – the politics of existential threat – as the defining core 
of security studies, then we have the basis for applying security analysis to a 
variety of sectors, including asylum and immigration, without losing the 
essential quality of the concept. In this way, security studies expand their 
arena beyond the traditional military focus without debasing the concept of 
security itself. As expressed by Buzan et al. (1998:32), securitisation studies 
aim to gain an increasing understanding of who securitises, on what issues 
(threats), for whom (referent objects), why, with what results, and not least, 
under what conditions (i.e. what explains when securitisation is successful?). 
The Copenhagen School differs from other ‘wideners’ in that it claims 
that the way to study security is to study discourse and political constellati-
ons: when does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic 
structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of 
rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed? A discourse that takes the 
form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object does 
not by itself create securitisation – this is a securitising move. Analysing the 
securitising moves of European policy makers is the subject of chapter four. 
In fact, the issue of asylum and immigration is securitised only when the 
issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and 
justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. Put 
differently, securitisation is not fulfilled only by breaking rules (which can 
take many forms), nor solely by existential threats (which can lead to noth-
ing), but by cases of existential threats that legitimise the breaking of rules 
(Buzan et al. 1998:25). If a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent, it is 
no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institu-
tionalised.13 Moreover, an issue is securitised only if and when the audience 
accepts it as such (ibid.).  
However, the authors themselves acknowledge that there is a problem of 
size and significance (ibid.). The concept of international security has a clear 
definition of what we are interested in, but does not tell us how we sort the 
important cases from the less important ones. There is in other words a ques-
tion of operationalisation. In the following I will try to operationalise 
‘securitising moves’ and ‘securitisation’, in order to employ the concepts in 
the study of asylum and immigration. 
                                                     
13  This situation is most visible in the military sector, where states have long endured threats 
of armed coercion or invasion and in response have built up standing bureaucracies, pro-
cedures and military establishments to deal with those threats (Buzan et al. 1989:27). 
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2.3.2 Operationalising ‘securitising moves’ and ‘securitisation’ 
A securitising move has already been described as a discourse that takes the 
form of presenting something as an existential threat to a referent object. 
According to the securitisation approach cited in Buzan et al. (1998), securi-
tising moves are to be discovered in speech acts, and conducted on texts that 
are central in the sense that if a security discourse is operative in the com-
munity, it should be expected to materialise in a text because its occasion is 
sufficiently important. Employing language theory, the emphasis on speech 
acts amends classical realism by introducing a performative and generic 
understanding of language. Since not every speech act is by definition suc-
cessful in establishing the elocutionary effect, the question arises: Who can 
utter security successfully or legitimately?  
Buzan et al. (1989:40) assume that it makes a difference where the agents 
uttering security are socially positioned. This is in line with Bigo’s (2000) 
claim that common players in this role are political leaders, bureaucracies, 
governments, lobbyists and pressure groups. Buzan et al. (1998:40) add that 
these players are not usually the referent objects of security, because only 
rarely can they speak security through reference to the need to defend their 
own survival. Their argument will normally be that it is necessary to defend 
the security of the state, nation, civilisation, or some larger community, prin-
ciple or system. An analysis of a plephoria of European policy makers and 
their asylum and immigration discourse is thus likely to reveal the different 
referent objects referred to by these actors.  
On the other hand, societal security concerns threats to cultural identity 
rather than state sovereignty; those who speak for or in the name of society 
are not necessarily only those who speak in the name of the state. The mobi-
lisation of security dispositions in the societal sector may well depend on 
agents other than statesmen who utter security in a diplomatic context. This 
means that in analysing EU policy actors’ rethoric on asylum and immigra-
tion, one must be open to a wider diversity of agents than those speaking in 
the name of the Union. This is, however, a question of delimitation, and 
within the confines of this analysis, the main focus remains the speech acts 
of EU policy makers. 
Regarding the operationalisation of securitisation, the shift from securitis-
ing moves to securitisation is not made very clear by the Copenhagen 
School. Rather it is assumed that securitisation ‘happens’ in various stages, 
beginning with a rhetorical phase. In this initial phase the securitising actor 
merely makes a securitising move – i.e. uses the rhetoric of existential threat 
(phase 1). One way of operationalising this shift is to claim that 
securitisation ‘happens’ when the securitising actor takes one step further 
and moves from political deliberations or discourse to actual decision 
making (see Rieker 2001:3). Whereas the political deliberations of European 
policy makers on immigration are the subject of chapter four, the actual 
policy making in the area is the subject of chapter five. When decisions are 
adopted along the same lines as expressed in the security discourse, without 
any strong popular resistance or protest, one may assume that public 
acceptance has been obtained (phase 2).  
Being an intergovernmental matter, the decisions we study are those 
taken by the Union and the European Council. Hence, following this logic, 
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securitising moves taken by EU policy makers in the field of immigration, 
become securitised when unanimously adopted by the Council.14 Notwith-
standing that such decisions do not automatically admit general public 
approval, they are generally assumed to be acceptable to the public unless 
clear evidence of public protests can be found. Moreover, decisions adopted 
by the Council will require the support of national parliaments in order to be 
legitimate. ‘Public approval’ is thus perceived as a function of the support of 
democratically elected parliaments that depend on the support of their 
electorates.  
2.4 Methodological considerations 
The choice of methodology is important in the analysis of society and poli-
tics because it contributes to systematising the way we examine reality, by 
giving us advice on how the researcher can collect, manage and analyse data 
(Hellevik 1994:14). As stated in the introduction, I am faced with a choice 
regarding various methods for collecting and analysing data. Ib Andersen 
(1990) suggests that the key question should determine the choice of metho-
dology. Svein Andersen (1997:5), on the other hand, emphasises that this 
choice partly needs to be determined by the thematic topic. Considering both 
the key question, as well as the phenomenon to be analysed, I have chosen a 
qualitative approach in the study of the EU asylum and immigration policy. I 
start by outlining its main components, and explain why it is interesting to 
study the EU’s asylum and immigration policy using this framework (2.4.1). 
Thereafter I explain the choice of case study as the analytical strategy chosen 
(2.4.2). Lastly, I examine how security can be studied through discourse ana-
lysis (2.4.3).  
2.4.1 Qualitative methodology 
Characteristic of the qualitative method is that the analysis contains few 
units and many variables. In addition, a non-statistical approach for the adap-
tation of data is employed. The advantages are several: in linking the pro-
blem to its context, a deeper understanding is reached. Secondly, an inten-
sive examination provides for substantial and detailed knowledge, identify-
ing a unit’s value on a long range of variables (Hellevik 1994). In this way, 
the qualitative method helps create a picture of the contextual aspects of 
social phenomena, and I find it particularly suitable in this case, as the inten-
tion of the analysis is to understand and explain a special process; the securi-
tisation of asylum and immigration issues, and the objectives and instru-
ments later defined in the area.  
Moreover, the intention of the qualitative analysis is to understand the 
particular and the unique (Andersen 1990). Generalisations can therefore 
become problematic, and this is often perceived to be the main limitation 
regarding the use of qualitative methodology. However, qualitative method-
                                                     
14  With the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, asylum and immigration became 
community matters, and the Treaty therefore provides for recourse to Community instru-
ments, i.e. regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. These are 
the kinds of instruments that will be further examined in chapter five.  
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ology is well suited to generate a deeper understanding of the object of 
study, as well as to understand its relation to the whole problem complex. 
While my intention is primarily to provide a deeper understanding of the 
topic, and not to produce generalised data, it is important to emphasise that 
qualitative and quantitative methods are not mutually exclusive, and that 
both seek to understand and explain the phenomenon being studied.  
2.4.2 A case study of the EU asylum and immigration policy 
When deciding upon the framing of the key questions, a choice was made 
regarding the design of the analysis. The choice signals the study of a single 
case, the development of a common EU policy on asylum and immigration. 
The notion ‘case’ stems from the Latin noun casus and emphasises the signi-
ficance of the single and unique (Andersen 1997:8).  
The analysis reflects Robert K. Yin’s definition of a single case study, 
where the EU’s policy on asylum and immigration is investigated as a ‘con-
temporary phenomenon within its real-life context, and where the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident’ (Yin 1994:13). 
Andersen (1997:126) emphasises that there are no easy or clear-cut proce-
dures to understand what is a case, how to perform a case study, or how to 
draw conclusions and present results.  
According to Yin (1994:38), however, three purposes justify the above- 
mentioned research design. First, the case study should represent a critical 
case; i.e. a critical test of a significant theory. The case study is valuable if it 
tests a central, well-established or innovative theory within its field of re-
search. The use of social constructivist theories in the analysis of the securi-
tisation of asylum and immigration policy at the European level challenges 
traditional rationalist ideas regarding security. This does not mean that other 
theoretical contributions have been disregarded as uninformative, but simply 
that the changed security situation has been described to require a broader 
theoretical foundation. It should be emphasised, however, that the purpose of 
the analysis is not to test theory, but to employ a theoretical framework in 
order to create a deeper understanding of the case.  
A second rationale for a single case study is one in which the case repre-
sents an extreme or unique case, representing a new combination of more or 
less familiar facts that have not before been studied (ibid.:39). The framing 
of the EU’s objectives on asylum and immigration following the 1997 
Amsterdam summit reflects a reorientation and expansion of co-operation 
that has not been analysed in great depth by scholars. Emphasis on a cross-
pillar approach creates new challenges and opportunities in the development 
of the EU asylum and immigration policy. While I have no intentions of 
formulating data that can be generalised and employed in new situations in 
international politics, I still hope to contribute to a deeper understanding of 
objectives and instruments in what can be termed a new phase of European 
judicial co-operation. 
A third rationale for a single case study is the revelatory case (ibid.:40). 
This situation exists when an investigator has an opportunity to observe and 
analyse a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific investigation. 
Little research has been done approaching asylum and immigration from a 
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security perspective.15 Until recently, asylum and immigration issues were at 
the margins of the European integration process, only vaguely included in 
the intergovernmental third pillar. Studies on the developments of the field 
after the 1997 Amsterdam summit have been scarce, and it is all the more 
interesting to study the objectives and instruments recently introduced. 
Central to the theoretical framework employed is the study of discourse. 
Discourse analysis is particularly important to understand how policy is 
defined, interpreted and placed on the political agenda.  
2.4.3 Studying security through discourse analysis 
As an analytical concept, discourse analysis has been frequently used during 
the last ten years, and it has been employed in texts and debates that often 
fail to specify its contents. Fairclough (1995:7) defines discourse as ‘analysis 
of how texts work within sociocultural practice’, discourse being the use of 
language seen as a form of social practice. Another broad interpretation is 
given by Vagle (1995:127), claiming that the concept should include verbal 
language in order to analyse the interplay between text and its context. The 
aim of discourse analysis, therefore, is to analyse text or the use of language, 
regarded as a social activity in its social context. Both written and verbal lan-
guage can be subjected to discourse analysis, and all types of manifestations 
are included, ranging from newspaper chronicles to novels, speeches and 
informal conversations.  
To discuss the EU’s policy on asylum and immigration I rely on 
Mathisen’s (1997:3) definition of discourse analysis as ‘analysis of the use 
of language in a societal context, focusing on how ideas and concepts that 
produce the context interpret and help shape parts of social reality’. This 
definition emphasises the relevance of discourse analysis to social sciences, 
and underlines the fact that not everything merely consists of text, and that 
not all communication takes place through the use of language. Without 
these distinctions, it would be difficult to criticise ‘mainstream’ texts or dis-
courses when they do not give a proper account of the political significance 
of language (Mathisen 1997).  
The definitions above imply an understanding of human actions as mean-
ingful. To understand political actors and their actions it is necessary to ana-
lyse communication. This is not so because the texts give us an insight into 
their motives and strategies, but because it makes the actors what they are 
and regulate their actions. As stated by Buzan et al. (1998:25), the way to 
study securitisation is to study discourse and political constellations. It is 
important to establish when an argument with a particular rhetorical struc-
ture achieves sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of 
rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed.  
Discourse analysis is presented as a suitable method because we are inter-
ested in when and how something is established by whom as a security 
threat. The process of securitisation is what Wæver (1995) calls a speech act. 
                                                     
15  Early works include Wæver et al. (1983) and Bigo (1996). More recently Huysmans 
(2002) and Buzan et al. (1998) have written on asylum and immigration from a security 
perspective. Most works on EU asylum and immigration, however, are historical or eco-
nomic (spillover) analysis, and of less relevance here. See for example Castles and Miller 
(1998) and Hailbronner (2000). 
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It is not interesting as a sign referring to something more real; it is the utter-
ance itself that is the act.16 The defining criterion of security is textual: a 
specific rhetorical structure that has to be located in discourse. The implica-
tion of this is that discourse is studied as a subject in its own right, not as an 
indicator of something else (underlying motives, hidden agendas etc.). One 
of the weaknesses of this method, therefore, and as I will come back to later, 
is that it is an insufficient strategy for finding real motives. As pointed out by 
Buzan et al. (1998:177), ‘discourse analysis can uncover one thing: dis-
course’. Transposed to this analysis, discourse can uncover how asylum and 
immigration issues are presented as security threats through securitising 
moves.  
However, and as I pointed out earlier, discourse analysis does not try to 
uncover the objective reality, or reveal the real intentions of actors. Its focus 
is rather to examine how we create our reality, so that it becomes a matter of 
course to us (Jørgensen & Phillips 1999). Presented like this, discourse ana-
lysis will not help to discover the true intents and motives of EU policy 
actors, and we are therefore faced with the potential problem that there might 
be a gap between what people say and how they act. However, the operation-
alisation referred to earlier tries to counter this problem. The shift from 
securitising moves to securitisation is interpreted as an indication of the ex-
tent to which rhetoric becomes practice, and will therefore reveal when poli-
tical actors fail to act upon their securitising moves.  
But there is also a potential problem when interpreting discourse. 
Neumann (2001:80) shows how scholars tend to emphasise the written and 
spoken word over the materiality of discourse. This implies reading too 
much into documents and texts, and too little into the reflection of discourse 
in societal institutions. In the analysis of EU asylum and immigration policy, 
emphasis is put on the degree to which representations are reflected in the 
actions of relevant actors, thereby assessing the reliability of the analysis. 
Reliability refers to accuracy of the operations performed. A high degree of 
reliability is achieved if two researchers examining the same phenomenon 
reach the same conclusion. Validity refers to the data’s relevance for the 
main problem of the analysis (Hellevik 1994:159). The validity and reliabil-
ity of discourse analysis are often questioned, because they are premised 
upon definitive answers and clear quantitative results. The underlying 
assumption is that there exists one single reality or true representation that 
the researcher is able to grasp. This does, however, not correspond with the 
underlying assumptions of this analysis. Because a discourse analysis does 
not produce ‘hard facts’, reliability and validity are first and foremost 
assured through convincing argumentation and argumentational logic 
(Borgen 2001). Reliability hence becomes a question of identifying different 
                                                     
16  Onuf (Kowert et al. 1998:66) calls a speech act ‘the act of speaking in a form that gets 
someone else to act’. According to Adler (2002:103), speech acts have an illocutionary 
dimension (doing something by saying something), and hence do not only describe real-
ity, they also construct it. Wæver first theorises the speech act from a classical-realist per-
spective, where statesmen representing the state are the privileged agents in the securitis-
ing process. Later, he amended classical realism by introducing a performative and gene-
ric understanding of language. What the theorisation then does is to discriminate between 
the individual agents and determine ‘who’ is in a ‘powerful’ position to speak security. 
See Wæver (1995) and Huysmans (2002). 
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representations of a phenomenon, and admitting to one’s influence in 
interpreting these representations (ibid.).  
To further increase the validity and reliability of the analysis, I take 
advantage of triangulation. This is done by using several kinds of data. In 
addition to secondary literature, I employ both official and unofficial data. In 
other words, the analysis relies on several mutually independent sources. 
Methodological triangulation has also been used when performing unofficial 
interviews in addition to textual analysis of the same material. Finally, theo-
retical triangulation is assured through the use of several theoretical perspec-
tives.  
Through an analysis of the EU institutions’ ‘speech acts’, I assume to get 
an idea of how the debate is structured. I will argue that speaking or writing 
about an issue in security language has an integrative capacity. It enables the 
connecting of isolated features such as, for example, migration, terrorism, 
drugs and Islamic fundamentalism into a meaningful whole. Thus, language 
operates as a mediating instrument that brings social practices into a particu-
lar communicative, institutionalised framework.  
2.5 Concluding remarks 
In sum, the traditional security perspectives do not seem adequately equip-
ped to deal with the post-Cold War security context, having emerged from 
the Cold War with a narrow military conception of national security and a 
tendency to assert its primacy over other policy fields. Its preoccupation with 
military statecraft limits its ability to address the many foreign and domestic 
problems that are not amenable to military solutions. Buzan and the Copen-
hagen School rightly point out that the concept of security is broad enough to 
integrate the fields of international relations theory, peace studies, human 
rights and so on.  
Through a division of sectors, the Copenhagen School offers a 
framework for analysis that structures the security debate, and that includes 
other referent objects than the state in security analysis. Asylum and 
immigration issues are regarded as societal security issues when they are 
staged as a threat to a community, and the very identity of that community. 
To delimit the scope of the analysis, however, I approach societal insecurity 
through an examination of identity discourse on behalf of European political 
leaders. The main purpose is to discuss the extent to which the securitising 
moves revealed in European asylum and immigration discourse become 
policy through cases of securitisation. Securitisation has been described as 
the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game, and 
has been delimited and operationalised to encompass decisions taken 
unilaterally by the Union Council and the European Council. Such decisions 
require unanimity and are centred around the consensus principle, and it is 
therefore assumed that popular approval is largely obtained.  
I have chosen a qualitative approach to the study of the EU’s asylum and 
immigration policy, to be investigated as a case study that may shed light on 
the objectives and instruments recently proposed in the area. Discourse ana-
lysis offers a useful way to examine securitisation and political constellati-
ons with its emphasis on language that brings social practices into a particu-
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lar communicative institutional framework. Through discourse analysis, I 
hope to gain insight into how the debate is structured, and how the represen-
tations discovered in discourse are reflected in the actions of EU policy mak-
ers. Different regional, national and international factors starting in the 
1970s, envisaged changed conditions for asylum seekers and immigrants in 
Europe. These factors constitute the background variable of this analysis, 
and are the subject of the next chapter. 

3. Changed conditions for asylum and 
immigration in Europe 
This chapter seeks to describe the changing conditions for asylum and immi-
gration seekers in Europe after the enormous changes in world economy in 
the 1970s, and the gradual emergence of common policies at the European 
level. My objective is to provide for a contextual analysis that can account 
for the background of the EU’s policy on asylum and immigration, and the 
instruments used to promote such a strategy. Regional, national and interna-
tional conditions have previously been identified as background variables 
having decisive influence on the later establishment of an EU asylum and 
immigration policy. These conditions have been operationalised to encom-
pass factors that are assumed to have influenced European perceptions of 
immigration and security. In particular, these conditions can be divided into 
three factors: economic and political changes in the 1970s (3.2); the inter-
national system after the end of the Cold War (3.3); and the accelerating 
integration process in the European Union (3.4). But before I discuss these 
three different categories of explanations, and to understand the historical 
context in which these changes have taken place, it is necessary to outline 
the main elements of migration in Europe before the 1970s. 
3.1 Patterns and tendencies in European migration history 
Migration is nothing new. In fact, it has been a constant feature of European 
history, driven by factors as diverse as war, famine and individual ambition. 
Many European countries have experienced waves of emigration, as was the 
case for Italy only 10–20 years ago, or for Norway 100 years ago. Character-
istically, these countries witnessed the flight of large elements of its popula-
tion to avoid hunger and starvation.  
Migration was also easier before. Until the beginning of the First World 
War, few political or legal barriers prevented people from travelling or 
moving, and it was possible to travel within Europe without a passport 
(Brochmann 1997, Hailbronner 2000). Although the notion of ‘asylum’ as 
protection from persecution can be traced back to the times of the Greeks 
and Romans (Lavenex 1999:4), its formal foundations were only laid in the 
first half of the twentieth century when it was recognised that the refugee 
problem was a matter concerning the international community. The foundati-
ons for the contemporary system of international refugee protection were 
laid at the end of the 1930s, as a reaction to the dramatic intensification of 
the European refugee problem due to the spread of Fascism and Nazism on 
the eve of the Second World War. By the end of the Second World War, the 
refugee problem had reached dramatic proportions, relations between the 
Western powers and the Soviet Union had rapidly deteriorated, and the issue 
of refugees became trapped in East–West controversies. In the West, 
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refugees became a symbol of Soviet repression and were used by 
governments as instruments of Cold War antagonism (Urwin 1989, Loescher 
1996).  
The 1950s can be termed a liberal phase of refugee policy, consisting 
mainly of the repatriation of Second World War refugees and the protection 
of refugees from Central and Eastern Europe. In fact, Western governments 
welcomed and encouraged these emigrations in order to weaken their rivals 
ideologically and to gain political legitimacy in the Cold War struggle 
(Loescher 1996:59). This liberal approach to refugees was supported by a 
dynamic economic environment which favoured not only generosity towards 
refugees, but also the intake of large numbers of labour migrants in all West-
ern European countries. Hence, in the years following the Second World 
War until the early 1970s, immigration played an important part in the deve-
lopment of Western Europe. The rapid and extensive welfare developments 
after the war were in many countries dependent upon the existence of 
foreign labour. Migrant workers thus contributed to a great extent to the 
industrialising and rebuilding of the continental countries, and did not 
become subject of public debate for the first 25 years after 1945 (Brochmann 
1997). This is an indication that until the beginning of the 1970s, immigrants 
and asylum seekers were subjected to little public debate, and were not a 
contested group in the Western European societies.  
Moreover, acute refugee crises in the third world very rarely affected 
Western Europe before the 1970s. Instead refugees moved within the areas 
they came from, thereby absorbing the problem regionally.17 Western Euro-
pean countries could thus channel funds through the UN system, or bilateral-
ly, and avoid a confrontation with the ‘problem’ inside their own borders.  
3.1.1 Institutionalising asylum at the international level 
It was in the hostile environment of the Cold War, and against the votes from 
the Eastern bloc, that the General Assembly of the UN decided to establish 
the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) in 1949. It has remained the central international organisation for 
the promotion of refugee protection, and it was under its auspices that the 
central principles, norms, rules and procedures of the international refugee 
regime became institutionalised (Lavenex 1999). In that respect, the primary 
source of refugee law is the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees of 1951, together with the New York Protocol of 1967. The 
convention, which was prepared by the UNHCR, was initially limited to 
persons who became refugees as a result of events occurring before 1 
January 1951, and was designed to regulate the organisation of the right to 
asylum.  
The provisions of the Geneva Convention presuppose the assignment and 
execution of refugee status as the prerogative of the sovereign contracting 
states, but also establishes the norm of non-refoulement. This principle stipu-
lates that ‘no contracting state shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in 
                                                     
17  Even if this picture has changed somewhat, this is still the main tendency: 90 % of the 
world’s refugees come from third world countries, and 90% of these remain in the regions 
they were born in; i.e. they move to another developing country (Brochmann 1997).  
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any manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, mem-
bership or a particular social group or political opinion’.18 Over the years it 
has gained the status of customary international law, which means that it is 
considered universally binding on all states irrespective of their assent to the 
convention.19  
It is important to note that today, the range of persons protected by the 
prohibition of refoulement is much broader than the definition of refugees 
under the Geneva Convention. The acceptance of non-convention refugees 
by the host countries of the West usually occurs on a relatively informal and 
ad hoc basis. In the absence of a set of international rules, their status is very 
disparate through Europe and does not, by and large, award the same quality 
of rights and conditions for settlement as the Geneva Convention.  
3.2 Economic and political changes in the 1970s 
The early 1970s introduced a new political phase in Western Europe’s 
relationship with immigration. The oil crisis and the ensuing economic set-
back marked the beginning of extensive restructuring processes in several 
countries. At the same time, new causes for concern for Western govern-
ments appeared, as the political crisis in Indochina and the coup d’état in 
Chile introduced new concepts such as ‘boat refugee’ and ‘jet refugee’ to the 
West (Brochmann 1997). Somewhat simplified, two main categories of 
interdependent causes for Western concern can be found in this period: 
socio-economic and political causes.  
3.2.1 Socio-economic causes 
The tendency towards the internationalisation of migration is one of the most 
pronounced features of recent times. Two processes account for this transfor-
mation. Firstly, the structures of communication have greatly expanded, 
enabling citizens of developing countries to be relatively well-informed 
about events, conditions and opportunities in the West (Miles & Thränhardt 
1995). Around the world, people have better access to information that is 
relevant to their migration chances. Secondly, the means of public 
transportation have been revolutionised (ibid.). Today’s refugees not only 
cross land borders but also travel by sea and by air. Now that 
communications have improved, the importance of the geographical 
proximity of the country left behind has declined. 
The oil crisis and the following economic set-back confronted Western 
countries with inflation and unemployment at the same time, leading to a 
policy of modernisation and rationalisation in many sectors. The oil crisis no 
doubt legitimised a stricter immigration regulation in the early 1970s 
through the so-called ‘immigration stop’ (Brochmann 1997, Dinan 1999). 
                                                     
18 See Article 33 of the Geneva Convention. 
19  Thus, the crucial norm of the international refugee regime today is not the right to asylum 
as such, but the obligation of states not to return people demanding protection to countries 
where they would risk serious human rights violations. This central principle of asylum 
law is reinforced by by general human rights law and, to a lesser extent, by humanitarian 
law. 
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Germany was the first country to employ the new measure in November 
1973, followed by France in April 1974. This mainly had two impacts on 
asylum and immigration policies. Firstly, when immigration rules were still 
generous, many persons forced to leave their country of origin because of 
persecution or other human rights violations did not necessarily apply for 
asylum if other ways of entering the country were available. Secondly, these 
restrictions revealed a basic contradiction in the refugee system itself: 
whereas before, refugees who did not fulfil the criteria laid down in the 
Geneva Convention were usually accepted under immigration law, govern-
ments now had to find new ways of either returning them to their countries 
of origin, or, with the risk of refoulement, providing another basis for their 
stay. After the abolition of economic migration schemes, asylum became the 
only legal avenue to enter Western European states apart from family reuni-
fication. 
It is most likely, however, that not only economic reasons caused the 
radical changes in national immigration policies. It is instead probable that 
the 1973 oil crisis often became used as a legitimising factor paving the way 
for change. In France, decolonisation between 1958 and 1962 led to massive 
and almost uncontrollable immigration. The average, yearly number of 
immigrants increased from 66,400 in the period 1946–1955 to 248,800 in the 
period 1956–1967 (Brochmann 1997:41). Already in the late 1960s, there 
were forces in France that argued for a stronger differentiation of the immi-
grant population, corresponding with an increase in the number of non-Euro-
pean immigrants. The new attempts at controlling immigration can thus be 
explained as a result of the increasing displeasure with immigration from the 
third world. It was precisely in the period 1972–74 that the first symptoms of 
nationalist responses to immigration began to appear in France (Brochmann 
1997, Castles & Miller 1998).  
A similar pattern can be found in Germany, where a situation with no 
immigration control in the 1960s was replaced by more restrictive measures. 
The Western European governments did not have satisfactory control over 
the increasing level of immigration, and recruitment of foreign labour grew 
increasingly sensitive in the wake of rising domestic unemployment. As can 
be seen in France and Germany, but also in other European countries, immi-
grants came to be perceived as competitors in relation to work, housing and 
welfare benefits by the national labour force. Many immigrants had acquired 
the seniority to be entitled to social security in the host countries, and could 
not function as ‘buffers’ or reserve labour according to economic conjunc-
tures. Through the introduction of an ‘immigration stop’, governments could 
at least attempt to prevent new establishments. The general message signal-
led by Western European governments was in other words that of immigra-
tion being a strain and an increasing burden on their societies.  
3.2.2 Political causes 
Parallel to the economic recession, the 1970s mark the beginning of a glo-
balisation of the refugee problem. The multiplication of causes and regions 
of origin, and the increase in overall mobility and information, led to the 
direct exposure of industrialised countries. In particular, two major interna-
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tional crises carried the ‘new’ refugees to European borders: the spread of 
repressive military regimes in South America, and the protracted conflicts in 
Indochina producing innumerable refugees, especially after 1975. In contrast 
to earlier refugee flows in the third world, these refugees did not remain 
within their region of origin, but made their way to the industrialised coun-
tries. While during the 1970s, only select refugee groups were accepted on a 
quota basis, the end of the decade marked the arrival of increasing numbers 
of spontaneous refugees, which, in the eyes of the governments, undermined 
their sovereign power to control immigration (Castles & Miller 1998, 
Lavenex 1999). 
However, a transformation of the international refugee problem had 
already begun in the early 1960s. On the one hand, ever fewer Central and 
Eastern Europeans applied for asylum in the West, partly in consequence of 
the erection of emigration barriers by the Communist governments. Second-
ly, the locus of forced migration passed to the third world, where anti-coloni-
al insurgency and general violence following the rapid decolonisation gene-
rated vast numbers of refugees (Castles & Miller 1998). These developments 
led to a de facto extension of the categories of persons benefiting from inter-
national protection. An example is the refugee problem following the out-
break of decolonisation and secession struggles in Africa and India,20 which 
produced sudden and violent outflows of millions of people. Although these 
millions of refugees remained mainly in their regions of origin and did not 
reach European states, their presence posed a challenge to the instruments of 
the international refugee regime, as it was institutionalised after the Second 
World War. The majority of these people did not fulfil the criteria of refugee 
status under the Geneva Convention. They were either victims of generalised 
violence or participants in mass movements rather than subject to individual 
persecution, and the reasons for their flight could not be related to events 
which had occurred prior to 1951.  
In a first step, and to adapt to the new situation, the mandate of the 
UNHCR was extended in 1961 to include other persons under a ‘good offi-
ces’ doctrine (United Nations 1961). Secondly, on the initiative of the 
UNHCR, the international community agreed on the above-mentioned proto-
col to the Geneva Convention signed in New York in 1967 which abolishes 
the deadline of January 1951, and relinquished the geographical limitation 
for all states wishing to do so. In fact, the scope of international protection 
was de facto extended to a vaguely defined variety of persons suffering 
‘relevant harm’ in their country of origin (Loescher 1996:81). 
3.3 The international system after the end of the Cold War 
A second factor that is assumed to have influenced European perceptions of 
asylum and immigration issues relates to the end of the Cold War. The Cold 
War split the world into two opposing camps; the Soviet-led communist 
camp, and the US-led liberal camp. During the Cold War, local conflicts 
                                                     
20  These were in particular the decolonisation struggles in Algeria (starting in 1959), Zaire 
(1960), Rwanda (1963), Portuguese Africa (circa 1961), the confrontation between North 
and South in Sudan around 1963, and the secession war in Bengali (northeast India), (see 
e.g. Castles & Miller 1998).  
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became internationalised: the USA, the Soviet Union and former colonial 
powers sent weapons and troops to intervene in wars and revolutionary 
struggles in Africa, Asia and Latin America. With the end of the Cold War, 
intra-state instead of inter-state conflicts predominate. Many of these con-
flicts have generated vast numbers of refugees, such as the civil wars in 
Somalia and Rwanda. Moreover, the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia 
presented Western Europe with an acute refugee problem, and many feared 
that the conflict would lead to increased instability in the region. The events 
of 1989–91 also led to an upsurge in movements of asylum seekers from 
Eastern Europe to the West.21  
Corresponding in time with what has been called the ‘crisis of the welfare 
state’, a wave of right-wing parties popped up across Europe in this period, 
often arguing that many asylum seekers were in fact economic migrants who 
were using claims of persecution in order to evade immigration restrictions. 
As witnessed in most European countries, a result has been popular 
resentment and extreme-right campaigns and violence against immigrants. 
This has led some scholars to call immigration to Western Europe the heir to 
communism after the end of the Cold War (Weil 1992, Garcia 1992).  
The conflicts in the Balkan states nevertheless confronted Europe with 
the most complex and extensive refugee crisis since the Second World War, 
and the Yugoslavian crisis thus injected urgency into the process of restruc-
turing the Western European refugee strategy. It is likely that the refugee 
exodus from Bosnia arose on top of an existing concern in Western Europe 
over increasing migration from various parts of the world, and served as an 
impetus for tendencies that were already present. The majority of national 
economies in Western Europe have been under pressure during recent years 
with high unemployment and structural adjustments. In light of this, financi-
ally demanding asylum procedures have been viewed with increasing anxi-
ety. Due to the fact that a large proportion of asylum applicants have been 
allowed to stay despite being refused refugee status (acceptance on humani-
tarian grounds), existing refugee policy has generally developed into a costly 
and time-consuming system, in which questions of fairness have also been 
raised. As stated by Lavenex regarding the case of Bosnia: 
 
The Bosnian crisis was a marker both in terms of border control and in relation 
to internal conditions in the recipient country. Whereas refugee policy in prin-
ciple belongs to the realm of human rights, it turned out to be a border control 
issue where the (in this case obviously legitimate) right for refugees to seek pro-
tection was discarded. For the refugees who were actually accepted, the novelty 
temporary protection was supposed to cater to the fear of permanent immigra-
tion, seen from the authorities’ point of view (Lavenex 1999:37).  
 
In the Bosnian case, the majority of Western European countries discarded 
their normal practice of considering each case individually, and introduced 
temporary protection on a collective basis. The Bosnian case thereby clearly 
revealed the contentious nature of immigration policies, and the interdepend-
ence of the European countries in the face of refugee crisis.  
                                                     
21  The number of new asylum seekers in European OECD countries increased from 116,000 
in 1981 to a peak of 695,000 in 1992 (Castles & Miller 1998:88). 
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However, the realism in these threat scenarios may be discussed. Among 
experts there is near consensus that both politicians and the media tend to 
dramatise the prospects (Brochmann & Hammar 1999). Historical parallels 
are drawn to show that the de facto flows of today are by no means alarming 
compared with earlier times in Europe. Besides, immigration ‘pressure’ is 
obviously also a function of how strictly border control is enforced. As long 
as foreign labour was in demand, immigration pressure was not an issue in 
the West. However, the point made by constructivists is precisely that if 
immigration is perceived as a threat, it becomes a threat, until the public can 
be convinced of the contrary. It is in the end the feeling of being swamped, 
as well as worries in relation to the unpredictability of the future that sub-
stantiate general anxiety over immigration. This topic is further discussed in 
chapter four. 
3.4 The European integration process 
A third explanatory factor regarding changing European perceptions of 
asylum and immigration, relates to the European immigration process. The 
end of the Cold War provided the Union and its member states with in-
creased freedom of action, and at the same time it boosted the Union’s exter-
nal relations. The fall of the Iron Curtain and German reunification were 
important factors to explain the signing of the Treaty on the European Union 
(TEU) in Maastricht in 1992 (Dinan 1999). The acceleration of the EU inte-
gration process must also acknowledge that important changes were made by 
the member states themselves within the sphere of international politics. The 
signing of the European Single Act in 1985 provided the Union with a single 
institutional framework, and decided to establish the Single Market within 
the end of 1992. In this way, economy and politics were tied together into a 
whole, thereby pushing forward the development of common policies. The 
TEU can be regarded as a continuation of the main line the Community has 
been following since the 1969 Hague summit, whereby the authority of the 
Community institutions is gradually deepened (Sæter 1993:80).  
Not even mentioned in the 1957 Rome Treaty, co-operation on asylum 
and immigration matters long evolved outside the European Community 
framework. The ‘Ad Hoc Group Immigration’, established in 1986, emerged 
from an already existing forum, the TREVI group,22 founded at the Euro-
pean Council in Fountainebleau in 1976. Located outside the Community 
framework, its task was to co-ordinate justice and home affairs in the field of 
internal security and public order, especially in matters of terrorism and 
organised crime. The TREVI group’s scope was, however, qualitatively 
expanded in the mid-1980s, as a reaction to the confirmation of the internal 
market project in the 1986 Single European Act, whereby ‘an area of free 
movement of goods, capital, services and people should be ensured by the 
end of 1992’.23 Fearing a loss of control over immigration into their terri-
tories after the abolition of internal borders, the TREVI ministers decided to 
establish a formally independent ad hoc group on immigration, with a remit 
to safeguard internal security (Bigo 1996).  
                                                     
22  TREVI: Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale. 
23  Single European Act, Article 8A. 
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It has been claimed that the intergovernmental co-operation that eventu-
ally developed amongst EU member states was inspired less by the growing 
pressure of the world refugee problem, than by the reaction of national 
governments to the forthcoming abolition of internal border controls in the 
context of the Single Market project (Dinan 1999, Monar 2000). This was 
because the abolition of border controls would lead to a loss of control over 
the entry of persons to the territory. Especially with regard to asylum seek-
ers, it was feared that freedom of movement would be accompanied by an 
increased abuse of domestic asylum procedures through the simultaneous or 
repetitive allocation of multiple asylum claims in several member states, or 
‘asylum shopping’ (Lavenex 1999).  
Thus, co-operation on asylum and immigration matters largely emerged 
as a counter-reaction to the prospect of the abolition of internal borders, and 
was presented as a necessary compensatory measure to safeguard internal 
stability and security. As we shall see in the following, the Schengen process 
and the Maastricht Treaty marked the beginning of a common approach to 
asylum and immigration (3.4.1), whereas co-operation only gained true 
momentum after the 1997 Amsterdam summit (3.4.2). 
3.4.1 The beginnings of co-operation on asylum and immigration 
As a consequence of the lost control at national borders following the 
Schengen agreement, entry control was supposed to be reinforced at the 
external Schengen borders, and so-called ‘compensatory measures’ should 
be developed.24  
The Schengen agreement is often claimed to have had an inconsistent 
impact on immigration control in Europe (Marinho 2001). On the one hand it 
introduced the right to free movement for third country nationals having ent-
ered the Schengen area legally. It also substantiated the responsibility of the 
‘first country’ to handle asylum applications (unless they are ‘clearly 
unfounded’ and therefore refused directly at the border). On the other hand, 
entry into the Schengen area was (at least intentionally) made even more 
restrictive and, not least, the internal control within different nation states 
has been stepped up through the Schengen Information System (SIS), and 
through physical units on the ground. As I will argue in chapter four, there is 
little doubt that through the Schengen system, immigration has been handled 
as a security issue (den Boer 1998, Brochmann & Hammar 1999). The cate-
gorisation of asylum and immigration as purely ‘compensating measures’ for 
the loss of control over internal borders, strongly underlines this argument. 
Asylum and immigration issues were institutionalised following the 1993 
Maastrcht Treaty, when listed as two out of nine ‘areas of common interest’ 
in the new and intergovernmental third pillar.25 Although now formally inte-
                                                     
24  ‘Compensatory measures’ is here another term for increased mobilisation of security and 
internal control systems. Apart from regulations on the fight against drugs, terrorism, 
international crime and police co-operation, compensation included measures relating to 
the entry and the expulsion of non-EU citizens and asylum seekers. 
25  The third pillar comprised the questions of asylum, the crossing of external borders, 
immigration, drugs and fraud, together with judicial, customs and police co-operation. 
The reluctance of member states to engage in binding obligations in the field is proved 
through the adoption of informal, non-binding instruments such as ‘resolutions’ and ‘con-
clusions’. 
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grated into the structure of the European Union, co-operation in these mat-
ters was left to the intergovernmental level. The third pillar of the Maastricht 
Treaty only provided limited institutional innovations and formalised the 
existing structure of the Ad Hoc Group Immigration26 (den Boer 1998). But 
the fact that agreement was first reached over the issue of asylum illustrates 
the priority given to this field of co-operation by the member states.  
The cornerstones of co-operation in the area remain the Dublin Conven-
tion of 15 June 1990,27 and the draft Convention on the Crossing of External 
Borders. The impact of these agreements on European asylum policies has 
been considerable. Although initially framed as a limited side aspect of the 
implementation of the Single Market, the two agreements redefine the rules 
of international co-operation in asylum matters amongst EU member states, 
and restrict the conditions of entry for third-country nationals. The central 
rule regarding asylum is the implementation of a system of redistribution for 
handling asylum claims based on the ‘safe third country’ rule. This rule 
establishes the single responsibility of one signatory state for the examina-
tion of an asylum claim. Coupled with the conclusion of readmission agree-
ments, the application of the ‘safe third country’ rule to Central and Eastern 
Europe has led to the unilateral incorporation of these newly liberalised 
countries into the emergent EU refugee regime. Based on the so-called Lon-
don resolutions, the result is reduced pressure on national asylum determina-
tion systems by two strategies: the rapid singling out of applications which 
are regarded as bogus, and the externalisation of those asylum seekers who 
do not reach the Union’s territory directly, but who have passed through a 
country in which they could have found protection.  
The agreements do not aim at substantive harmonisation as both the pro-
cedures for the examination of an asylum claim and the criteria for the deter-
mination of refugee status remain within the competence of the member 
states. Notwithstanding this, the purpose of these measures has been evident: 
to prevent the uncontrolled movement of immigrants and asylum seekers in 
the European Union and limit their access to member states’ territories and 
asylum procedures. But as we shall see, dissatisfaction with the functioning 
of the third pillar resulted in the transfer of asylum and immigration to the 
supranational first pillar at the 1997 Amsterdam summit.28  
                                                     
26  The Commission was given a new right of initiative, to be shared with the member states, 
and the European Parliament was allowed a limited involvement foreseen through its 
regular information and consultation on principal aspects of the activities in these areas. 
27  The full name is the Dublin Convention on the State Responsible for the Examination of 
an Asylum Claim. The Dublin Convention has taken over the respective provisions of the 
Schengen Implementing Convention. 
28  As a general rule, organisational changes should only occur after a ‘transitional period’ of 
five years following the entry into force of the revised Treaty. Then, the Commission 
should be granted the sole right of initiative and the Council will take a decision regarding 
the greater involvement of the European Parliament. The central decision-making body 
remains the Council which, contrary to previous expectations, continues to work under 
the unanimity rule. A more significant amendment was taken with regard to the role of the 
European Court of Justice, which is granted the competence to give preliminary rulings 
over Council acts in asylum and immigration matters. However, this competence could in 
practice be limited by the accompanying clause that it should not apply to measures ‘relat-
ing to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security’. 
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3.4.2 Towards a common EU asylum and immigration policy 
The Amsterdam European Council transformed the development of EU poli-
cies in justice and home affairs into a fundamental treaty objective, whereby 
the new Article 2 TEU provided for the maintenance and the development of 
the EU as an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’. This new integration 
objective was at the same time strengthened through the communitarisation 
of large parts of the former third pillar, the incorporation of the Schengen 
acquis, new and more appropriate legal instruments and improved judicial 
control. This was followed by the decision of the Commission to set up a 
new Directorate-General for justice and home affairs, and a special European 
Council in Tampere in October 1999 which provided for a significant set of 
new guidelines for the areas of asylum and immigration. It is not an exag-
geration to say that the objective to develop a common asylum and immigra-
tion policy only gained true momentum after the Amsterdam Treaty revision, 
and the decision to establish an ‘area of freedom, security and justice’29 
(Guild & Harlow 2001, Marinho 2001).  
Up until the Amsterdam Treaty, all asylum and immigration initiatives 
had been justified as compensatory measures to be put in place before the 
abolition of internal border controls. However, in the years following the 
Maastricht Treaty, a number of initiatives had been adopted,30 whose logical 
connection to the necessities of the Single Market appeared to be rather re-
mote. For example, the progressive harmonisation of national asylum polici-
es was slowly becoming a goal in itself. As described by Boccardi (2002: 
153): 
 
Overall, momentous progress was made in the field of asylum and immigration 
at Amsterdam. Confirming the slow transition which had taken place in the years 
following the Maastricht Treaty, new areas of co-operation were introduced that 
did not specifically relate to the objectives of the internal market. Harmonisation 
of national asylum policies – or at least aspects of them – had finally become an 
objective in itself. The new Title IV TEC did not lay down any substantive har-
monisation principles, but it “equipped” the Community with the necessary 
instruments to fulfil its new asylum objective. 
 
The new and more effective instruments in JHA matters resulting from the 
Amsterdam IGC can be seen as an indication of an EU pledge to develop a 
common asylum and immigration policy, an approach that was long endor-
sed by the Commission and the Parliament. Partnerships with third countries 
of origin and transit were to be incorporated into the EU’s external relations, 
and to be the guiding principle of the common asylum and immigration pol-
icy. As previously mentioned, it was thought that by establishing a political 
dialogue and trade and aid links with countries producing migration flows, 
or affected by transit migration, the causes of population displacement could 
                                                     
29  The Amsterdam Treaty contained a five-year transition period: five years after its ratifica-
tion, the Council acts by unanimity, the Commission only has a shared right of initiative, 
and the Parliament is consulted only on proposed legislation. After the transition period, 
the Commission will acquire an exclusive right of initiative and the Council will decide 
whether to use the co-decision procedure to enact legislation on the free movement of 
people, but the Council must make that decision unanimously. 
30  Among those initiatives were for instance those concerning the uniform interpretation of 
Art.1, GC, minimum standards for asylum procedures and burden-sharing.  
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be addressed more effectively. This approach indicates a qualitative shift in 
terms of a commitment towards a holistic asylum and immigration policy, 
replacing ‘compensatory measures’ with a more co-ordinated immigration 
strategy. In the next chapter, the argumentative logic behind such a strategy 
is further examined. 
3.5 Concluding remarks 
The oil crisis and the following economic set-back in the early 1970s marked 
the beginning of extensive restructuring processes in many European coun-
tries, leading to the so-called ‘immigration stop’ after a period where liberal 
immigration policies had prevailed. The end of the Cold War, and the fol-
lowing upsurge in asylum seekers from Eastern Europe to the West, fol-
lowed by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and the ‘crisis 
of the welfare state’, injected urgency into the process of restructuring the 
Western European asylum and immigration strategy. The concept of ‘tempo-
rary protection’ following the Bosnia crisis signals a change of policy regar-
ding European standards of refugee protection.  
Gradually developed as a European policy area as a response to the 
Single Market project, progress on asylum and immigration in the EU was 
long hindered by the cumbersome decision-making structure and the structu-
ral inadequacies of the Maastricht third pillar provisions. This chapter has 
indicated that the development towards a common asylum and immigration 
policy was boosted by the Amsterdam European Council in 1997, creating 
an area of freedom, security and justice. This development reflects a re-
sponse to challenges and factors of instability that can be found, amongst 
others, in migration pressures, and in the poor economic conditions and the 
socially and politically instable regimes of the countries of origin. New 
objectives and instruments have been developed to deal with a growing 
immigration pressure, and this change towards a holistic approach to migra-
tion must be understood in light of the changed conditions for asylum seek-
ers and immigrants that were the object of this chapter.  
In sum, the factors described in this chapter provide the background vari-
able for a changed European immigration discourse. Such a discourse, fre-
quently presenting asylum and immigration issues as security challenges, is 
the object of the next chapter.  

4. European perceptions of 
immigration as a security threat 
As described in chapter three, and despite the obstacle constituted by con-
cerns about the loss of national sovereignty in the area of immigration and 
internal security, the member states of the European Union have begun to 
undertake concerted action in this field. This chapter goes beyond the 
national arena, and deals primarily with European perceptions of challenges 
emanating from asylum and immigration. Having discussed the nature of 
security, as well as when and how an issue becomes a security matter, I will 
study EU discourse to examine to what extent the phenomenon of asylum 
and immigration is defined as a security threat.  
This question is answered by structuring the chapter in three parts; by dis-
cussing European discourse on asylum and immigration matters employing a 
typology developed by den Boer (1995:98). Den Boer points to three corner-
stones for the construction of immigration as a threat to the internal security 
of EU member states: i) the link between immigration and crime; ii) the link 
between immigration and economic instability; and iii) the link between 
immigration and instability caused by xenophobia and racism.  
The typology is interesting because most of the contentious links referred 
to above relate to national immigration policies, yet they are often mentioned 
in the context of international, communitarian immigration measures. More-
over, most of the areas mentioned above are linked with the democratic 
necessity of controlling or preventing social outrage, racist abuse, unlawful 
exploitation and possibly even anarchy. An internal security problem may 
not be directly caused by the presence of immigrants in society, but in the 
way in which interior and judicial authorities are seen to be in control of 
potential trouble. An internal security problem is, therefore, at least as far as 
immigration is concerned, a problem of image and belief in the democratic 
competence of the authorities to guarantee a balance of treatment between 
various groups in society. Various EU documents are compared according to 
the theoretical and methodological framework previously identified.  
4.1 The link between immigration and crime  
The end of the Cold War presented the EU with new challenges, such as 
German reunification, and the daunting prospect of a future enlargement to 
the East. The fundamental changes that had occurred in the world’s security 
order, led Robert Aliboni, a prominent security expert, to state that: 
 
What is at stake is not national security in a conventional sense, but the security 
of European democratic polities and the welfare and civic order of the latter as 
they have developed after the end of the Second World War. The most important 
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spill-over effects concerning the EU are related to immigration, terrorism and 
internationally organised criminality (Aliboni 1998:2). 
 
Aliboni’s underlying premise is that our understanding of security is chang-
ing. Following the logic of the widened security concept, Aliboni enlarges 
the security concept to include the welfare of individuals, as well as the sur-
vival of the state. But Aliboni takes a step further, and continues to sketch 
the new security challenges of the post-war era, including immigration as 
one of them. In the following I shall argue that listing immigration together 
with terrorism and organised crime is symptomatic of the emerging under-
standing of the phenomenon of immigration. Following Aliboni’s reasoning, 
we shall see that the perception of migratory flows as bringing internal 
security into jeopardy often slips into the vocabulary of national security 
considerations.  
The link between immigration and crime is the general headline when 
looking in particular at three areas of co-operation that all have a tendency to 
emphasise immigration as a security threat. These are: securing the Single 
Market (4.1.1), the fight against organised crime (4.1.2) and the discussions 
about future enlargement (4.1.3). 
4.1.1 Creating security in the Single Market 
As previously stated, asylum and immigration issues were only properly 
addressed following the establishment of the Single Market, when these 
areas were ranged as two out of nine ‘compensatory measures’ in the 
accomplishment of a ‘border-free Europe’. The signing of the Schengen 
Implementation Convention and the Dublin Convention in 1990 already 
signalled an intensification of national policy harmonisation in the areas of 
border controls, visa and asylum. Various statements imply that fear of 
immigration pressures, and the impact of immigration flows on criminal 
activity in the Union, was an important motivational factor in these 
developments. During the discussions about the implementation of the 
Single Market at the EU summit in Edinburgh in 1992, immigration was 
clearly denominated as a destabilising factor: 
 
It noted the pressures on Member States resulting from migratory movements, 
this being an issue of major concern for Member States, and one which is likely 
to continue into the next decade. It recognised the danger that uncontrolled 
immigration could be a destabilising factor and that it should not make more 
difficult the integration of third country nationals who have legally taken up 
residence in the Member States (Bulletin of the European Communities – BEC 
12-1999:22).  
 
Employing words such as ‘major concern’ and ‘uncontrolled’ contributes to 
reinforce the importance of the issue, and easily creates associations to the 
concept of survival. ‘Society’ is projected as the main referent object, 
because the threat of ‘uncontrolled immigration’ is directed against the inte-
gration of third country nationals already residing in the Union. Not likely to 
decrease in pressure, the quotation indicates that the EU perceives immigra-
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tion to be a grave destabilising factor, and that tension between groups could 
proliferate through increased immigration. This implies an understanding of 
an objective threshold regarding how much immigration pressure Western 
European societies can handle. The actual scope of such a threshold, how-
ever, is not specified.  
The well-functioning of the Single Market was also a hot topic at the 
Dublin summit in December 1996. The Irish presidency went to great 
lengths to explain the need to create the new objective of an ‘area of free-
dom, security and justice’ as a guarantor of the functioning of the Single 
Market, and to protect the population from ‘threats to their personal security’ 
(European Council 1996:13). In this context, asylum and immigration initia-
tives were once again presented as mere ‘flanking’ measures for the estab-
lishment of the internal market. The international human rights dimension 
was almost completely ignored when it was stated that: 
 
Issues such as immigration, asylum, visas and external borders…must be hand-
led collectively if free movement in the Union is to be achieved without jeopard-
ising the security of citizens (ibid.:13). 
 
Unfortunately, in what way asylum seekers and immigrants might have con-
stituted a threat to the safety of EU citizens was left unexplained. However, 
the communication continues to sketch the importance of communitarising 
asylum and immigration at the next IGC, and implicitly acknowledges the 
link to international crime when stating that:  
 
The Dublin European Council calls on the Intergovernmental Conference to 
incorporate in the treaty provisions which will make it possible to combat inter-
national crime successfully, particularly by communitarising policies on asylum, 
immigration, visas, anti-terrorism measures, organised crime, drugs, fraud, cor-
ruption and trafficking in women and children (European Council 1996, para-
graph 11).  
 
Presented in this fashion, the communitarisation of asylum and immigration 
serves the main purpose of successfully combating international crime. It is 
assumed that co-operation on asylum and immigration will enable a stronger 
fight against bogus asylum applications. This is seen to be necessary because 
the loss of control following the abolition of internal borders could lead to a 
further increase in such applications, and a resulting destabilisation in the 
countries taking refugees. Not only is a link created between immigration 
and crime, but co-operation on asylum and immigration is presented as a 
mere instrument in the fight against international crime.  
One can argue, however, that this passage highlighted the theoretical 
model on which the development towards a common asylum and immigra-
tion policy has been conceived. Addressed in the context of the Single 
Market project, the immigration and asylum question is being framed as a 
challenge to the free movement of persons in Europe. Boccardi (2002:127) 
describes the process as an ‘intergovernmental-inspired vision of a liberal 
“freedom-from” polity, where the Union citizenship was seen as “a minimal 
framework of civil rights” in the context of the Union’s market-building 
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vocation’. In such a vision, European citizens are identified as the referent 
objects, by separating them from the ‘foreigners’ who need to ‘be excluded 
in order to make the citizens feel secure’ (ibid.). Such an understanding of 
the integration process as mainly economically driven is quite widespread 
amongst scholars (Hoffmann 1982, Moravcsik 1998). The assumption is that 
economic issues take precedence over the softer policy areas of asylum and 
immigration. Instead, migration issues are shaped by domestic pressures and 
interactions which in turn are often conditioned by the constraints and oppor-
tunities that derive from economic interdependence.  
According to Buzan et al. (1998:119), societal insecurity exists when a 
group defines a development as threatening for its own survival. Describing 
immigration as a ‘threat to personal security’, the European Council can be 
described as a securitising actor at the European level, who defines citizen-
ship as limited to member states’ citizens. However, the approach of the 
European Council contrasts clearly with that of the Parliament and the Com-
mission. In the Commission proposal to create a ‘Social Europe’, immigra-
tion is referred to as a resource and a strength to the European societies 
(European Commission 1996). According to the Commission’s model, citi-
zenship should be characterised by extensive political, social and economic 
rights for all without exclusion. “Social Europe” can therefore be called a 
supranational vision of an inclusive model.31 In the Commission’s view, the 
area of freedom, security and justice is merely one of the many aspects of 
Union citizenship, whereas for the European Council it actually constituted 
the starting point for all subsequent rights. 
The tendency to link asylum and immigration to crime and to the security 
of the Single Market is also apparent in the Schengen Convention. However, 
contrary to the other aspects covered in the Convention, asylum and immi-
gration matters were not specifically mentioned in the agreement of 1985. 
The subsequent insertion of asylum provisions was justified by a passage in 
Article 17 of the Schengen agreement, simply stating that: 
 
With regard to the free movement of persons, the Parties shall endeavour to abol-
ish checks at common borders and transfer them to their external borders. To that 
end, they shall endeavour first to harmonise, where necessary, the laws, regulati-
ons and administrative provisions concerning the prohibitions and restrictions on 
which the checks are based and to take complementary measures to safeguard 
internal security and prevent illegal immigration by nationals of States that are 
not members of the European Communities (Schengen Implementing Conven-
tion, Article 17).  
 
The wording of the article indicates that immigration controls were seen as a 
vital function of public security, and primarily as a compensatory measure in 
the creation of the Single Market. Arguably then, the starting point and cen-
tral concern of the Schengen Convention is not refugees, but the question of 
freedom of movement and creating security within the territorial borders of 
the EU. As Malcolm Anderson (1996:11) explains, borders have highly 
                                                     
31  The Commission proposal COM (96)90 of 28/2/96 was seen as a ‘blueprint for a new 
approach to Union citizenship based on a “European social model” of an inclusive 
nature’, and was supported by the Parliament (Miles and Thränhardt 1995). 
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symbolic power: as institutions they define a legal understanding of the 
sovereign state; and as processes, they are markers of identity, invested with 
mythic significance in building nations and political identities.  
There is, however, a dangerous side-effect to this process. By framing 
asylum matters in the context of a border-free Europe and the inevitable 
necessity of controlling the internal movements of aliens, asylum policy 
becomes increasingly identified as a mere part of immigration controls, and 
as a tool to combat international crime. On this background, it can be argued 
that member states appear to be losing sight of the fundamental aspect of 
protection, and increasingly subject refugees to the same restrictive trends 
they imposed on prospective migrants. As was argued by the Parliament:  
 
A Convention on the responsibility for asylum applications should in theory have 
been about protection from persecution and access to protection (European 
Parliament 1999:3).  
 
However, by linking the two conventions, the principle of states’ responsi-
bility for asylum applications became primarily a function of public security 
and the protection aspect was inevitably played down. Moreover, by empha-
sising the priority of control and internal security over the humanitarian 
value of asylum and refugee protection, internal security is presented as a 
process that can only be achieved through stricter border measures whose 
prime aim is to fight international crime. As will be shown in the next pas-
sage, this process has been accelerated by the emphasis on the fight against 
organised crime. 
4.1.2 The fight against organised crime 
Problems connected to law and order often constitute the core of immigra-
tion debates, and have therefore formed the politics of European govern-
ments. Globalisation, increased population mobility and the opening up of 
external borders are all reasons why organised crime has increased through-
out Western Europe since the 1980s. European governments’ problems in 
controlling the actions of non-state actors, have led Susan Strange (1996: 
121) to characterise international organised crime ‘as a major threat, perhaps 
the major threat to the world system in the 1990s and beyond’.  
Throughout the 1990s, questions of organised crime were repeatedly con-
nected to immigration (Lavenex 1999, Monar 2000). Bigo & Leveau 
(1992:9) note that the perception of migratory flows as bringing international 
security into jeopardy, often slips into the vocabulary of internal security 
considerations. Use is made of simple rhetoric, which usually starts with ‘of 
course we should not confuse the concepts of terrorism, drugs, organised 
crime with that of immigration, but…’ (ibid.).  
According to Huysmans (1995:53), the functional expansion of certain 
intergovernmental frameworks at the European level (such as TREVI, whose 
remit originally only covered terrorism) with the concern over migration, is 
symptomatic of the construction of an internal security continuum. Such a 
security continuum was further developed by the Schengen Convention and 
the Dublin Convention, putting migration into the same basket as the 
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struggle against drugs and terrorism, police co-operation, mutual assistance 
in criminal matters etc. The European Parliament Committee on Racism and 
Xenophobia has, ever since TREVI, accused EU member states of an ‘unac-
ceptable amalgam’ across the various committees, dealing with criminals on 
the one hand and with migrants on the other (European Parliament 1991: 
128). Just after having become an EU member state, this amalgam between 
immigration and organised crime is exemplified by a statement by the Swed-
ish government, in a report called ‘Sweden in Europe and the World’: 
 
Unemployment, organised crime and new risks of serious internal social tensions 
i.e. as a consequence of the last decades’ large migration flows to Europe consti-
tute problems also in the established democracies of Western Europe that under 
unfavourable conditions may undermine the foundations of democracy (Swedish 
Ministry of Defence 1995:17). 
 
The change from a relatively ethnic homogenous society to a somewhat 
more heterogeneous ethnic composition is referred to by the Swedish 
government as a phenomenon that in its extension may threaten democratic 
institutions. Migration flows are uncritically perceived to be an important 
cause of social tensions, unemployment and organised crime, but the report 
lacks any statistical evidence to support these allegations.  
Parallel government statements can be found in most EU member states. 
The Italian Minister of Defence, Mr Carlo Scognamiglio, pointed to Islamic 
fundamentalism as the threat that replaces the threat of communism and pro-
posed the use of the army in immigration control (Bigo 2000: 187). In Ger-
many, Helmut Kohl considered the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) to be 
an exclusively terrorist party and a threat to national security, while in 
France, the 1995 bomb attacks relaunched the surveillance of all immigrant 
associations and the strengthening of legislation concerning not only terror-
ism but immigration and political asylum (ibid.). 
It is possible to argue that national government rhetoric has a tendency to 
be harsher than EU rhetoric first and foremost because government officials 
respond directly to their electorates. EU co-operation on asylum and immi-
gration is based on unanimity, and statements have a tendency to be diplo-
matic and politically correct to accommodate the views of all of the member 
states.  
An exception to this general tendency, however, can be found in the 
‘Strategy Paper on Asylum Policy’ that was written by the Austrian presi-
dency in the summer of 1998. The paper was secretly distributed to member 
states during the first meeting of the expert committee on asylum and immi-
gration, but was quickly leaked by an Austrian newspaper, causing extreme 
alarm among human rights experts across Europe. The connection to orga-
nised crime was made explicit, as cited in Boccardi: 
 
Of the original proposal, only short extracts and summaries provided by the press 
were available for analysis. The language was characterised as blunt, the con-
tents as reiterating once again a paranoid vision of a “Fortress Europe” under 
assault…and migrants as sources of crime and instability. The main Austrian 
idea appeared to be the need for a unilateral rewriting of the Geneva Conventi-
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ons. The revised version certainly displayed a more “politically correct” tone, but 
it remained, nonetheless, a very powerful proposal, very different in tone and 
content from previous EU asylum and immigration initiatives (cited in: Boccardi 
2002:157). 
 
The intense criticism that surrounded the paper (it was never intended for 
public consumption), caused several member states to officially distance 
themselves from the Austrian perspective, and the Presidency was eventually 
obliged to withdraw it and reformulate its position. Explicit linkages 
between immigration and organised crime were made, and the choice of title 
indicated an intention to treat refugee issues within the broader framework of 
migratory problems. Only once, towards the end of this very lengthy propo-
sal, did the authors acknowledge that there ‘should be a clear analytical dis-
tinction between the accepted legal concepts of asylum and immigration’ 
(ibid.). Throughout the proposal, the two terms were used interchangeably. 
The importance of this Strategy Paper should not be undervalued as it repre-
sented the first global vision of a future EU asylum and immigration policy 
to be officially expressed after the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty. 
Although it was never adopted at the subsequent Vienna Council as a com-
mon policy statement, it undoubtedly influenced the parallel drawing of the 
new Action Programme demanded by the Cardiff Council in June 1998 
(Boccardi 2002:160). 
The link between immigration and organised crime can thus be found in 
both member state and EU discourse, where the referent objects often refer 
to ‘society’ or ‘democracy’. According to the language of Buzan et al. 
(1998), the existential threat can be characterised as the very identity and 
homogeneity of the European societies. However, immigration is not only 
linked to, but becomes a part of organised crime, when referring to the 
phenomenon of illegal immigration. In the last decade, illegal immigration 
has been the most discussed and disputed topic in immigration debates. As 
stated by the Parliament:  
 
  The traffic and employment of illegal immigrants is often linked to other forms 
of international organised crime. In order to combat all forms of illegal immigra-
tion, the Assembly recommended, in particular, the elaboration of a convention 
which would impose sanctions upon those smuggling illegal migrants into the 
country and those employing them. (…) Illegal entry goes hand in hand with cri-
minal activity, (…) the networks cover the sale of drugs and weapons, gambling 
houses, prostitution, the “adoption” of children, the sale of human organs, and 
the sale of false and stolen documents as well as the counterfeiting of money 
(Europe 1993:15).  
 
Human rights groups, such as the European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 
have reacted against the categorisation of different kinds of immigrants 
under the heading ‘illegal immigration’ (ECRE 2002). Some groups face the 
risk of refoulement if they return to their country of origin, but by treating 
these groups in the same manner as for instance economic migrants, this sig-
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nificant difference is overlooked.32 Moreover, it can be argued that by con-
necting illegal immigration with categories such as organised crime, the 
group is subjected to criminalisation. Since the focus of this section lies on 
presentations of migration as a security threat, it is important to highlight the 
fact that so-called illegal immigration does not have to be securitised, neither 
rhetorically nor in praxis. Bosniak (1991:744) shows that until the early 
1970s, undocumented immigrants constituted up to 80% of all immigration 
to France, and was simply described as ‘spontaneous migration’ and tole-
rated as such. This was also the case in other Western European countries.  
But with stricter border controls, illegal immigration has become connec-
ted to other forms and practices of organised crime. Limitations on the intake 
of immigrants in Europe since the 1970s, have created a lucrative market for 
human trafficking. According to statistics from the International Organisa-
tion for Migration, about 30% of all illegal immigrants, and 40% of all 
asylum seekers who arrived in Western Europe in 1993, used trafficking ser-
vices (Borgen 2001:60). Human trafficking is regarded as a threat because it 
undermines government laws and procedures regarding residence, immigra-
tion and asylum.  
In this respect, an attempt to counter illegal immigration and human traf-
ficking has been made through so-called ‘carrier sanctions’. Measures relat-
ing to carrier sanctions were contained in Chapter VI under the heading of 
‘Measures relating to organised travel’ in the Schengen Implementing Con-
vention.33 As stated in a communication from the Commission to the Coun-
cil: 
 
The prevention and the fight against illegal immigration are essential parts of the 
common and comprehensive asylum and immigration policy of the European 
Union…The creation of an area of freedom, security and justice requires all 
Member States to effectively apply common rules effectively. The common 
security system is only as strong as its weakest point. Consequently, it is crucial 
to enforce existing rules properly as a main priority (European Commission 
2002a:24).  
 
According to the above statement, the EU is described as a ‘security system’, 
and measures such as carriers’ liability are designed as mechanisms to 
improve the functioning of this system. However, the UNHCR has repeat-
edly stressed that the way EU states have designed and enforced their carrier 
sanctions violates their obligations under the 1951 Geneva Convention, and 
places an unbearable burden on untrained airline personnel.34 The referent 
                                                     
32  ECRE argues that particularly three types of persons should not be included in the term 
‘illegal immigrants'. These are 1) those who are failed asylum seekers; 2) those whose 
protection status has ceased; and 3) those whose temporary protection has ended after 
they have had effective access to the asylum system. Facing the risk of refoulement, 
ECRE suggests these three groups be defined as ‘people who no longer have a legal basis 
for remaining in the EU’ (ECRE 2002).  
33  They provide for the compulsory introduction to the member states’ legislation of two 
types of measures. Firstly, it establishes the responsibility of the carrier to return every 
illegal alien to the country of origin, the country of departure, or a third country which 
would guarantee entry. Secondly, it provides for the introduction of penalties against car-
riers that transported aliens without proper travel documents from a third state into the 
Schengen territory. 
34  See, for example, Conclusions of the International Protection of Refugees, adopted by the 
Executive Committee of the UNHCR, published by the UNHCR, 1991, pp.52-53. 
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object being the ‘security systems of Member States’, one is led to believe 
that immigration affects both state and society. The feeling of vulnerability 
on the part of the EU forces through the perception that extraordinary mea-
sures are necessary in order to guarantee internal security. Employing the 
terminology of Wæver (1995:55), the introduction of carrier sanctions brings 
the issue out of ‘normal politics’, because state responsibility for countering 
illegal immigration is partly placed upon private parties. 
Moving next to the discussion on asylum and immigration within the 
context of eastward enlargement, the securitising moves are made even 
clearer. 
4.1.3 Eastward enlargement 
As all the eastern neighbours of the EU have applied for membership in the 
Union, and negotiations for accession commenced in 1998 with five of these 
applicant states,35 the main stretch of the erstwhile Iron Curtain is destined to 
become an internal EU boundary in the following few years. However, the 
enlargement facing the EU today poses a unique challenge, since it is with-
out precedent in terms of scope and diversity: the number of candidates, the 
area (increase of 34%) and population (increase of 105 million), as well as 
the wealth of different histories and cultures (European Commission 2002b). 
The Central and Eastern European countries constitute not only the immedi-
ate backyard of the EU’s emerging internal security zone, but also an area of 
primary concern to the EU security regime. Serious structural weaknesses in 
the policing and border control systems, a high incidence of corruption in 
some countries, exposure to organised crime and migratory flows, have all 
added to the perception on behalf of the EU member states, that enlargement 
will be a big and potentially even dangerous challenge in the area of internal 
security. On this background, the Luxembourg European Council in 1997 
stated that: 
 
Extending the European integration model to encompass the whole of the conti-
nent is a pledge of future stability and prosperity… The applicant countries must 
share a commitment to peace, security, and good neighbourliness, respect for 
other countries’ sovereignty, the principles upon which the European Union is 
founded, and the integrity and inviolability of external borders (European Coun-
cil 1997:13).  
 
The emphasis of the European Council is on the need to maintain the secur-
ity standards of the EU when a future enlargement takes place. Stringent 
external border measures are presented as a condition for the stability and 
prosperity of the Union – central values upon which the integration process 
is founded. The referent object can be interpreted as the integration process 
per se, because the failure to adopt to the European integration model will 
have the effect of hampering a successful accession.  
Part of the accession process is the demand by the EU that the applicant 
countries police their eastern borders efficiently. In this respect, European 
                                                     
35  These were Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia and Estonia. 
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Commissioner of the Single Market, Mario Monti, told the Polish govern-
ment that:  
Poland’s chances of joining the EU depends to a great extent on how well it poli-
ces its borders. The strengthening of Poland’s eastern border is seen as the first 
attempt to erect a serious obstacle to illegal immigration flows and illegal trade 
from east to west (cited in den Boer 2000:95).  
 
The Commissioner signals the priority of border controls over other topics in 
the accession negotiations. Schengen standards, in other words, are being 
exported eastwards in order to prevent organised crime, and to secure the 
future eastern frontier of the EU. Immigration can be interpreted as a politi-
cal threat because it can lead to the undermining of democracy. The direct 
language is reminiscent of what Buzan et al. (1998) call the ‘grammar of 
security’ – because what is at stake is the very survival of the political 
system. According to Buzan et al. (ibid.), societal insecurity exists when a 
group defines a development as threatening to its own survival. The percep-
tion of immigrants as representing flows rather than individual human 
beings, reinforces the threat image of immigration. Metaphors like ‘flood’, 
‘invasion’, and ‘hungry hordes’ play on people’s fear and insecurity in the 
receiving countries. 
The fact that immigration issues are of importance, not only to the EU’s 
internal security, but also to its foreign policy, became obvious already in 
1994, when a Commission report on enlargement stated that: 
 
If migratory pressures are not carefully managed through planned co-operation 
with the countries concerned, they could all to easily give rise to friction, damag-
ing both to international relations and the immigrant populations themselves 
(European Commission 1994:11).  
 
The argumentation technique is typical of that of creating a security dis-
course, whereby the societies of the EU member states are referred to as the 
referent objects. Economic and political problems in the applicant countries 
are increasingly perceived to be European problems that impinge upon EU 
states. The argument is that if the Eastern European countries do not take 
actions to improve their economic and political situation, increased immigra-
tion will lead to confrontations between population groups, as well as pro-
blems maintaining law and order. Turning migration into a question of exter-
nal and internal security, the Union could thus use this argument as a negoti-
ating tool, when the strategies towards eastward enlargement were laid.  
On behalf of the Committee on Civil Rights, a member of the Parliament 
comments on the approach of the Commission and the member states regard-
ing enlargement: 
 
As opposed to the objectives of the Amsterdam Treaty, most Member States 
have no true and consistent immigration policy in relation to other European 
countries. To develop a common policy, the participation of all the Member 
States and the candidate countries is needed. For success, the following are indis-
pensable: an attitude of convergence, solidarity and mutual trust, with a strong 
commitment to equalisation and proportionality, and a common responsibility 
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for the management of the external borders. This requires an interpillar, integra-
ted approach, in particular with regard to the relationship with third countries and 
transit of migrants. It is necessary to take account of migration policy in other 
fields, such as regional policy, social policy, education and external relations. 
We will get nowhere without a multidisciplinary approach (Watson 2001:48). 
 
Taking a more inclusive stance, the Parliament has a tendency to employ 
strong words as a call for action, and to criticise the lacking ability of mem-
ber states and the Commission to make decisive decisions. The committee 
representative goes on to say that ‘a coherent policy was, and still is, lack-
ing’ (ibid.). Employing words such as ‘solidarity’, ‘convergence’ and ‘mutu-
al trust’ projects an image of equal footing with the candidate countries. The 
Parliament also emphasises the need for a multidisciplinary approach, 
suggesting a holistic understanding of asylum and immigration issues. 
However, the Parliament is often accused of using strong words and a call 
for action without taking account of budgetary restraints and diverging mem-
ber states’ positions. As a result, Parliament discourse tends to be of a more 
critical and direct nature. 
Moving next to the link between immigration and economic instability, 
such institutional differences in European discourse are even more high-
lighted.  
4.2 The link between immigration and economic instability 
The consequences of shaping policy issues in a certain rhetorical mode 
become vital for those concerned when a certain representation becomes 
dominant in press and public discourse. As I will argue in the next sections, 
securitising moves have been especially noticeable in European discourse 
that has created a link between the notion of immigration and that of econo-
mic decline or instability. In a situation of economic restructuring and high 
unemployment, the argument favoured by European far-right politicians has 
often been that immigrants constitute an additional burden on already strain-
ed European societies, linked with the fear of ‘immigrants stealing our jobs’. 
But at the European level, economic arguments to reduce immigration are 
often of a more subtle nature. In the next sections I will argue that the link 
between immigration and economic instability has been particularly visible 
throughout the 1999 Kosovo crisis (4.2.1), as well as in establishing ‘part-
nership’ action plans on third countries (4.2.2).  
4.2.1 The Kosovo crisis 
In Kosovo, Europe faced the most dramatic humanitarian crisis since the 
Second World War. More than a million people were displaced, some 
700,000 persons within Kosovo, the others fleeing towards Montenegro, 
Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Mahncke 2001:135). As during the 
Bosnian crisis (see chapter three), the EU was heavily criticised for its 
inability to act swiftly and successfully to restore stability and stop 
aggression. Collectively endorsing NATO action, and leaving the substantial 
part of the military campaign to the Americans, the EU finally agreed to 
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provide practical support to assure refugee relief (Council of the European 
Union 1999a, The Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000).  
Prior to the war in Kosovo, however, European Union countries were 
criticised for failing to acknowledge the difficult situation for the many 
Kosovo Albanians, who were trying to flee from their country. Sweden and 
Germany signed readmission agreements with the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1996, and began repatriating Kosovo Albanians despite 
reports that a quarter of those repatriated were questioned, threatened or 
incarcerated upon their return (Campaign against Racism and Fascism 1999: 
2). In Austria, only 10% of Kosovo Albanians’ asylum claims were success-
ful, and in the UK, where an immigration appeal tribunal decided in 1997 
that 10,000 Kosovo Albanian asylum seekers were genuine refugees, the 
Home Office refused to give refugee status immediately to the claimants, 
saying it would deal with them on a case-by-case basis (ibid.).  
These national reactions were accentuated despite an appeal by the 
UNHCR to European governments in March 1998 not to return rejected 
asylum seekers from Kosovo (U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1998). At the 
same time, the German Interior Minister, Manfred Kanther, criticised the 
seven German states that had agreed not to deport Kosovars, saying that: 
 
The decision sends out a devastating signal that could encourage more ethnic 
Albanians from Kosovo to seek asylum in Germany (cited in U.S. Committee for 
Refugees, 1998:3).  
 
The economic reasoning behind these actions was strengthened when 
German Internal Affairs Minister Otto Schily described the acceptance of 
Kosovo refugees in the countries of the EU as ‘the last of resort, and the last 
of several possibilities for aid’. Moreover, in August, the Austrian Interior 
Minister, Karl Schlögl, said that:  
 
Austria will not provide temporary protected status and assistance to Kosovar 
Albanians, as was given to Bosnians, because they do not have the same willing-
ness to integrate (ibid.).  
 
These statements leave a lot of questions unanswered. While the first state-
ment seems to regard all immigration from Kosovo as a general evil, a view 
that is enhanced by employing the word devastating, the second statement 
builds on the peculiar comparison of Koasovar refugees with Bosniak ones. 
The Kosovo population is regarded negatively, in that they are assumed to be 
unable to integrate. Any acknowledgement of their life situation was left un-
commented. The link between immigration from Kosovo and economic 
instability is implicit in these statements, because the problems referred to 
regarding the acceptance of Kosovo Albanian refugees were in the last 
instance economic. Assumably, the signal sent to these refugees were ‘deva-
stating' because of the economic ramifications their integration would entail. 
In addition, most of the discussion between EU countries in this period con-
cerned quarrels over burden-sharing.  
At the EU level, in September 1998, as more Albanians were being killed 
and burned out of their homes in Milosevic’s offensive, an EU home minist-
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ers’ meeting expressed concern at ‘the risk of massive migration outflow’, 
but did nothing to plan for the organised reception of the many thousands 
that would have to flee. Apparently, all the EU member states were keen to 
keep the ‘problem’ of war refugees out of their countries.  
The Commission indeed emphasised the security aspect of migration, 
when the External Relations Commissioner, Cristopher Patten36, commented 
on the Kosovo crisis, stating that: 
 
Our citizens rightly expect the European Union to prevent, or at least to manage 
effectively, conflicts in its own backyard. The best contribution the Commission 
can make to EU foreign policy, is the ability to bring Community policies (such 
as trade, aid and migration) to bear on the EU’s foreign policy objectives (Patten 
1999:1). 
 
Exactly how migration policy could bear on foreign policy objectives was 
left unanswered. But by including migration as an aspect of foreign policy, 
and as a tool in the management of the Kosovo crisis, Mr Patten indirectly 
underlined the security aspect of migration policy. On the positive side, the 
Kosovo crisis certainly proved that a good co-ordination of foreign policy 
and the will to devise a unanimous front in security matters were able to 
make an enormous difference in the solution of refugee crisis. Indeed, 
Kosovo showed that the military had an important role to play in the 
everyday management of such a crisis.  
On the other hand, the technological development has revolutionised the 
mass media, and at the same time the immediacy of conflicts. Because of the 
popular outrage and distress that images of mass suffering create, democratic 
countries are heavily pressured to ‘do something’ to mitigate the suffering. 
Arguably then, and as I shall come back to in chapter five, a possible way of 
easing popular outrage without creating a long-term asylum commitment to 
the Kosovar refugees was found in the so-called ‘temporary protection 
regime’. This regime affords practical assistance to war refugees without 
giving them any expectation of permanent settlement in the EU. 
Despite this criticism of the EU’s role in the solution of the Kosovo crisis 
however, there is no doubt that this became a humanitarian campaign, and 
the concern with the destiny of the Kosovo Albanians was repeatedly 
expressed by all EU member states. The EU and NATO repeatedly stated 
that they had a ‘moral duty to end the violence and the humanitarian disaster 
in the province’. As stated by the Berlin Council in 1999: 
 
Europe cannot tolerate a humanitarian catastrophe in its midst… We, the coun-
tries of the European Union, are under a moral obligation to ensure that discrimi-
nate behaviour and violence are not repeated. We are responsible for securing 
peace and co-operation in the region. We have a duty to ensure the return to their 
homes of hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons. This is a way 
to guarantee our fundamental European values, i.e. respect for human rights and 
                                                     
36  Rt Hon Christopher Patten, CH Member of the European Commission responsible for 
External Relations: ‘The Future of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and 
the role of the European Commission’, Conference on the Development of a Common 
European Security and Defence Policy – The Integration of a New Decade. Berlin, 16 
December 1999. 
Rita Furuseth 
nupi january 03 
52 
the rights of minorities, international law, democratic institutions and the inviol-
ability of borders (Bulletin of the EU 3-1999:1.40).  
The reader is struck by the consistency in the norms fundamental to the EU’s 
role (such as democratic values and human rights), and the endorsement of 
action to ensure the handling of the refugee crisis. Claiming that ‘we are 
responsible for securing peace and co-operation in the region’ can easily be 
interpreted as a justification for intervention. Acknowledging such a 
responsibility thus implies the endorsement of military intervention as a 
form of appropriate behaviour. But although an intervention finally came, 
European responses to the Kosovo refugee crisis will largely be remembered 
through the innovation of temporary protection and the quarrels over burden-
sharing.  
The next section examines the so-called ‘partnerships with third coun-
tries’ that were the result of the Tampere European Council in December 
1999. Founded on the principles of dialogue and equality, the link between 
immigration and economic instability is particularly visible in the strategic 
outlines of the partnership action plans.  
4.2.2 Partnerships with third countries 
The Tampere Conclusions refer to partnership with immigrant countries of 
origin and transit37 as guiding principles underlying a common asylum and 
migration policy. According to the Tampere ‘milestones’, co-operation with 
immigrant source countries is to be an essential element of such a strategy 
(European Council 1999). It was argued that, by establishing a political dia-
logue and trade and aid links with countries producing migration flows or 
affected by transit migration, the causes of population displacement could be 
addressed more effectively. At the same time, instability in third countries is 
assumed to have unfortunate and spreading economic consequences for the 
EU countries (ibid.).38  
The interpillar approach suggested here had long been the objective of 
the EU’s Mediterranean policy. Provisions that include migration are present 
in policies designed for the whole Mediterranean, most notably in the EU’s 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Initiative (EMP), launched in November 
1995. Through its three chapters the EMP has sought to create a holistic, 
symbiotic and all-encompassing approach to the creation of what the Barce-
lona Declaration calls a ‘region of peace and stability’ (European Commis-
sion 1995). As it was described in a Commission proposal in 1994:  
 
The Mediterranean basin constitutes an area of strategic importance for the Com-
munity. The peace and stability of the region are of the highest priority to 
                                                     
37  Instead of the term ‘country of transit’, the term ‘countries in the neighbouring region’ has 
been preferred in recent EU documents. Iran and Pakistan have hosted hundreds of thou-
sands of Afghan refugees during two decades now and can therefore hardly be considered 
as countries ‘of transit’. 
38  The High Level Working Group decided on the selection of countries for preparations of 
an action plan to implement the partnership initiatives on 25 January 2000. The action 
plan covered Afghanistan/Pakistan, Albania and the neighbouring region, Morocco, 
Somalia and Sri Lanka. The group was also tasked with providing an assessment of the 
existing action plan on the influx of migrants from Iraq and the neighbouring region (see 
Council of the European Union 1999b).  
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Europe. To consolidate that peace and stability in the region, a number of chal-
lenges have to be faced, notably: (i) to support political reform, respect for 
human rights and freedom of expression as a means to contain extremism; (ii) to 
promote economic reform, leading to sustained growth and improved living con-
ditions, a consequent diminution of violence and an easing of migratory pres-
sures (European Commission 1994).  
 
The Commission proposal reflects the worries of the EU member states re-
garding factors that contribute to create conflicts in the EU’s near abroad, in-
cluding migratory pressures. The inclusion of migration indicates the role of 
migratory pressures as a function of increased security. The importance of 
this region for the security of Europe is further emphasised through accentu-
ating the need to develop peace and stability in the region. To this end, both 
economic and political factors are deemed important.  
Clearly, at the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean region constituted 
the main gap on Europe’s strategic map. Through the EMP partnerships, 
efforts have been made to include the Mediterranean in Europe’s security 
considerations, employing a holistic approach that also accounts for the per-
ceived challenge of migration from this region. Implicit in the above state-
ment is the assumption that migratory pressures are a source of economic 
instability, and that the EMP initiative offers a remedy through the creation 
of peace and stability.  
The same logic can be found in the partnership action plans with immi-
grant countries established at Tampere. Inherent in the argumentation for 
partnership agreements is the focus on security. As stated in a Commission 
communication:  
 
Preventive action should be aimed at preventing situations conducive to large-
scale refugee or migratory movement…Prevention must be aimed at addressing 
potential sources of instability and insecurity (cited in Van der Klaauw 2001:22).  
 
The statement openly admits to the need to reduce the immigration pressures 
facing the EU. However, the impression of migratory movements as sources 
of instability is enhanced when the communication continues to state that: 
‘the ultimate goal of such strategies is to promote stability and security’ 
(ibid.).  
Failing to specify for whom security is required, the assumption is that 
partnerships with third countries are necessary to ensure the security and sta-
bility of the Union. Such formulations provide a subtle way of presenting 
immigration pressures as a security threat, and do not comply with the 
‘grammar of security’ discourse referred to by Buzan et al. (1998). But even 
if the referent object remains unclear, the communication indicates the urg-
ency of EU action.  
The initiative to deal with root causes of migration was much appreciated 
by refugee organisations and human rights activists (Marinho 2001). How-
ever, the promising declarations to create partnerships with immigrant coun-
tries of origin have been met with criticism regarding their implementation. 
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The main objections have been raised by the Parliament39. A report to the 
European Council in Nice in December 2000 noted that:  
 
There is a general problem of integrating objectives relating to migration into 
development policies, and the lack of sufficient human and financial resources 
are the main impediments to implementing the Action Plans. There is the risk of 
an unbalanced approach with emphasis on security and control aspects which are 
often quicker and easier to implement, than measures aimed at promoting respect 
for human rights (European Parliament 2000:7).  
 
While endorsing the interpillar approach stipulated in the partnership initia-
tives, the Parliament warns against the priority to ensure security over mat-
ters such as human rights. Compared to the discourse used by the Commis-
sion and the Council, the Parliament seems to have a different view of what 
an ‘interpillar approach’ in immigration questions means. The view taken by 
the Parliament is that high priority should be given to adequate funding to 
ensure a proper and balanced implementation of the action plans. The Coun-
cil’s interpretation of an interpillar approach has been that justice and home 
affairs elements are to be ‘factored into the EU’s external relations with tar-
get countries, rather than providing JHA policies with an external, foreign 
policy dimension’.40 Although this must be called a vague definition, the 
implications of introducing migration policy in the EU’s foreign and security 
policy are obvious in terms of securitisation. As I shall return to in chapter 
five, including asylum and immigration matters as an element of the Union’s 
security policy means, at least in terms of organisational value, to turn the 
issue into a security matter.  
In the next section, however, discussions on asylum and immigration 
shift away from a focus on an integrated approach towards a European 
discourse that is highly influenced by the new geopolitical realities facing 
the European states today.  
4.3 Linking immigration and instability due to racism and 
xenophobia 
Argumentation in favour of stricter immigration control is often legitimised 
by the need to prevent xenophobia and racism, typically warning against 
right-wing popular insurgency. National politicians have helped in construct-
ing immigration as an internal security threat, as when the former British 
Foreign Secretary, Tristan Garel-Jones, expressed that ‘maintaining firm 
immigration controls helps to keep fascism at bay’ (cited in: Goldsmith 
1992:39). This philosophy was echoed by the former British Home 
Secretary, Kenneth Baker, who said that “if immigration flows are not 
checked, extreme nationalist politics will resurge right across Europe” (BBC 
documentary 1992). The ideology reiterated by these statements is that 
                                                     
39  Mainly due to pressure from the Parliament, a special budget heading for external actions 
in the field of migration and asylum was created in 2000 to reinforce the Commission’s 
role in the implementation of the action plans. 
40  This was confirmed in the report submitted to the Feira European Council, June 2000, on 
the EU priorities and policy objectives for external relations in the field of justice and 
home affairs, para II (a).  
4. European perceptions of immigration as a security threat 
nupi january 03 
55 
governments should introduce tough controls to exclude immigrants because 
xenophobia and right-wing extremism are reactions against a growing num-
ber of immigrants. Consequently, these phenomena risk endangering the 
internal security and national stability of the individual member states.  
Wæver et al. (1993) point to society as a referent object that is to be dis-
tinguished from the sovereign state. The interpretation of mass migration, 
together with European integration, is considerably bound up with the sepa-
ration of society from the state: foreigners, understood as cultural others, are 
primarily seen to threaten society, rather than the state. Hence, the justifica-
tion of politicians for control-inspired and exclusive measures is often rela-
ted to the fear of racist extremism, and how this might impinge on society.  
Immigration policy became a top priority issue at the European Council 
in Seville in June 2002. Especially set to focus on illegal immigration, the 
Spanish Prime Minister, José María Aznar, leading the Spanish Presidency, 
described illegal immigration as ‘the most important question in European 
politics at the moment’ (Financial Times 21 May 2002). European discourse 
on asylum and immigration particularly figured in two debates that both ten-
ded to create a link between immigration and instability caused by racism 
and xenophobia: namely, the dramatic change in the world’s security order 
after the events of 11 September 2001 (4.3.1) and the perceived need to fight 
illegal immigration (4.3.2). 
4.3.1 11 September and the fight against terrorism 
Ever since the establishment of the TREVI group in the mid 1970s, efforts 
have been made at the European level to find common solutions to terrorist 
threats, especially regarding the activities of European left radicals, 
separatists or right-wing extremists. Clearly, the attacks on the US on 11 
September 2001 provided a sense of urgency to step up co-operation. As it 
was emphasised by a Commission proposal on combating terrorism on 19 
September 2001:  
 
Terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to democracy, to the free 
exercise of human rights and to economic and social development. This has 
never been clearer than in the terrible aftermath of the unprecedented, tragic and 
murderous terrorist attacks against the people of the United States of America on 
11 September 2001 (European Commission 2001a).  
 
As a result, several measures were agreed upon, including the decision to 
establish a European arrest warrant.41 On 7 May 2002, moreover, the Com-
mission proposed measures for the integrated management of the EU’s 
external borders, including the longer-term objective of setting up a Euro-
pean corps of border guards. Although this must be characterised as a 
                                                     
41  The European arrest warrant replaces the current extradition system. Its mechanism is 
based on the mutual recognition of court judgements. The basic idea is that when a judi-
cial authority of a member state requests the surrender of a person, either because he has 
been convicted of an offence, or because he is being prosecuted, its decision must be 
recognised and executed automatically throughout the Union. Refusal to execute a Euro-
pean arrest warrant must be confined to a limited number of hypotheses (see European 
Commission 2001b). 
Rita Furuseth 
nupi january 03 
56 
contentious proposal, it signals the increasing attention given to the fight 
against terrorism after 11 September. The EU High Representative, Javier 
Solana, highlighted the challenges facing the EU after 11 September, and 
included migration issues as an integrated part of these challenges, when he 
stated that: 
 
Security threats, and our responses to them, were evolving rapidly even before 
11 September. That challenge has now doubled: we are having to rethink our 
entire security strategy. Ever since the end of the Second World War, the causes 
of conflict have had little to do with the nineteenth century concept of sovereign 
nations…Security risks today arise from a variety of causes, such as poverty and 
lack of economic development, disintegration of state structures, ethnic and reli-
gious conflicts, organised crime, uncontrolled migrations, environmental disast-
ers. The transnational nature of these risks has rendered purely national respon-
ses much less effective if not totally inadequate (Solana 2002a).  
 
The views expressed by the High Representative give resonance to the works 
of Buzan et al. (1998) and the Copenhagen School regarding a widened 
notion of security that encompasses a broader agenda than military defence. 
The statement indicates a stronger attention to these challenges in the after-
math of 11 September, and suggests that new security threats were exacer-
bated after this event. ‘Uncontrolled migration’ is explicitly referred to as a 
security threat, and a risk that needs to be acted upon collectively. The listing 
of uncontrolled migration as one out of many new ‘security threats’ in need 
of extra attention after the events of 11 September creates the impression 
that migration is a destabilising and potentially disruptive force.  
Moreover, the threat of terrorism gives legitimacy to defensive actions. In 
the aftermath of 11 September, political leaders have repetitively employed 
the words ‘terrorist activities’ to describe what they perceive to be illegiti-
mate opponents, whether that be on the part of Israeli authorities to charac-
terise Palestinian opposition, or Russian President Putin’s description of 
Chechen rebels. Using the ‘terrorist argument’, and the need for action after 
11 September inject increased salience to measures aimed at imposing stric-
ter immigration controls. While the referent object remains unclear in the 
passage, a similar speech by the High Representative regarding ‘new secur-
ity threats’, gives further details on the matter: 
 
An assessment of the threats to European security, conventional and unconven-
tional, requires an understanding of what triggers conflict, its root causes, and its 
nature in the modern world…The relatively new phenomenon of mass move-
ment of people has meant that we live in multi-ethnic multicultural societies, in 
which distant conflicts almost always have a resonance on the part of our own 
society…To conclude, the primary security task for European nations is no 
longer territorial defence and our survival is not threatened as it was in the era of 
the Cold War. What we must defend today are our values, interests and stability 
– and these do not end at our borders (Solana 2002b).  
 
Immigration is again described as a destabilising factor, whereby multicul-
tural societies bring with them a risk of fragility and vulnerability. But the 
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referent object is not the state, but the very survival of Western European 
values, i.e. our identity. The impression is that of conflict between Western 
European and non-Western European values, implying that the two are 
indeed incompatible. This easily creates what Wæver (1993) calls a ‘we-
them’ feeling, where co-ordinated action is needed to avert the loss of com-
mon values.  
In the aftermath of 11 September, fears that the incidence should lead to a 
deterioration in the relationship between the West and the Arab world were 
widely proclaimed, also by EU representatives.42 Perceptions of Muslim 
fundamentalism as a security threat to Western societies can clearly have 
repercussions for Arab immigrants to the West. It is difficult, however, to 
find clear examples of EU statements suggesting that Islam and Islamism 
constitute security challenges. Signs of tensions between the two ‘camps’ are 
more easily traced. For example, Shireen Hunter (1997:141) explains how 
the fear of Islam is deeply rooted in the collective memory of Europeans 
dating back to the rivalry between Islam and Christianity in the era of cru-
sading. In modern times, the fear of Islamic fundamentalism is primarily 
related to the Iranian revolution in 1979, bringing to power a revolutionary 
Islamist regime in what the West considered to be a strategic allied state 
(Borgen 2001:67). Terrorist acts performed by Islamist movements during 
the 1980s and 1990s contributed to enhance the connection between Islam 
and security, because the fear led to a formulation of discourse in security 
terms. The Secretary General of NATO, Willy Claes, described Islam funda-
mentalism as ‘the greatest threat to European security after the fall of com-
munism’ (Europe, no. 6416, 1995:3), indicating that Islam has replaced com-
munism as the leading ideological challenge to the Western world. 
Hence, there is reason to believe that Islam to some extent already consti-
tuted a threat in the eyes of Western policy makers before the events of 11 
September. A report by the Western European Union (WEU) in 1993 lists 
‘migration and refugee flows as the third biggest threat against European 
security, after instability in Russia and in the former Soviet republics’ (WEU 
1993:8). Describing immigrants from the south as a threat to national 
identity, the report exclaims: 
 
Many of the migrants from the South have not, or do not want to assimilate into 
Western European society. For different reasons, many of them prefer to keep 
and cultivate their cultural identity. For many, accustomed to newcomers seeking 
to assimilate and integrate, this multiculturalism is seen as a threat (ibid.). 
 
Reiterating Wæver’s vocabulary and the creation of a we-them continuum, 
the report suggests that Western societies have difficulties integrating large 
groups of immigrants, and that immigrants’ resistance to integrate affects a 
society’s ability to govern. Post-war non-European immigration has trans-
formed most European states into multicultural societies, where the presence 
of a large Muslim population is especially dominant. Following the above 
statement, immigration is perceived to be a threat against national identity 
                                                     
42  See for example Javier Solana: “My Message to the Arab World”, Article published in the 
Arab League Countries’ newspapers on 27 March (Solana 2001), and Proposal for a 
Council Framework Decision on combating terrorism, (European Commission 2001a). 
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when large groups of immigrants wish to maintain their cultural, linguistic 
and religious traditions in their new countries of residence instead of assimil-
ating. Here, the underlying logic has often been that since popular disappro-
val of governments’ immigration and refugee policies may increase the room 
for manoeuvre for populist and right-wing extremist parties, immigration 
may in the long run threaten democracy. Immigration thus becomes an 
urgent issue, since the popular opinion in this area remains important to all 
politicians in power.  
According to Wæver et al. (1993:45), immigration has the potential to 
redefine ‘the nation’, thereby redefining the idea of the state as a conse-
quence of the changes in the ethnic composition of the population. The clear-
est examples of immigrants being presented as security threats can be found 
in the discourse of extreme right-wing parties, such as the French Front 
National, and the Dutch party of Pim Fortuyn. In France, Bruno Mégret, one 
of the Front National’s leaders, has on several occasions claimed the return 
of immigrants to be a question of ‘national survival’ (Borgen 2001:64). The 
threat of ‘islamisation’ was here one of the main arguments, endangering the 
French principle of ‘la laïcité’; the French Republic’s principle of reducing 
religious influence in the public space to a minimum. In fact, surveys from a 
variety of countries show that the fear of Islam is dominant throughout 
Western Europe, and that this religion is highly associated with violence 
(Spencer 1993:53). Cultural stereotypes have rendered the discussions on 
integration of immigrant groups difficult, and the enemy picture created by 
the events following 11 September and the ensuing war on Afghanistan 
could contribute to an ‘islamisation’ of the Muslim population in Europe, 
and thereby create social unrest and ethnic tensions. Signs of this is visible 
throughout Europe today, where extreme right-wing parties have gained an 
unprecedented popularity and upsurge. Although not regarded as a threat in 
itself in EU documents, Arab immigration is often indirectly included in the 
presentation of other security challenges, for example when identifying Arab 
countries as unstable regions. A similar process, we shall see, relates to the 
concept of ‘illegal immigration’. 
4.3.2 The fight against illegal immigration 
The fight against illegal immigration topped the agenda at the Seville Euro-
pean Council in June 2002, where the Spanish Presidency was keen to win 
approval for a new action plan to improve external border controls. In fact, 
illegal immigration was described as ‘the most important question in Euro-
pean politics at the moment’, by José María Aznar (Financial Times, 7 June 
2002). It can be argued, however, that the European discourse that followed 
the Seville Council failed to draw a clear line between legal and illegal 
immigration, but instead confounded the one with the other. Following his 
meeting with the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Jean-Claude Juncker, Mr 
Aznar, the President of the European Council, stated that: 
 
Immigration must be neither a fortress nor a sieve, nor wide open. Unless 
Europe’s leaders tackle the phenomenon of immigration seriously, there could be 
many problems in the future. The landscape has changed. We can no longer 
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maintain the line that there is room for us all, with legal and illegal immigrants 
alike (Press statement, Spanish Presidency web-page 10 June 2002). 
The statement suggests that the very phenomenon of immigration, both legal 
and illegal, constitute a burden and a challenge to the societies of the EU. 
Failing to distinguish between the two categories, the impression is that 
Western European societies lack the capacity to host both legal and illegal 
immigrants. The referent object ‘we’ gives the impression of a common 
European stance and the impression of shared solidarity in the face of a com-
mon problem. The immigrant is negatively defined; he or she lacks some-
thing which is considered crucial for normal membership. Commenting on 
the Spanish agenda in Seville to fight illegal immigration, the Italian Interior 
Minister, Claudio Scajola, introduced the security argument when telling the 
Guardian that: 
 
We don’t want Europe to turn into a fortress, but we want to promote an integrat-
ed model that will guarantee the security of our citizens within our common 
space (The Guardian Friday 31 May 2002).  
 
The implication of this statement is that the security of EU citizens within 
the common European space requires stricter immigration measures. The 
statement made by the Italian minister must take account, however, of the 
strategic location of Spain and Italy as the guardians of the external EU bor-
der to the south. Providing the entry gate into the Union from the south, 
these countries have been advocates of stronger external border measures, 
and a division of funding to initiate such measures. But even if the motivati-
ons of the southern member states seem relatively clear, the security argu-
ment is a powerful one, bringing with it a sense of urgency, and the capacity 
to place immigration at the top of the political agenda.  
The sense of urgency was enhanced by the British proposal at the Seville 
summit, to make overseas aid to developing countries conditional upon their 
co-operation in cracking down on illegal migration, and their taking back 
rejected asylum seekers. The proposal was met with harsh criticism from 
human rights groups. Amnesty International stated that ‘any sense of balanc-
ing objectives of security and immigration control with human rights and 
protection obligations appears to have been lost altogether’ (The Guardian 
13 June 2002). Romano Prodi, president of the Commission, sounded a note 
of caution, telling governments to: 
 
Take care not to undermine democratic principles and retreat into nationalism. 
Recent political signals we have received are very clear. We cannot allow the 
question of security to take a back seat. Nor can we go back and retrench on 
nationalistic positions. This is not going to help us rise to transnational chal-
lenges (ibid.).  
 
The position of the Commission contrasts sharply with the tone of the Coun-
cil and the Presidency. Mr Prodi even infers that the proposal risks under-
mining the very principles upon which our democracies are founded. More-
over, the security argument is presented as a step towards far-right national-
ism. Although the British proposal to withhold aid to third countries was not 
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adopted in its original form, a strong caution and a signal was clearly made, 
when the Seville Presidency conclusions stated that: 
The European Council considers it necessary to carry out systematic assessment 
of relations with third countries which do not co-operate in combating illegal 
immigration. Inadequate co-operation by a country could hamper the establish-
ment of closer relations between that country and the Union…In that event the 
Council may, in accordance with the rules laid down in the treaties, adopt mea-
sures or positions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and other 
European Union policies (European Council 2002). 
 
Although failing to specify what criteria constitute ‘inadequate co-opera-
tion’, the Presidency conclusions signal the view of illegal immigration as a 
challenge and a threat, and warn that sanctions could be introduced if third 
countries should decide not to co-operate with the Union. If sanctions were 
to be introduced following the Seville declaration, it would be an example of 
a securitising move that turns into a successful securitisation. According to 
Buzan et al. (1998:25), ‘securitisation is not fulfilled only by breaking rules 
(which can take many forms), nor solely by existential threats (which can 
lead to nothing), but by cases of existential threats that legitimise the break-
ing of rules’. In this case, the European Council in Seville does not only sig-
nal a deterioration in the relationship with countries that fail to co-operate in 
combating illegal immigration. Instead, the statement opens up the possibil-
ity of taking extraordinary ‘measures’ should the Union deem it necessary. 
The statement thus signals the importance of the immigration issue for the 
Union’s role with third countries.  
Many academics have pointed to the inaccuracies inherent in the presen-
tation of illegal immigration by national and European policy makers. Miles 
and Thränhardt (1995:76) have proven flaws in immigration statistics in 
many of the EU countries. For example, Italy is commonly believed to be 
‘flooded’ by an uncontrollable ‘wave’ of immigrants, especially from North 
Africa. Speculations about the exact number of foreigners living illegally in 
Italy have produced widely different figures. While some estimates speak of 
a total of between 1.5 and 2 million illegal aliens, Montanari and Cortese 
argue that in 1990 there were fewer than 500,000 illegal migrants from non-
EU countries (ibid.). With 57 million people, illegal immigrants represent 
less than 1% of Italy’s total population, and it is therefore doubtful whether 
one can speak of an immigrant flood to that country. An important aspect of 
this problem is described by den Boer (1995:97): 
 
The question is whether Europe’s internal security is at stake as a result of immi-
grants taking advantage of Europe’s exposure. The “internal security-gap” ideo-
logy ignores the lack of substantial evidence about the effectiveness of border 
controls against crime and illegal immigration, and injects a belief into the public 
that international crime and illegal immigration are new phenomenon reinforced 
by the abolition of border controls. 
 
Den Boer points to the lack of evidence and reliable numbers in the debate 
concerning immigration pressures. According to den Boer (ibid.), the 
rhetoric of populist right-wing parties, largely focusing on social benefit 
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abuse by immigrants, conceals acertain hypocrisy: namely that some 
governments regard clandestine immigration and employment as 
instrumental in certain sectors of the economy. Moreover, in Britain, critics 
have noted that allegations of supplementary benefit abuse, and illegal 
immigration itself, are ‘marginal features of the social scene but they 
command disproportionately great attention and an actual maldistribution of 
administrative efforts and other public resources’ (den Boer 1995:98). The 
virtual absence of abuse of the social security system by (illegal) immigrants 
has also been echoed in the Netherlands (ibid.).  
Although some will dispute such findings, or argue that the exact numb-
ers regarding illegal immigration are not available, an internal security pro-
blem still constitutes, at least as far as immigration is concerned, a problem 
of image and belief. As emphasised by Buzan et al. (1998), when an issue is 
repeatedly stated as an internal security problem, and when extraordinary 
measures are adopted to deal with it (such as an unexpected strengthening of 
the EU external borders), asylum and immigration become security matters 
by virtue of being referred to as such. As witnessed in this chapter, proclaim-
ing asylum and immigration as an internal security problem has been 
described to happen ever since the issue was brought into the Community 
fold. Evidently, security arguments continue to constitute an important fea-
ture of European asylum and immigration discourse, as recently expressed 
by the 2002 Seville European Council.  
4.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has focused on the political significance of the migration ques-
tion in the European Union. It has highlighted how migration essentially 
articulates more than a managerial question of how to effectively manage 
transnational population flows, and the integration or assimilation of immi-
grant communities. It is entangled with a complex challenge to the legitimate 
political order of post-war Europe, which is partly reflected in the European 
integration process and partly exacerbated by it.  
In the introduction of this chapter I asked to which extent asylum and 
immigration issues have been defined as security threats at the European 
level. To this end, the typology offered by den Boer (1995:98) corresponded 
well with the structuring of the debate. The securitising moves of European 
policy makers have been identified in three main discursive spaces: the link 
between immigration and crime, between immigration and economic insta-
bility, and between immigration and instability due to racism and xeno-
phobia.  
Regarding the link between immigration and crime, the classification of 
asylum and immigration as ‘compensatory measures’ in the establishment of 
the Single Market contributed to the perception of immigrants as a challenge 
to the free movement of persons in Europe. Eastward enlargement and the 
fight against organised crime both put an emphasis on providing security to 
EU citizens through enhancing border controls and harmonising legislation. 
Linking immigration with the fear of economic instability was particularly 
prominent in the quarrel over burden-sharing during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, 
and as an element of the partnerships with third countries. The partnership 
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initiatives reflected the worries of the EU member states regarding factors 
that contribute to create conflicts in the EU’s near abroad, including migra-
tory pressures. Economic and political incentives were accentuated as a 
means of enhancing security. Thirdly, the link between immigration and 
instability due to racism and xenophobia was frequently used as a legitimis-
ing factor in favour of stricter immigration control after the 11 September 
attack on the US, and in the fight against illegal immigration following the 
2002 Seville summit. Describing immigration as a destabilising factor, 
multicultural societies were frequently portrayed as bringing with them a 
risk of fragility and vulnerability. In particular, stricter immigration mea-
sures have been presented as a necessity by European governments in order 
to decrease the room for manoeuvre for populist and right-wing extremists. 
At the same time, established national political parties have reformulated 
their immigration policies in more restrictive terms in an attempt to regain 
votes from anti-immigration parties. As a result of all this, crime, borders, 
immigration and threats to national identity have become inextricably inter-
mingled.  
The referent objects of the analysis can be found within the confines of 
the societal security sector referred to by Buzan et al. (1998:119). The refer-
ent objects sometimes refer specifically to the EU societies, but are often left 
unspecified, simply referring to ‘Western values’ or ‘identity’, suggesting 
that there exists a cultural difference between recipient and sending country, 
and that this difference would affect (i.e. threaten) the cultural identity of the 
host population. The statements analysed in this chapter can be interpreted as 
examples of what Buzan et al. (1998:25) call ‘securitising moves’; i.e. dis-
course that takes the form of presenting something as an existential threat to 
a referent object.  
However, this subtle identity discourse on behalf of European policy 
makers does not completely correspond with the description of ‘securitising 
moves’ projected by Buzan et al. (1998:25). According to the Copenhagen 
School, securitising moves refer to the necessity to implement ‘extraordinary 
measures’. The problem concerning this criterion is that ‘extraordinary mea-
sures’ are quite problematic to propose in democratic and bureaucratic insti-
tutions like the EU, because such measures require the circumscribing of 
regular proceedings. This does not mean that European discourse fails to 
refer to immigration and asylum issues as security matters. However, the 
framing of these issues as security issues are not necessarily presented as 
existential threats requiring ‘emergency measures’. This finding suggests 
that the exclusive use of official documents as data material has certain 
weaknesses, and that is has proved more difficult than originally presumed 
to employ the theoretical framework to distinguish between politisation and 
securitisation in an empirical analysis of speech acts.  
Lastly, and regarding the identification of the securitising actors, the 
question of representativeness has to be posed. How representative is the dis-
course examined in the general European debate regarding asylum and im-
migration? Asylum and immigration control has been created within and by 
forums which are not integral parts of the European Union, thereby construc-
ting a web of intergovernmental relations. The main securitising actors and 
agenda setters in the European context, therefore, have mainly consisted of 
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the European Council, the Union Council and the role of the different presi-
dencies. Although the analysis does not distinguish between the relevance of 
the various statements, it is natural to assume that the ability of different ac-
tors to influence the meanings and reflections of politicians vary. As I previ-
ously argued, being an intergovernmental matter, the European Council’s 
statements are assumed to embrace shared views, because the decision-mak-
ing procedure is consensus. On the other hand, the activity of the European 
Councils is closely coupled to national perspectives, and is often character-
ised by diplomatic statements, and a reluctance towards expanding EU com-
petencies. This must be taken into account when analysing its common state-
ments.  
The Commission enjoys a shared right of initiative with the member 
states in asylum and immigration issues, and can be seen as visionary and an 
actor trying to drive the integration process forward, often through the deve-
lopment of long-term strategies. In Commission statements, the integration 
process per se is often the referent object of European security. This must be 
interpreted according to the unique role of the Commission as agenda-setter 
and initiator in the European institutional construction.  
The Parliament is more often seen to be emphasising the human rights 
dimension of asylum and immigration measures. The Parliament comes 
across as more outspoken, with a tendency to frame asylum and immigration 
in security terms as a means to criticise the inaccuracies and lack of action 
by the Council and the Commission. Having little impact on the decisions 
made in the area of justice and home affairs, the views of the Parliament are 
given less attention, but should not be ignored completely. The above varia-
tion in representations, however, is not all together that diverse, leading to 
the conclusion that the analysis has managed to throw light on the dominant 
representation of EU perceptions of asylum and immigration. 
Moreover, the representativeness of the discourse analysed is put to a test 
in the next chapter. Chapter five focuses on the objectives and strategies 
developed through the common EU asylum and immigration policy, and 
aims at finding out whether the ‘securitising moves’ proclaimed by EU pol-
icy makers, and revealed in this chapter, have been securitised through EU 
decision-making. This is assumed to give an indication of the extent to 
which the common asylum and immigration policy also merits to be called a 
‘security strategy’. Generally criticised for its inability to reveal the true 
motives behind political statements, discourse analysis should be comple-
mented with an analysis of actual decision-making and ‘political facts’. The 
study of securitisation in the next chapter can be called a step in that direc-
tion. 

5. From perceptions to policy: the 
European Union’s common asylum 
and immigration policy 
While the preceding chapter sought to identify securitising moves by 
European policy makers in the field of asylum and immigration, the purpose 
of this chapter is to examine the extent to which these moves have been 
securitised. To what extent has the threat image of migration developed into 
a policy framework where new objectives and instruments have been 
designed as mechanisms to counter these threats? Jef Huysmans refers to the 
process of securitisation when he states that: 
 
Although migration is often represented as a managerial problem and as a nuis-
ance or even a threat, it is also a force which has a capacity to call into being or 
at least to support a struggle about responsibility and the nature of the political 
community in which this responsibility is institutionalised and enacted. In other 
words, migration is not just a threat or a risk for a community, leading to a call 
for preserving the community as it is, it is also an anchoring point for political 
movements seeking the transformation of the political community (Huysmans 
2000:149).  
 
It is thus necessary to analyse the creation of specific instruments in the field 
of asylum and immigration, and the extent to which these can be regarded as 
instruments of ‘threat-management’. In the light of this therefore, I first dis-
cuss the extent to which the securitising moves revealed in the previous 
chapter have become securitised; i.e. turned into actual policies (5.1). Sec-
ondly, I explore the relationship between the perceived challenges and the 
instruments developed, in order to analyse the actual functioning of the com-
mon asylum and immigration policy (5.2). Can the development towards a 
common asylum and immigration policy be called a security policy strategy? 
Thirdly, and on a somewhat more normative note, the last part of the chapter 
tries to assess the impact of the common EU asylum and immigration policy 
on the international regime for refugee protection (5.3).  
5.1 The securitisation of asylum and immigration  
A securitising move was described in chapter two as the ‘move that takes 
politics beyond the established rules of the game, and frames the issue either 
as a special kind of politics or above politics’ (Buzan et al. 1998:23). How-
ever, except describing securitisation as requiring emergency measures and 
justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure, the 
Copenhagen School gives few indications on how to operationalise the shift 
from securitising moves to securitisation. The study of measures adopted by 
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the Council in the area of asylum and immigration is an attempt to operation-
alise this shift, by delimiting the concept to decision-making and political 
processes at the EU level (Rieker 2001:3).  
In order to follow the reasoning from the preceding chapter, the typology 
developed by den Boer (1995:98) is also employed to discuss the 
securitisation of asylum and immigration. The process of securitisation is 
thus discussed by looking at the link between immigration and crime (5.1.1), 
between immigration and economic instability (5.1.2), and between 
immigration and instability caused by xenophobia and racism (5.1.3).  
5.1.1 The link between immigration and crime 
Chapter four stressed how the securitising moves of EU policy makers could 
be found in the discursive practices that linked immigration with crime, and 
most frequently with international crime. However, securitisation goes 
beyond rhetoric. In the words of Didier Bigo: 
 
Securitisation is not simply rhetoric, but the product of a considerable work of 
mobilisation. Securitisation rests on the capacity of actors to constitute statistics 
about their aim and under their own categories, to put them in series, to be able 
to submit them to examination, to protocols of research, with empirical checks, 
in short, to produce “a truth” on these statements (Bigo 2000:195).  
 
The ‘criminal migrant’ thesis was shown in chapter four to be frequently 
supported by EU policy-makers as well as by the media, creating a ‘security 
short-circuit’ that presents immigration as being synonymous with insecur-
ity. One of the major arguments put forward by the supporters of the ‘crimi-
nal migrant’ thesis is the high criminal involvement rate of migrants, and 
their overrepresentation in European prisons throughout the 1990s. It should 
be noted, however, that any comparison of the criminal involvement of 
migrants with that of nationals is by definition problematic. This is so 
because not only are migrants usually young, male, unmarried, and poor 
(each of which variable is a crimogenic factor), but they are also often discri-
minated against by the criminal justice system of their country of residence 
(Ceyhan & Tsoukala 2002:26). Moreover, migrants tend to be over-repre-
sented because when they are involved in criminal activity it is usually crime 
of a highly visible kind (ibid.).  
It is possible to argue that the 1998 ‘Action Plan on establishing an area 
of freedom, security and justice’ represents a case of securitisation because it 
constitutes a response to the challenges that have been raised in European 
immigration discourse. The plan was approved by the European Council at 
the Vienna summit in December 1998, and laid down the priority areas on 
which the Council should focus its initiatives in the following five years. The 
plan pointed out that past initiatives had been crippled by two main weak-
nesses: their lack of binding effects and the absence of adequate monitoring 
mechanisms. Hence, the transfer of the asylum and immigration competen-
ces to the first pillar at the Amsterdam summit opened up the opportunity to 
correct such weaknesses with new legally binding instruments.  
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However, the new legally binding instruments sketched out in the Vienna 
action plan have been criticised for their emphasis on control and monitoring 
instead of protection and uniformity. The plan’s emphasis on stricter control 
measures has led some scholars to describe asylum and immigration as a 
mere security matter in the post-Amsterdam era (Bigo 2000, Lavenex 2001). 
Highest on the asylum and immigration agenda were indeed measures con-
cerning external border control and burden-sharing. Improving the effective-
ness of the 1990 Dublin Convention was seen as essential, and the entry into 
force of Eurodac was also seen as imperative.43 The Eurodac system was 
considered an important mechanism in the Union’s fight against organised 
crime, and as a mechanism to reveal bogus asylum seekers and to monitor 
migration flows (Council of the European Union 1998b). In fact, according 
to the Commission scoreboard, only one-third of the Commission’s 
legislative proposals on asylum and immigration have been adopted by the 
Council so far within the timeframe of five years set out by the Amsterdam 
Council (European Commission 2002c).44 The decisions adopted so far refer 
mainly to the protection of the Single Market against criminal activities 
related to migration such as human trafficking, and the prevention of 
‘asylum shopping’. Measures to provide minimum protection standards have 
yet proved difficult to agree upon.  
Moreover, and in order to ensure a more speedy implementation of the 
priorities of the action plan, the Vienna Council decided to create a European 
Task Force on Immigration and Asylum that would report to the special 
October Council in Tampere the following year. Among its tasks were the 
preparation of a series of reports on a number of countries that were great 
sources of migration to the EU, (‘migration’ intended as an influx both of 
asylum seekers and immigrants), and so-called ‘sources of instability’. These 
reports clearly constituted the precursor of the partnerships with third coun-
tries, and were particularly aimed at ‘sources of instability’, in terms of 
criminality and social and political unrest (European Council 1998a). 45  
The Vienna action plan thus seems to fulfil the criteria of securitisation, 
in so far as the main body of asylum and immigration measures decided so 
far have been directed at securing the Single Market. This point is reiterated 
by Boccardi (2002:163), claiming that the Vienna action plan aimed primar-
ily to deal with the root sources of organised crime, and lacked a comprehen-
sive strategy of efficiency and fairness. Among the measures deemed less 
urgent in the action plan – arguably because they were more controversial – 
were the definition of minimum standards on the reception of asylum seekers 
and the harmonisation of national carriers’ liability laws. The Parliament, 
commenting on the action plans, indicated that supplementary measures on 
data protection should also have been included on the agenda, and described 
                                                     
43  Eurodac was envisaged as a database, set up at the Commission, to which member states 
would communicate fingerprints taken from asylum applicants and certain other illegal 
aliens, in order to control whether a person had already applied for asylum in another 
member state. The draft Convention was agreed upon at the 1998 Vienna summit. The 
proposal was then frozen in order to wait for the coming into force of the new Treaty, so 
that it could be adopted as a Community legal instrument. 
44  The scoreboard is updated every six months and sets out a timetable on how far the Com-
mission and the Council have progressed regarding the objectives set out by the Tampere 
European Council in December 1999. See European Commission 2002c. 
45  The initial six countries chosen were Albania, Afghanistan, Morocco, Somalia, Sri Lanka 
and Iraq. 
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the outcome to be more ‘the result of a “reactive” approach than that of a 
“proactive” comprehensive strategy’ (European Parliament 1999:64).  
No doubt, on the surface, the action plans appeared to be a fairly good 
starting point for the development of a stronger EU asylum and immigration 
policy. However, the noticeable emphasis on stricter control measures and 
minimum standards instead of protection measures signalled the priority 
among EU member states to strengthen the security aspects of this policy 
area. In that respect, these measures can be seen as a response to the per-
ceived security threats outlined in chapter four. On the other hand, the prin-
ciple of the respect for human rights, as contained in Article 6 TEU, was to 
be taken into full account in the Union’s asylum and immigration policy, and 
consultation with the UNHCR was encouraged. In addition, the principles of 
subsidiarity, solidarity and operational efficiency were seen as extremely 
important, and as guiding principles in the development of ‘an area of free-
dom, security and justice’.  
It can be argued that there is no example in history of an emerging politi-
cal community which has not relied at least to some extent on a distinction 
between ‘members’ and ‘non-members’, those ‘within’ and those ‘without'. 
This logic is exemplified by the role of the Schengen acquis in the co-ope-
ration on asylum and immigration. The mere compensatory status of asylum 
and immigration has made some academics claim that the Schengen frame-
work has securitised asylum and immigration matters (den Boer 1995: 94). 
In respect to eastward enlargement, the EU has made the entirety of the 
Schengen acquis an obligatory part of the EU acquis, which the applicants 
will have to accept for admission. As argued by Monar (2000:17), the Union 
has an obvious interest in expanding its security regime already before the 
accession of the new member states because it is likely to reduce the risks of 
the applicant countries ‘importing’ specific internal security risks, such as 
organised crime, into the Union through immigration flows. Given that the 
EU member states have had the choice of whether or not to join Schengen, 
the ultimatum is surprising and unprecedented. In the case that the new 
members are not able to take on the entire Schengen acquis, either their 
accession to the EU could be delayed, or border controls between the 
Schengen zone and the applicant countries could be maintained after acces-
sion.  
As was pointed out in chapter four, the new EU Treaty objective of 
Article 29 TEU is to ‘provide citizens’ freedom through a high level of saf-
ety’. According to Monar (2000:3), the underlying idea of guaranteeing citi-
zens’ freedom through a high level of safety has clear major implications: it 
implies a fundamental distinction between a ‘safe(r) inside’ and an ‘unsafe(r) 
outside’, with the EU’s frontiers as the dividing line and law enforcement as 
the key instrument of securitisation; to maintain and further enhance this 
distinction. The reference to European citizens’ ‘concerns’ adds a powerful 
claim to legitimacy regarding this distinction and its full implementation 
when set out to enlarge the internal security zone of the EU eastwards.  
Contrary to the above-mentioned fears, however, a study made by the 
Commission, suggests a different scenario: 
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A study called “The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Employment and Labour 
Markets in the EU Member States”, suggests that only about 335,000 people 
would move to the EU-15 countries from Central and Eastern Europe even if 
there were free movement of workers immediately on accession. In fact, the 
Union has now agreed on a flexible transition period of up to seven years for 
limiting the inflow of workers from new member states (Boeri & Brücker 2000: 
12). 46 
 
The Commission study counters the fears expressed in most member states 
that enlargement will bring about uncontrolled immigration. For instance, 
the data for 1997 in Germany indicates that more foreigners left the country 
than entered it (ibid.). It is also pointed out that the wave of labour migration 
predicted when Spain and Portugal joined did not materialise. 
Thus, fears regarding immigration pressures are often unwarranted. How-
ever, one can argue that immigrants are criminalised through the unilateral 
control rationale of the Schengen acquis. Such evidence of securitisation via 
Schengen control mechanisms can, for instance, be found in the Union’s visa 
policy. Visa policy is a classic instrument of admission and exclusion of for-
eign nationals. A Schengen visa cannot be issued to any person who has 
been reported by any of the Schengen countries for the purpose of being 
refused entry. This means that a third country national may be excluded from 
the entire Schengen zone if only a single Schengen country has reported him 
as a ‘person not to be permitted entry’. Bø (2002) shows how visa pro-
cedures often block the possibility of applying for asylum in most EU coun-
tries. In order to apply for asylum in the Union, the asylum seeker has to be 
in the country of destination or at its borders. However, visa is particularly 
demanded from persons from so-called ‘asylum-seeking countries’, and for 
these countries, visa requests are routinely rejected if the authorities suspect 
that a visa applicant is a potential asylum seeker. Bø claims that these visa 
practices contradict the UN Declaration on Human Rights, and its Article 14, 
stating that ‘everyone has the right to seek and to in other countries enjoy 
asylum from persecution’ (Bø 2002:210). Instead, the Union’s visa regime 
serves to criminalise third country nationals, because potential asylum 
seekers are routinely rejected as ‘bogus’ asylum seekers. The link between 
immigration and crime is here of an implicit nature, but nevertheless 
obvious. 
To conclude, the securitisation of asylum and immigration has taken 
place through the Schengen framework and the Vienna action plan, where 
the adopted measures have been mainly control-inspired, and have intended 
to deal with the problem of organised crime and the protection of external 
borders, while the protection aspect of asylum and immigration has been 
played down. Although it is the Union’s declared aim to arrive at an ‘open 
and secure European Union’, the security imperative has so far clearly and 
by far prevailed over that of openness. The Union’s visa regime is a clear 
example of the securitisation of the link between immigration and crime, 
                                                     
46  ‘The Impact of Eastern Enlargement on Employment and Labour Markets in the EU 
Member States’ was a study made for the Directorate General for Employment and Social 
Affairs, by T. Boeri and H. Brücker, European Integration Consortium, Berlin and 
Milano, 2000. 
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because certain third country visa applicants are rejected under the suspicion 
of being bogus asylum seekers even before they apply for asylum. This evi-
dence of securitisation is in line with the model sketched out by Buzan et al. 
(1998:23), framing the issue as a ‘special kind of politics’, whereby migra-
tion policy largely becomes a matter of internal and external control.  
5.1.2 The link between immigration and economic instability 
Chapter four highlighted the extent to which EU discourse on the partnership 
action plans focused on the need to prevent economic instability in the 
Union as a result of migration. Commenting on these action plans, Lavenex 
(2001:136) claims that we have an indication of securitisation when it is 
recognised that a foreign affairs dimension to asylum and immigration poli-
cies exists. The focus of the action plans has been to ensure that migration 
policy takes into account the political, human rights and development issues 
in the immigrant countries of origin and transit through partnerships with 
them. The external dimension of the partnerships is emphasised by the 1998 
European Council: 
 
The advances introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty will also enhance the 
Union’s role as a player and a partner on the international stage, both bilaterally 
and in multilateral forums. As a result, and building on the dialogue that it has 
already started in Justice and Home Affairs cooperation with an increasing num-
ber of third countries and international organisations and bodies, this external 
aspect of the Union’s activities can be expected to take on a new and more 
demanding dimension. Full use will need to be made of the new instruments 
available under the Treaty. In particular, the communautarisation of the matters 
relating to asylum, immigration and judicial cooperation in civil matters permit 
the Community…to exercise its influence internationally in these matters (Euro-
pean Council 1998b:2). 
 
Emphasising the external aspect of justice and home affairs, the action plan 
highlights the ambition of the EU to establish itself as an important inter-
national actor.47 The EU’s external identity has also expanded to encompass 
elements of justice and home affairs. The High Level Working Group on 
Migration and Asylum (HLWG) was created in 1998 to develop integrated 
and cross-pillar operational strategies to address refugee and migration 
movements from selected main source countries. The securitisation approach 
referred to by Buzan et al. (1998:23) can be found in the many reports of the 
HLWG, recognising the mutual dependency between democracy, economic 
development and security. Commenting on the action plans of the HLWG, 
van der Klaauw (2001:26) notes: 
 
The ultimate goal of such strategies is to promote stability, safety and security by 
remedying the variety of factors causing further flows. Comprehensive 
                                                     
47  Efforts to enhance the international influence of the EU have been pronounced in the last 
few years. The development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) was 
boosted by the Anglo-French Saint Malo declaration in 1998, and the EU has gained com-
petence over all meaningful security operations short of collective defence (Youngs 
2002). 
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approaches to particular problems of displacement include the promotion of 
human rights, democratic institutions, good governance and the strengthening of 
the rule of law in countries of origin. 
 
Liberal Western ideals of democracy and the rule of law are in other words 
the main components upon which these strategies are founded. The Euro-
pean integration process has proven how conflicts between former enemies 
have been rendered unthinkable through economic development and regional 
co-operation. It is precisely because the discursive logic behind the action 
plans builds on a security argumentation that it is possible to call these mea-
sures a result of securitisation. The common asylum and immigration policy 
seeks to prevent situations conducive to large-scale refugee or migratory 
movement, and thereby address potential sources of instability and insecurity 
through economic development. Among the activities thought to contribute 
to the prevention of situations of migratory movements are preventive diplo-
macy at national, regional and international level, and the establishment of 
early warning mechanisms based on timely data collection and analysis 
(Marinho 2001). According to Van der Klaauw (2001:29), other elements 
encompassed by these strategies are legal and judicial capacity-building in 
actual and potential refugee-producing countries, educational, cultural and 
mass media activity to promote tolerance and reconciliation, and, where 
necessary, the establishment of an international monitoring of peacekeeping 
presence in areas of actual or potential displacement.  
Van der Klaauw goes on to say that political and social instability is 
among the principal causes of refugee and migratory movements. The inter-
national community can best address these factors through a mixture of 
effective political pressure, expert technical assistance, generous aid and fair 
trade measures (Van der Klaauw 2001:28). One can thus argue that the Euro-
pean integration model is sought transferred to the partnership countries, 
whereby regional economic co-operation becomes an important mechanism 
for conflict prevention and peaceful co-existence. Liberal trade seeks to 
increase transactions between states and create a feeling of mutual trust, as 
well as ‘expectations of peaceful change’ between the parties. 
The thinking behind increased regional trade and deregulation as an 
instrument in the EU’s asylum and immigration policy to limit migration 
flows, implies that the instruments will promote productivity and increase 
European investments in the area. This is in turn assumed to create employ-
ment opportunities, improve trade balances, increase export revenues and of 
course reduce migration pressures. The foundations for these strategies can 
be found in neoliberal economic theory, perceiving economic reforms as cru-
cial for developing countries to be competitive in a globalised economy.48 
As we saw in chapter four, the Seville European summit declined the British 
proposal to withhold economic aid to partnership countries whose help to 
tackle illegal immigration was considered inadequate. Instead, a declaration 
                                                     
48  Based on the so-called ‘Washington consensus’, neoliberal economic theory is founded 
on a common understanding between American authorities, the IMF and the World Bank 
on the strategy to deal with underdevelopment and debt problems in the third world. The 
action plan consists of elements aimed at limiting public expenditure, tax reform, liberali-
sation of trade, strengthening foreign investments, privatise state-owned enterprises and 
re-regulate production (Borgen 2000:106). 
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was made whereby economic aid should be used as a ‘carrot’ to countries 
providing substantial support in the area. The ‘carrot instead of the stick 
approach’ to economic aid in developing countries is thus a clear example of 
securitisation through economic strategies in the EU asylum and immigra-
tion policy.  
The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) commented on 
the Seville Presidency conclusions, saying that: 
 
Regrettably, the Conclusions limit themselves to border control enforcement 
measures and the evaluation of agreements with host and transit countries to pro-
mote their cooperation in the fight against illegal immigration and do not include 
any measures to ensure access to the EU for those who need protection (ECRE 
web page, 25.06.2002). 
 
The comments made by ECRE suggests that refugee protection measures are 
not at the top of the agenda in the EU discussions on required strategies in 
the field of asylum and immigration. Moreover, the Commission action 
plans have been criticised for their vague nature, and for trying to replace 
action by words (Marinho 2001). The partnership action plans have thus 
been proved to build on a security-based rationale, whereby instruments such 
as development aid have been introduced to deal with the perceived 
challenges in this field, such as that of economic instability. 
Although not referred to explicitly as a security threat, chapter four 
described how the link between immigration from Kosovo and the prospect 
of economic instability became clear through the measures agreed upon to 
deal with the exodus, including the quarrel between member states over bur-
den-sharing. Fundamentally, the EU dealt with the Kosovo refugee crisis 
through measures aimed at ‘voluntary repatriation’ (Council of the European 
Union 1999a:1). The term ‘displaced persons’ had hitherto been used to 
define persons who were not perceived to be covered by the Geneva Con-
vention, but who were nonetheless in need of protection. They constituted 
the great majority of the refugees that had fled to Europe during the Balkan 
conflicts of the early 1990s. It was clear from the situation covered by these 
initiatives that member states intended their protection to be only of a ‘tem-
porary’nature, hence the stress on ‘repatriation’. The Joint Actions adopted 
focused mainly on financing repatriation, but also served the indirect pur-
pose of giving official sanction to the idea that repatriation was an unavoid-
able part of affording protection. Consequently, most member states conten-
ded that the majority of the refugees of the last decade were in fact not 
Geneva Convention refugees, because their grounds for persecution did not 
fall under those listed in the convention, or because they could not prove 
‘individual’ persecution. This assumption was widely criticised by acade-
mics and human rights groups.49  
                                                     
49  Evidence that the temporary protection regime was not as comprehensive a solution as it 
had been hailed to be was made clear by the inherent paradox to exclude certain 
categories of refugees from the protection of the GC. For example, in the case of the 
Rwandan massacres, Tutzi individuals that might have made it to Europe would have 
been left virtually unprotected because ethnic cleansing would not have been acceptable 
as a ground for persecution under the GC. See for example ECRE, Guarding Standards – 
Shaping the Agenda (London, May 1999). 
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Eventually, quarrels over burden-sharing were subsumed into the new 
European refugee fund, and a radically revised temporary protection direc-
tive was adopted by the Council in July 2001 (Council of the European 
Union 2001). The handling of the Kosovo refugee crisis corresponds with 
the securitisation model presented by Buzan et al. (1998:23) in so far as the 
temporary protection regime can be described as requiring emergency mea-
sures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure. 
‘Temporary protection' was an innovation in order to deal with mass influxes 
of refugees, and was dealt with as an emergency situation needing immedi-
ate handling. Chapter four concluded that there is little doubt that EU mem-
ber states regarded permanent migration from Kosovo as a destabilising and 
a costly element. In fact, the introduction of the ‘temporary protection’ 
clause can be interpreted as an attempt to circumvent responsibility laid 
down in international agreements in order to deal with the costly treatment 
of long-term refugees.  
5.1.3 The link between immigration and instability caused by 
xenophobia and racism 
Chapter four also concluded that European discourse tends to argue that 
stricter controls should be introduced to exclude immigrants because xeno-
phobia and right-wing extremism are reactions against a growing number of 
immigrants, and because these phenomena endanger the internal security and 
national stability of the individual member states. Hence the justification for 
control-inspired and exclusive measures is related to the fear of racist 
extremism.  
In this area, however, there are less clear examples of actual decision-
making on asylum and immigration that refer explicitly to the need to fight 
racism and xenophobia. There does not seem to be much evidence of what 
Buzan et al. (1998:23) call emergency measures resulting from politicians 
‘justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’.  
On the other hand, there are examples of a more implicit nature of deci-
sion-making in the EU that securitises the discursive practices revealed in 
chapter four. The 11 September attack initiated a so-called ‘war on terror-
ism’, led by the United States, but closely followed by Western Europe. In a 
Parliament newsletter on developing the external dimension of the third pil-
lar, it was emphasised that: 
 
The determination to combat racism, anti-semitism and xenophobia constitutes a 
core element of the Union’s external policy and the efforts to combat terrorism 
(European Parliament 2001:1).  
 
The need to fight racism and xenophobia was thus promoted as a foundation 
of the policy initiatives promoted in the fight against terrorism. The commu-
nication referred in particular to the decision to establish a European arrest 
warrant, and the framework decision on combating terrorism (ibid.). The Eu-
ropean arrest warrant does not cover just terrorists, but will replace all extra-
dition procedures and widen the scope of offences for which people can be 
extradited. Although an efficient solution to the European extradition re-
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gime, human rights groups have warned of the consequences for asylum 
seekers and immigrants. Statewatch has warned of a witch-hunt against 
people with Arabic roots, and has suggested that fast-track extradition may 
expose increasing numbers of innocent citizens to injustice (Statewatch 
2001:2). ECRE welcomes the commitment to combat racism and xenopho-
bia in the aftermath of 11 September, but regrets that the Council limits itself 
to border control enforcement measures, and does not include any measures 
to ensure access to the EU for those who need protection (ECRE 2002: 1).  
In fact, in its communications after 11 September, the Commission has 
listed a number of principles that should be the foundation of European 
migration policy, including the fight against racism with the work towards 
creating peace and stability in Europe’s near abroad; encouraging refugees to 
remain as close as possible to their homes, promoting trade, economic co-
operation and fight illegal immigration together with the sending countries 
(European Commission 2001c). More clearly than before, asylum and immi-
gration issues are integrated in the common foreign and security policy, 
reflecting the security dimension of JHA issues. It is arguable that we have a 
case of securitisation when the fight against racism and xenophobia is 
interpreted as a legitimising factor in the creation of new instruments to 
promote security in the area of freedom, security and justice. 
On the other hand, the EU has issued several declarations that stress the 
need to fight racism and xenophobia as an integrated element of its justice 
and home affairs policy. There was already inter-institutional consensus sur-
rounding the 1990 declaration, stating that: 
 
The European Council deplores all manifestations of these phenomena (anti-
Semitism, racism and xenophobia). It agrees that vigorous measures must be 
taken to combat them, whenever and wherever they appear in the Community 
(BEC 6-1990:20). 
 
The fight against extremism is presented as a matter of urgency, and the 
Union signals its willingness to employ extraordinary measures in order to 
combat such movements. The decision to establish a European Monitoring 
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia is an indication that the Union takes this 
policy seriously. Moreover, the European Commissioner for Justice and 
Home Affairs, António Vitorino, has repeatedly emphasised the charter of 
fundamental rights as a foundation for the area of freedom, security and 
justice (Vitorino 2000a). In the aftermath of 11 September it has been of par-
ticular importance to prevent a criminalisation of the Arab population.  
However, the danger of criminalising the Arab population did not arise 
with the events of 11 September 2001. Following the end of the Cold War, 
Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington provoked an intense debate that 
is still going on. According to Fukuyama’s (1989) ‘end of history’ thesis, the 
lack of ideological clashes after the end of the Cold War would lead to the 
end of history for the rich countries of the world. Conflicts would still pre-
vail, but principally between rich states and those parts of the world still 
caught ‘in the grasp of history’. The main dividing line would thus be 
between rich and poor nations, geographically located between the North 
and the South. 
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The alleged confrontations between the Muslim world and the West cre-
ated by the 1990-91 Gulf War, was the background of Samuel Huntington’s 
(1993) thesis that future conflicts would take place between nations and 
groups from different cultures. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait mobilised a 
new coalition of former enemies that joined forces in a massive bombing 
campaign. Saddam Hussein’s encouragement to the world’s Muslim popula-
tion to go to holy war (jihad) towards the West, was a reminder to many 
Europeans of Ayatolla Khomeni’s threat in 1979 to export Iran’s Islam revo-
lution to the rest of the world. The Gulf War was by many Europeans con-
sidered to be a confrontation between Islam and the West, and Huntington 
argued precisely that the dividing lines after the end of the Cold War would 
lie between ‘civilizations’, and that clashes between these would dominate 
global politics (ibid.:22).50  
Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s predictions have experienced a revival 
after the attack on the US on 11 September, and have contributed to fuel an 
academic debate that examines the relationship between the Western and the 
Islamic world.51 I have shown that there has been a wide emphasis from EU 
policy makers that the fight against terrorism should not under any circum-
stances be particularly directed at the Arab population. The extent to which 
EU asylum and immigration measures become securitised as a result of the 
fight against terrorism, where the Muslim population is particularly targeted, 
is yet too early to say. But I have pointed to the warnings made by human 
rights groups such as Statewatch and ECRE that the European arrest warrant 
and the framework decision on terrorism might impinge negatively on inno-
cent immigrants and asylum seekers. Whether this will be the case must be 
the subject of a later analysis. In any case, the revival of Huntington’s thesis, 
and the intense debates on Western-Arab relations after 11 September have 
clearly put a stronger emphasis on the security dimension of asylum and 
immigration policies, and have caused a debate in most EU member coun-
tries regarding the extent to which national asylum laws admit ‘terrorists’. It 
is thus possible to argue that the dynamics of securitisation have been fuelled 
in part because the EU has chosen to react to the events of 11 September 
through its asylum and immigration policy. 
But the actual functioning of the common asylum and immigration policy 
does not necessarily correspond with the decisions made and the instruments 
adopted in the area. An important question to pose is therefore the extent to 
which the securitisation of asylum and immigration is visible through the 
actual functioning of this policy area. The purpose of the next section is pre-
cisely to gain an idea of the functioning of the common EU asylum and 
immigration policy, through an analysis of the relationship between the per-
ceived challenges and the instruments developed. 
                                                     
50  Huntington, in particular, has been frequently criticised for his predictions. Academics 
have questioned the manner in which the eight civilisations are divided, and the presenta-
tion of the civilisations as ‘super-states’ (Rubinstein & Crocker 1994). Huntington also 
assumes that civilisations strive towards the same political purposes and goals, and he 
fails to acknowledge that there does not exist a collective block of Islamic states, or any 
political foundation for such a coalition.  
51  For an insight into this debate after 11 September 2001, see for example Silberstein 
(2002), Hiro (2002) and Satloff (2002). 
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5.2 The functioning of the common asylum and immigration 
policy  
The securitisation of asylum and immigration takes place through the deve-
lopment of objectives and instruments whose purpose is to respond to the 
challenges sketched out in chapter four, dealing with asylum and immigra-
tion issues within a security framework. By looking at the way in which this 
policy works in practice, it is possible to assess the relationship between the 
perceived challenges and the instruments developed. If the instruments are 
adequately equipped to meet the challenges outlined in chapter four, then it 
is possible to refer to the development towards a common asylum and immi-
gration policy as a security strategy.  
In the following therefore, I take as a starting point the Commission 
scoreboard reviewing progress on the creation of an area of freedom, secur-
ity and justice (5.2.1). I then proceed to examine the internal control 
mechanisms (5.2.2), and the external control mechanisms (5.2.3) upon which 
the common asylum and immigration policy is founded.  
5.2.1 The European Commission scoreboard  
With the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU institutions have 
embarked on a five-year legislative programme to develop the main ele-
ments of a common asylum and immigration policy as provided for under 
Title IV of the treaty.52 The scoreboard to review progress on the creation of 
an area of freedom, security and justice is presented by the Commission 
every six months to monitor progress in the adoption and implementation of 
justice and home affairs measures. The scoreboard is interesting because it 
meticulously lists the main achievements in the area of asylum and immigra-
tion since Tampere, and therefore serves as a good indication of the 
functioning of this policy. 
Most interesting, when examining the latest Commission scoreboard, is 
the substantial delay regarding the objectives set out by the Tampere Euro-
pean Council (European Commission 2002c). In fact, only one-third of the 
legislative proposals set out by the Commission have been adopted so far 
(ibid.). The adopted proposals in the latest term refer mainly to decisions to 
combat illegal immigration, a regulation on the Eurodac system, and techni-
cal decisions regarding common visa formats. The Commission has com-
mented on the delay in important areas of asylum and immigration, saying 
that: 
 
The decisions on the proposals concerning the European arrest warrant and the 
framework decision on terrorism, suggest that the Union is capable of taking 
practical action on the objectives set by the Amsterdam Treaty where the need 
for action conjoins with the will to act (European Commission 2002c:4). 
 
                                                     
52  Within five years the Council must adopt measures defining: the member state 
responsible for examining an asylum claim, minimum standards on the reception of 
asylum seekers, minimum standards on the qualification of third country nationals as 
refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, minimum standards on procedures for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status, and minimum standards for giving temporary 
protection. 
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The message signalled by the Commission is thus that in the more sensitive 
areas of minimum common standards, repatriation and family reunification, 
it has been more difficult to find common solutions than in the more techni-
cal field of safeguarding the Single Market. While the events of 11 Septem-
ber boosted member states’ willingness to deal with topics related to terror-
ism, such a drive has been lacking in most other areas. The current proposal 
on family reunification is the third amended proposal by the Commission, 
and has proved a very sensitive issue in the Council negotiations. A potential 
problem with amended proposals is that continued amendments often water 
down the contents, leading to decisions using the lowest common denomi-
nator.  
The dividing lines in the Council vary from topic to topic, but one of the 
most important innovations of the Amsterdam Treaty is the strengthening of 
forms of flexible integration, and especially the possibility of opt-outs in this 
field. Because of the implications on questions of national sovereignty, a 
special protocol on the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark enables these 
countries to choose between participating and remaining outside every mea-
sure undertaken in the Treaty Title on asylum and immigration.53 In particu-
lar, these states have been freed from the need to vote under any of the pro-
cedures and from any binding character regarding the measures taken, as 
well as from the operational costs involved. The strong use of flexibility in 
EU asylum and immigration policy has led to concerns over legal and politi-
cal fragmentation. Moreover, the continuation of unanimity in decision mak-
ing has been called a source of rigidity (Lavenex 2001:131). Germany, form-
erly a strong proponent of communitarisation, laid down a veto on the intro-
duction of qualified majority during the 1996–97 IGC. The main reasons for 
this retreat were the opposition of some Länder, that feared being outvoted 
by other member states which follow different ambitions in the field of 
asylum and immigration, in particular the former transit countries of the 
South and the Scandinavian countries (ibid.).  
One can argue, however, that democratic and judicial accountability has 
been improved by the introduction of European Court of Justice competence 
to give preliminary and interpretative rulings in asylum and immigration 
matters (Article 68 EC).54 This competence will empower the ECJ to assure 
uniform interpretation of binding legislative measures taken under Title IV 
TEC. But despite national differences on which asylum and immigration 
measures to adopt, the legal instruments proposed in the negotiations have 
also proved quite difficult to use. No precise description of the effects of a 
‘common position’ or a ‘joint action’ was contemplated in the Treaty on 
European Union. It has been argued that because of the lack of binding 
effect following such common statements, most of them are of a vague and 
uncertain nature (Guild & Harlow 2001). As for conventions, they have 
proved to be a very unwieldy instrument, as states have to submit them for 
                                                     
53  Protocol 4 TEU relating to the United Kingdom and Ireland, and Protocol 5 TEU relating 
to Denmark enable these states to choose between participating and remaining outside 
with respect to every measure undertaken through this Title.  
54  Preliminary rulings refer to the old Art. 177 TEC (new Art. 234 TEC), under which natio-
nal courts may submit cases to the ECJ in order to clarify the validity of Council acts with 
regard to primary European law. Interpretative rulings can also be requested by the Coun-
cil, the Commission or a member state regarding questions concerning primary and secon-
dary law in this area.  
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ratification at national level. Although numerous conventions have been 
signed, their implementation is still awaited, whereas circumstances often 
call for rapid responses.  
According to António Vitorino, the European Commissioner for Justice 
and Home Affairs, the many delays in the Union’s asylum and immigration 
policy must be understood in light of the incremental nature of policy mak-
ing in this field:  
 
The Commission has outlined the principal dimensions of an integrated policy in 
regard to migration in its 1994 Communication. Since then, we have stuck to this 
vision of tying together relations with third countries, the management of migra-
tion flows and integration policies…The development of such a policy is, how-
ever, a long-term work, and its results will not be visible immediately (Vitorino 
2000b).  
 
This process-oriented perspective suggests that the common asylum and 
immigration policy should be studied as a long-term strategy, and not as a 
project likely to be realised in the near future. Similar to the development of 
the EU, the common asylum and immigration policy should be regarded as a 
process without a clearly defined goal. In the literature on regional integra-
tion, the end product of the integration process is often left unspecified or 
unclear.55 This logic is reflected in the Commission statement that the com-
mon asylum and immigration policy must be regarded as a movement 
‘towards an integrated policy in regard to the entire phenomenon of migra-
tion…It is also, of course, important to avoid illusions or dangerous short-
cuts’ (ibid.).  
The process towards a common asylum and immigration policy can thus 
be viewed as an incremental process, as well as an all-encompassing one. 
The process is incremental in that there is a widespread belief among EU 
politicians that co-operation in one area facilitates co-operation in other 
areas (Dinan 1999:447). The process must also be characterised as all-en-
compassing because of the mutual interdependence between fields of compe-
tencies. This can be seen in the Schengen agreement and the Dublin Conven-
tion that placed asylum and immigration issues within the same organisatio-
nal and institutional framework as the struggle against drugs and terrorism, 
police co-operation and mutual assistance in criminal matters, and framed 
the issue as one out of many ‘compensatory measures’ in the establishment 
of the Single Market.  
Thus, the functioning of the common asylum and immigration policy 
does not correspond exactly with the 1997 Amsterdam legislative agenda. 
The instruments developed so far have not adequately met the challenges 
that were pointed out in chapter four, at least what concerns refugee protec-
tion standards and common minimum standards. Instead, decisions aimed at 
increasing security and control have been at the forefront of the political 
agenda. But the Commission scoreboard is not a sufficient indication of 
                                                     
55  For example, the neofunctionalist Ernst B.Haas (1973:18) gave the following statement 
on the problems defining the end product of integration: ‘(…) the task of selecting and 
justifying variables and explaining their hypothesized interdependence cannot be accomp-
lished without the agreement as to possible conditions to which the process is supposed to 
lead. In short, we need a dependent variable’. 
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actual practices. In fact, the common asylum and immigration policy can be 
said to function both as a mechanism of internal control as well as a mechan-
ism of external control. In the following, an examination of these two types 
of mechanisms is hoped to provide an answer to the extent to which the 
common asylum and immigration policy can be described as a security pol-
icy strategy.  
5.2.2 Asylum and immigration as a mechanism of internal control 
The term ‘immigration control’ is often used synonymously with the more 
frequent term ‘immigration regulation’ (Brochmann & Hammar 1999:9). 
The term can, however, be used more broadly, concentrating on policy gene-
ration, content, implementation, outcome as well as evaluations (ibid.). 
While internal control of aliens may be exercised from their first entry to 
their possible fulfilment of citizenship, external control consists of the more 
visible measures undertaken by states to control entry before arrival (here 
explored through the Union’s external relations policy). 
It can be argued that an important aspect of improving internal immigra-
tion control can be found in the transactions taking place within the frame-
work of the common asylum and immigration policy.56 Co-operation on 
asylum and immigration between EU member states has nurtured a qualita-
tive and quantitative growth of transactions, reshaping collective identities 
and altering social facts, using the terminology of Emile Durkheim 
(Durkheim 1984). Although still confined to an intergovernmental frame-
work, asylum and immigration issues are deliberated in working groups and 
in European parliamentary forums on a daily basis, and have become the 
subject of co-operation between different European executive agencies such 
as Schengen and Europol. Den Boer (2000:45) demonstrates how member 
states’ provisions on asylum and immigration are affected by co-operation at 
the European level regarding administrative adaptation. The Schengen struc-
tures have been strongly enmeshed with national administrative structures, 
and the implementation effect of Schengen has been noticeable in a number 
of ways: decentralised information centres that are linked up with the 
Schengen Information System, direct access to the SIS by different law 
enforcement agencies (around 40,000 terminals throughout the Schengen 
area) etc. At the national level, these implementation efforts have unleashed 
new co-operative ventures across different law enforcement agencies and 
new inter-institutional relationships with government (ibid.).  
In addition, increased co-operation between member states’ immigration 
authorities regarding the secondment of liaison officers signals the variety of 
transaction channels between the contracting parties. The secondment of liai-
son officers is experienced as ‘extremely efficient and useful for daily prac-
tices’, mainly because it contributes to confidence-building and to the 
acceleration of co-operation between immigration authorities (European 
Commission 1999).  
Internal control is primarily exercised through institutions. Seen through 
a neoliberal as well as a social-constructivist lense, institutions ‘facilitate and 
                                                     
56  A transaction can be defined as a ‘bounded communication between one actor and 
another’ (Adler & Barnett 1998:41).  
Rita Furuseth 
nupi january 03 
80 
encourage transactions and trust by establishing norms of behaviour, moni-
toring mechanisms, and sanctions to enforce those norms’ (Adler & Barnett 
1998:41). Institutions are therefore an important contribution to increase 
transactions in the field of asylum and immigration, because they can create 
transparency, exchange information and monitor agreements, and can thus 
be presented as sites of socialisation and learning, places where political 
actors learn and perhaps even ‘teach’ others what their interpretations of the 
situation and normative understandings are (ibid.). Transferred to the 
European level, Lambert (1995:127) claims that the dynamics of European 
integration has forced a common perception of migratory challenges at the 
European level, originating in the move towards the Single Market and the 
abolition of internal borders. The prospect of a Single Market with common 
external borders prompted member states to address the immigration issue 
together, and devise common internal control instruments.  
It can be argued that the development of asylum and immigration within 
the third pillar as an internal control mechanism together with areas such as 
police co-operation and drugs control, framed the issue as an element of a 
broader security strategy in the safeguarding of the internal market. This is 
particularly so because the organisation of co-operation on asylum and 
immigration largely takes place within security organs such as the Schengen 
Information System and Europol. This is, however, not only the case when 
looking at the internal control mechanisms of asylum and immigration, but 
even more clearly so when looking at external control mechanisms. 
5.2.3 Asylum and immigration as a mechanism of external control  
External control thus refers to the more visible measures undertaken by 
states to control entry of aliens into the EU before departure or arrival 
(Brochmann & Hammar 1999:12). In the European Union, the domain of 
external relations is traditionally where the EU executes its foreign and 
security policy, through bilateral and multilateral co-operation. However, the 
Tampere European Council affirmed the need to integrate migration policy 
into the broader framework of external relations, and in this respect it provi-
ded the Commission with the authority to initiate legislative proposals 
(European Council 1999:5). It can be argued that the area of asylum and 
immigration functions as an external control mechanism in the Union’s 
external relation policy, and that a security policy dimension has been 
attributed to the area following the Tampere European Council. This is 
particularly noticeable in the process towards eastward enlargement, and in 
the partnership action plans with third countries. 
In the case of enlargement, chapter four pointed to the fear expressed in 
European discourse regarding a wave of immigration from the East. 
Responding to this potentiality, the EU member states have made the 
entirety of the Schengen acquis an obligatory part which the applicant states 
will have to accept for admission, and there has been a significant upgrading 
of mechanisms monitoring the implementation of the Union acquis in justice 
and home affairs (Monar 2000:15). For the Central and Eastern European 
countries this entails not only major practical challenges – extensive changes 
are needed in legislation, administrative and judicial structures, training and 
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practical procedures. There are also difficult political challenges, such as the 
need to accept the EU’s restrictive visa regime (which is to disrupt long-
standing cross-border links with some of their eastern neighbours), and to 
adopt much more restrictive EU approaches in a number of JHA policies 
(such as immigration and police co-operation). As noted by Monar: 
 
Security regimes have the tendency to be expansionist: They aim both at maxi-
mising control within their territory and at providing “added” security by creat-
ing protective zones outside of their territory…The Union’s emerging area of 
freedom, security and justice is no exception to that. During the last few years 
the Union has been quite successful in expanding substantial elements of its 
internal security regime beyond its own borders, either through partial inclusion 
or through the threat of exclusion in case of non-compliance with its own inter-
nal security standards and mechanisms (Monar 2000:11).  
 
Asylum and immigration can thus be seen to function as an external control 
mechanism in the process towards eastward enlargement. The pressure put 
on the Central and Eastern applicant countries, and the strict terms for mem-
bership negotiations, are indications of the power asymmetry between the 
EU and its negotiating partners.  
Power is engendered with a double meaning: on the one hand power con-
ventionally understood can be the result of a core state’s ability to nudge and 
occasionally coerce others to maintain a collective stance. Yet power can be 
alternatively understood as the authority to determine shared meaning that 
constitutes a ‘we-feeling’, as well as the conditions which confer, defer or 
deny access to the community and the benefits it bestows on its members 
(Adler & Barnett 1998:45). In this sense, a community formed around a 
group of strong powers creates the expectations that weaker states joining 
the community will be able to enjoy the security and potentially other bene-
fits that are associated with that community, and can thus be termed ‘norma-
tive’ or ‘soft power’57 (Nye 1997, Matlary 2002). 
Arguably, the use of soft power has been important in the negotiations on 
eastward enlargement, where the EU may be characterised as a hegemon that 
has managed to conclude various measures safeguarding the EU internal 
space, for example through so-called readmission agreements.  
On the other hand, there are obvious restrictions on the unlimited use of 
power by EU member states in the accession negotiations. Clearly, the EU 
stands to lose both political recognition and legitimacy should enlargement 
fail to take place within the time frames and conditions agreed upon by the 
parties. An additional consideration is the fact that one day, the applicant 
countries become equal member states of the Union, and the importance of 
establishing good relationships should therefore not be neglected. There is 
also a risk of an increase in social unrest and dissatisfaction in the applicant 
states should the terms and conditions of membership prove too difficult to 
manage.  
                                                     
57  There are many contributors to the relevance of ‘soft power’ in international relations. In 
particular, Joseph S. Nye (1997) theorises on the continuum of power, where on the most 
familiar end we find coercive power, while on the other end we find co-optive or ‘soft 
power’. As we move towards this side of the continuum, we find ‘agenda-setting’ and 
‘attraction’ as important instruments.  
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The role of the Union’s asylum and immigration policy as a mechanism 
of external control is also relevant when analysing the role of the 
partnerships with third countries. The emphasis on norms such as 
democracy, the rule of law and human rights in the partnership action plans 
can be interpreted as a liberal framework through which the EU is seeking to 
change the identities and interests of the partner countries. In particular, the 
EU is creating material incentives for these countries to accept the norms 
and principles formerly discussed. The incentives are focused on economic 
and technical aid and loans. Put differently, the EU is offering the 
partnership countries economic support as well as other benefits accrued 
from participating in international co-operation. In return, it wants a 
commitment towards democracy and economic liberalisation.  
The Seville Presidency conclusions (European Council 2002) underline 
the structural power of the EU, when stating that: 
 
In accordance with the Tampere European Council conclusions, an integrated, 
comprehensive and balanced approach to tackle the root causes of illegal immi-
gration must remain the European Union’s constant long-term objective. With 
this in mind, the European Council points out that closer economic co-operation, 
trade expansion, development assistance and conflict prevention are all means of 
promoting economic prosperity in the countries concerned and thereby the 
underlying causes of migratory flows. The European Council urges that any 
future co-operation, association or equivalent agreement which the European 
Union concludes with any country should include a clause on joint management 
of migration flows and on compulsory readmission in the case of illegal immi-
gration (European Council 2002:3).  
 
In very explicit terms, the European Council underlines the link between 
economic aid and the management of migration flows, urging its co-opera-
tion partners to participate in the fight against illegal immigration, towards 
which the economic assistance is intended. As the strongest actor of the par-
ties, the EU can be said to yield substantive power through its capability to 
offer economic aid to countries willing to co-operate on migration issues, a 
suspicion that is enhanced by the continuation of the Seville Presidency con-
clusions, adding that: 
 
After full use has been made of existing Community mechanisms without suc-
cess, the Council may unanimously find that a third country has shown an 
unjustified lack of co-operation in joint management of migration flows. In that 
event the Council may, in accordance with the rules laid down in the treaties, 
adopt measures or positions under the Common Foreign and Security Policy and 
other European Union policies (ibid.)…  
 
Failing to specify which criteria should be employed to determine what con-
stitutes ‘unjustified lack of co-operation’, the conclusions are nevertheless of 
a threatening nature, implying the use of sanctions should co-operation with 
a third country be deemed unsatisfactory. This adds to the perception of 
asylum and immigration as a security strategy, using the fight against illegal 
immigration as a mechanism of external control. This is a perspective similar 
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to that presented by Michael Smith (1996), claiming that the EU is trying to 
create a ‘negotiated order’ through a hierarchical structure of different asso-
ciation agreements.  
Asylum and immigration issues have, in other words, become important 
elements of the Union’s external relations, playing a particularly important 
role in the relationship with the Central and Eastern European applicant 
countries, as well as in the partnership action plans. The inclusion of asylum 
and immigration in the Union’s external relations has important implications 
for the perception of the area as a security matter, and is in line with the 
securitisation of the policy area referred to in 5.1. In this section, asylum and 
immigration issues have been seen to function as an external control 
mechanism, displaying an asymmetrical power balance between the Union 
and third countries.  
An important question, however, relates to the importance of the securiti-
sation of asylum and immigration on the broader issue of refugee protection. 
Chapter two raised the question whether the researcher faces a normative 
dilemma when analysing securitisation practices. Huysmans (2002:43) main-
tains that the normative dilemma consists of how to write or speak about 
security when the security knowledge risks the production of what one tries 
to avoid: i.e. the securitisation of asylum and immigration. It is possible to 
argue that an analysis of European securitisation practices is important, 
because it has major implications for the international regime for refugee 
protection. This is the topic of the next section. 
5.3 Consequences for the international regime for refugee 
protection  
In contrast to the main body of the European acquis, which focuses on eco-
nomic matters, the development of a common asylum and immigration pol-
icy addresses a deeply political issue which is directly linked to questions of 
human rights and state sovereignty (Lavenex 2001). Defined as persons who, 
having been violated in their basic human rights and having lost the protec-
tion of their country of origin, seek refuge in another country, the notion of 
refugees derives from universal human rights. Conversely, the admission of 
refugees and the granting of protection are subject to the fundamental norm 
of state sovereignty, which provides the right of states to admit or refuse the 
admission of aliens into their territory.  
As we saw in chapter three, the right of asylum was formalised in parallel 
with the codification of international human rights in the international 
regime and in national laws after the Second World War. With the 
multiplication of migration flows worldwide and the end of the East-West 
ideological antagonisms, however, the normative core of the asylum concept 
has become increasingly blurred (Loescher 1996, Lavenex 2001). In the 
following, therefore, I discuss the consequences of EU co-operation on the 
global refugee regime (5.3.1) 
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5.3.1 The consequences of EU asylum and immigration strategies  
As we saw in chapter three, the Maastricht Treaty was a positive step 
towards the development of more efficient asylum and immigration co-ordi-
nation, albeit on an intergovernmental basis. The third pillar codified and 
streamlined the old EPC structures, building its new system along the path 
set by the Schengen and Dublin initiatives. However, these initiatives did not 
represent any substantive harmonisation of national asylum laws. In the form 
of ‘resolutions’ or ‘conclusions’, they were only soft law initiatives that led 
to scarce and far from uniform implementation (Boccardi 2002). 
The progress in the field of asylum and immigration achieved at Amster-
dam was by any standards exceptional. Communitarisation undoubtedly dis-
played all the advantages that past intergovernmental co-operation had 
lacked. Democratic accountability, judicial control and a more independent 
role for the Commission were certainly key aspects of the development of a 
fairer refugee policy, as well as a truly ‘common’ approach. But from the 
refugee protection point of view the potential impact of the new provisions 
on asylum and immigration was of a mixed nature. Among the measures 
conspicuously missing were those concerning the national integration of 
refugees. These could have greatly benefited a fairer European refugee pro-
tection. Likewise, real democratic accountability could only take place if in 
the future the Council renounced its unanimous decision-making in favour of 
co-decision. Therefore, the five-year interim period envisaged by the 
Amsterdam Treaty has proved to be of pivotal importance. The numerous 
opt-outs to the provisions on asylum and immigration and the Schengen 
Protocol are indicative of the reluctance of some governments to deepen co-
operation in the field of asylum and immigration. In particular, the UK, Ire-
land and Denmark negotiated extensive exception clauses to co-operation in 
these matters, which in practice allow them to participate or not, measure by 
measure.  
More substantively, a heavily disputed innovation was the successful 
Spanish proposal to exclude EU citizens from the right of asylum in the EU, 
thereby introducing a de facto geographical limitation to the Geneva Con-
vention, the underlying intention being to prevent, among other things, mem-
bers of the separatist Basque organisation ETA from being granted asylum in 
another member state as had been the case in France and Belgium (Lavenex 
1999:47). While it is not yet clear whether this protocol will really affect the 
policies of member states, it illustrates the controversial political and diplo-
matic character of the act of conceding asylum. Lavenex (1999:65) has noted 
that: 
 
With this closed institutional configuration, the EU refugee regime evolved out-
side the existing structures of the international refugee regime and excluded tra-
ditional actors dealing with international protection such as the UNHCR, the 
Council of Europe and NGOs from participating. This exclusive institutional 
structure was accompanied by a closure of the circle of deliberation, which fav-
oured the adoption of a homogeneous and limited technical view of the refugee 
problem. 
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This approach to the refugee issue is reflected in the legal acquis, reached in 
this field, which basically consists of those measures considered necessary to 
safeguard internal security in the Single Market. As I discussed in chapter 
four, and as stated by Lavenex: ‘having been linked from the beginning with 
other, negative phenomena such as international crime, drug trafficking, and 
terrorism as a threat to internal security in the Single Market, this perspective 
has supported the reinterpretation of refugee policies from a formerly 
humanitarian question to one of internal and international security’ (ibid.). 
Against the background of the normative tensions inherent to the refugee 
concept, this restrictive trend places EU co-operation on refugee policies 
between two conflicting paradigms: the commitment to international human 
rights on the one hand and the preoccupation with the safeguarding of inter-
nal security on the other. But coupled with the multiplication of migration 
flows worldwide and the end of the East–West ideological antagonisms, the 
normative core of the asylum concept has become increasingly blurred. 
Together, the multiplication of the causes of forced migration and the 
attempt to limit the exposure to refugee flows as witnessed in this thesis, 
have contributed to a conceptual confusion regarding the definition of refu-
gees and their protection, expressed most conspicuously in the inconsistent 
approaches developed towards the admission of Bosnian and Kosovo refu-
gees in the 1990s. The novelty of ‘temporary protection’ became, as we saw 
in chapter three, a means whereby the member states sought to deal with the 
mass influx of refugees from the Balkans during the two crises. But this pro-
vision has been met with heavy criticism (Lavenex 1999, Hayter 2000). 
Boccardi (2002) has stated that: 
 
If the purpose of the temporary protection regime was to fill the gaps left by the 
obsoleteness of the Geneva Convention, then it was insufficiently equipped for 
its task. Firstly it conditioned the possibility of approving a temporary protection 
regime in favour of a certain country because of an ill-defined concept of “mass 
influx of refugees”. What would in practice be a “significant number of refugees: 
hundreds, thousands, millions? The squabbles that ensued from the attempts to 
reach an equitable distribution of Kosovar refugees sadly illustrated the relativity 
of this concept (Boccardi 2002:170). 
 
In practice, this meant that only areas in the EU periphery could eventually 
qualify for it, since large masses of refugees could only travel relatively 
short international distances. Moreover, the presumption that the offering of 
an alternative ‘protected’ status could effectively suspend a member state’s 
obligation to examine an asylum application under the Geneva Convention 
was in itself open to questioning .  
Thus, the effects of EU co-operation on asylum and immigration issues 
on the wider international regime of refugee protection is left unclear. The 
concept of temporary protection is likely to contribute further to a streng-
thening of the state vis-à-vis the individual refugee in so far as it tends to be 
applied also to persons who fall within the scope of the Geneva Convention, 
as shown in the case of the Kosovo crisis. In sum, the main result of EU co-
operation in this field can be seen in the adoption of limited, mainly 
restrictive, and legally non-binding measures restricting access to domestic 
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asylum procedures. The consequence is that today, the emergent European 
refugee policy faces a fundamental confusion, namely the difficulty to deter-
mine who deserves protection – and who does not. 
5.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter discussed the extent to which the securitising moves revealed in 
chapter four have been securitised and transformed into actual policy making 
at the European level. Secondly, I analysed the relationship between the per-
ceived challenges and the instruments developed, to explore the manner in 
which the European asylum and immigration policy is implemented. Thirdly, 
the impact of European integration on the international refugee regime was 
discussed. 
The presentation of asylum and immigration as a security threat has been 
met with co-ordinated action through policy making in the European Union. 
Regarding the link between immigration and crime, most policy initiatives 
dealing with asylum and immigration have been control-inspired, and take 
place within frameworks that link asylum and immigration with the fight 
against organised crime, human trafficking and drugs control, such as the 
Schengen and Dublin frameworks. Their intention is to create security in the 
Single Market and protect the Union’s external borders through instruments 
such as visa control, and these aspects have by far prevailed over the need 
for stronger harmonisation and the creation of minimum protection standards 
in the common asylum and immigration policy. 
The link between immigration and economic instability has been securi-
tised through the EU’s external relations, where asylum and immigration 
issues are playing an increasingly important role. The decision to establish 
partnership action plans with immigrant countries of origin and transit build 
on a security rationale, where trade and development aid are perceived to be 
the main instruments. Moreover, the temporary protection regime developed 
after the Balkan refugee crisis can be described as an ‘emergency measure 
that justified actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’ 
(Buzan et al. 1998:23). The temporary protection directive, and the emphasis 
on limiting the migration flows from Kosovo can be interpreted as an 
attempt to circumvent responsibility laid down in the Geneva Convention in 
order to deal with the costly treatment of long-term refugees.  
After 11 September, the need to fight racism and xenophobia has been 
employed as a legitimising factor to introduce stricter immigration controls, 
and human rights groups warn against the effects of the new extradition 
regime. Although the charter of fundamental rights and the European Moni-
tor Centre on Racism and Xenophobia represent positive measures in this re-
spect, the ‘war on terrorism’ risks an unwanted criminalisation of the Arab 
population.  
However, the analysis revealed a problematic aspect regarding the theore-
tical framework employed, namely the criteria emphasised by Buzan et al. 
(1998:23) that a matter only becomes a security matter when ‘requiring 
emergency actions, taking an issue out of normal politics’. The securitisation 
of asylum and immigration has often been the result of recognising a foreign 
affairs dimension to EU co-operation, by expanding the EU’s external iden-
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tity to encompass elements of asylum and immigration. Securitisation has 
also been revealed in the continuing emphasis on security and control in the 
asylum and immigration field, to the detriment of protection and minimum 
standards. There are, however, fewer indications of the EU having taken 
‘emergency actions’, although the temporary protection regime, and the 
decisions following 11 September might be categorised as such. This is an 
indication that the analysis did not correspond completely with the frame-
work offered by Buzan et al.  
On the other hand, the analysis must take account of the special nature of 
EU policy making. Being an intergovernmental matter, and governed by an 
extensive bureaucratic structure, the extent to which ‘emergency actions’ can 
be taken within short timeframes is limited. This is perhaps an indication that 
the securitisation model developed by Buzan et al. (1998) is too stringent – 
at least when employed to policy making in the European Union. 
This chapter also analysed the functioning of the common asylum and 
immigration policy. The Commission scoreboard revealed that political 
realities do not correspond exactly with the 1997 Amsterdam legislative 
agenda. The instruments developed so far have not adequately met the chal-
lenges that were pointed out in chapter four, at least what concerns refugee 
protection standards and common minimum standards. Instead, asylum and 
immigration issues function as mechanisms of internal and external control, 
projecting the Union as a hegemonic actor and a role model in its 
relationship with the Eastern and Central European applicant countries. 
Lastly, the effects of EU co-operation on asylum and immigration on the 
wider international regime of refugee protection remain unclear. The concept 
of temporary protection is likely to contribute further to a strengthening of 
the state vis-à-vis the individual refugee, in so far as it tends to be applied 
also to persons who fall within the scope of the Geneva Convention. This 
was made clear by the 1999 Kosovo crisis. 

6. Concluding comments  
The purpose of this report was to examine the change that has taken place in 
European perspectives on asylum and immigration in the 1990s, through an 
analysis of political discourse, and to demonstrate how this is reflected in 
new security policy strategies at the EU level. The key question was twofold: 
To what extent has the issue of asylum and immigration come to be seen as a 
security threat in the European Union? And: To what extent is the above 
question reflected in the objectives and instruments of the common EU 
asylum and immigration policy? In the following I will present the main 
findings, and discuss the reliability and validity of these findings. 
The perception of immigration as a security challenge was not created by 
the 1997 Amsterdam summit. Many factors contributed to the perception of 
a challenge that needed to be dealt with at the European level. The oil crisis 
and the following economic set-back in the early 1970s marked the begin-
nings of extensive restructuring processes in many European countries, lead-
ing to an ‘immigration stop’ after a period where liberal immigration policies 
had prevailed. It is most likely, however, that the 1973 oil crisis was used as 
a legitimising factor paving the way for change, in the wake of the first signs 
of nationalist responses to immigration in many countries, together with 
growing displeasure with third world immigration.  
Coinciding with the spread of globalisation, cross-border migration at the 
same time became strongly affected by transnational processes, characterised 
by developments within world economy, production and finance, transporta-
tion, information and mass media. In a globalised world, transportation 
enables relatively poor migrants to travel further away from their places of 
origin, and information technology makes it easier to keep in touch with 
family and friends.  
A second factor explaining why immigration came to be perceived as a 
threat refers to the end of the Cold War. The following upsurge in asylum 
seekers from Eastern Europe to the West, followed by the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, injected urgency into the processes of restruc-
turing the Western European refugee strategy. While superpower rivalry 
internalised local conflicts, intra-state conflicts have predominated after the 
lid of the Cold War was removed. This, in turn, generated vast numbers of 
refugees, as in the cases of the civil wars in Rwanda and Somalia. Facing the 
refugee exodus from Bosnia, the majority of Western European countries 
discarded the Geneva Convention requirement of considering each case indi-
vidually, and introduced ‘temporary protection’ on a collective basis, thereby 
signalling a change of policy regarding European standards of refugee 
protection.  
Thirdly, the European integration process included asylum and immigra-
tion on its agenda from the early 1990s onwards. Gradually developed as a 
European policy area as a response to the Single Market project, the area of 
asylum and immigration was long treated as a mere ‘compensating measure’, 
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and only included in the intergovernmental Schengen co-operation to 
facilitate the abolition of internal border controls. Within the framework of 
the Maastricht Treaty, however, co-operation on asylum and immigration 
was anchored in a special institutional structure, and began to develop its 
own dynamics. In sum, the combination of these factors contributed to the 
perception of immigration constituting a challenge that needed to be solved 
at the European level. 
Distinguishing between referent objects, and claiming that every issue in 
principle can become a security matter through speech acts, the theoretical 
framework developed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) has proved 
well suited for the analysis of different EU representations on immigration. 
At the European level, this thesis has shown that cross-border migration is 
increasingly discussed and treated as a security matter in the societal sector. 
The referent object is frequently seen to be the societies and identities of the 
European member states, and immigration is referred to as a phenomenon 
with the potential to threaten national security.  
Regarding the first part of the key question, and in light of the changes in 
the framework conditions for European security after the end of the Cold 
War, a discourse analysis of various EU documents has shown that the con-
struction of immigration as a threat to the internal security of EU member 
states had three cornerstones (den Boer 1995:98): 1) the link between immi-
gration and crime; 2) the link between immigration and economic instability; 
and 3) the link between immigration and instability caused by xenophobia 
and racism.  
Regarding the link between immigration and crime, chapter four de-
scribed how the classification of asylum and immigration as ‘compensatory 
measures’ in the establishment of the Single Market contributed to the per-
ception of immigrants as a challenge to the free movement of persons in 
Europe. Eastward enlargement and the fight against organised crime both put 
an emphasis on providing security to EU citizens through enhancing border 
controls and harmonising legislation. Linking immigration with the fear of 
economic instability was particularly prominent in the quarrel over burden-
sharing during the 1999 Kosovo crisis, and as an element of the partnership 
action plans with third countries. The partnership initiatives reflected the 
worries of the EU member states regarding factors that contribute to create 
conflicts in the EU’s near abroad, including migratory pressures. Economic 
and political incentives were accentuated as a means of enhancing security. 
The link between immigration and instability due to racism and xenophobia 
was frequently used as a legitimising factor in favour of stricter immigration 
control after the 11 September attack on the US, and in the fight against ille-
gal immigration following the 2002 Seville summit. Describing immigration 
as a destabilising factor, multicultural societies were frequently portrayed as 
bringing with them a risk of fragility and vulnerability.  
However, while the chosen discourse reflects different representations of 
reality, not everyone utters security with the same authority. Because of the 
intergovernmental nature of co-operation on asylum and immigration, the 
European Council has played a particularly important part in framing the 
EU’s agenda in asylum and immigration matters. For this reason, the Coun-
cil is given special attention, and is regarded as the main securitising actor. 
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Commission statements tend to treat the integration process as the referent 
object of European security, in order to push the integration process forward. 
The Parliament, on the other hand, has a tendency to emphasise the human 
rights dimension of asylum and immigration measures. The Parliament often 
frames asylum and immigration in security terms in order to criticise the lack 
of action by the Council and the Commission. Although the referent object 
in most cases refers specifically to the European societies, it is also often left 
unspecified, simply referring to ‘Western values’ or identity, suggesting that 
there exists a cultural difference between segments of the population. 
Regarding the second main question, chapter five discussed the extent to 
which the securitising moves identified in chapter four have been transfor-
med into actual policies, i.e. securitised. Regarding the link between immi-
gration and crime, most policy initiatives dealing with asylum and immigra-
tion have been control-inspired, and take place within frameworks that link 
asylum and immigration with the fight against organised crime, human traf-
ficking and drugs control, such as the Schengen and Dublin agreements. 
Their intention is to create security in the Single Market and protect the 
Union’s external borders, and these aspects have by far prevailed over the 
need for stronger harmonisation and the creation of minimum protection 
standards in the common asylum and immigration policy. 
The link between immigration and economic instability has been securi-
tised through the EU’s external relations, where the area of asylum and 
immigration is playing an increasingly important role. The decision to 
establish partnership action plans with immigrant countries of origin and 
transit builds on a security rationale, where trade and development aid are 
perceived to be the main instruments. Moreover, the temporary protection 
regime developed after the Balkan refugee crisis can be described as an 
‘emergency measure that justified actions outside the normal bounds of 
political procedure’ (Buzan et al. 1998:23). The temporary protection 
directive, and the emphasis on limiting the migration flows from Kosovo can 
be interpreted as an attempt to circumvent responsibility laid down in the 
Geneva Convention in order to deal with the costly treatment of long-term 
refugees.  
After 11 September, the need to fight racism and xenophobia has been 
employed as a legitimising factor to introduce stricter immigration controls, 
and human rights group warn against the effects of the new extradition 
regime. Although the charter of fundamental rights and the European Moni-
tor Centre on Racism and Xenophobia represent positive measures in this re-
spect, the ‘war on terrorism’ risks an unwanted criminalisation of the 
Muslim population.  
However, there were some problems complying with the securitisation 
model sketched out by Buzan et al. (1998:23). In practice, it was difficult to 
find clear examples of speech acts that corresponded with the criteria of 
securitisation listed by Buzan et al. (ibid.:25). Evidence of EU decision mak-
ing regarding what Buzan et al. (ibid.) call ‘extraordinary measures outside 
the normal bounds of political procedure, whereby action is taken that is out-
side the normal rules of the game’, is rarely found.  
But ‘extraordinary measures’ are difficult to initiate in the highly bureau-
cratic and democratic EU system, where change does not come about easily. 
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The introduction of the ‘temporary protection’ regime following the Kosovo 
crisis, and the extradition measures adopted after 11 September 2001, are 
nevertheless an indication that immigration control has become a matter of 
high politics. In my opinion, the emphasis on ‘extraordinary measures’ by 
the Copenhagen School imply an unnecessary narrowing down of the secur-
ity concept. Originally intended to prevent everything from becoming secur-
ity matters, the requirement does not correspond with the understanding of 
security that has been revealed in EU documents. On the contrary, the cri-
teria of ‘extraordinary measures’ are easily associated with military logic 
and the use of military instruments as a response to another state’s 
aggression (Borgen 2001:128). The presentation of asylum and immigration 
as security challenges is of a non-military nature, and it is presented as such 
without necessarily moving outside the normal bounds of political 
procedure. 
Regarding the validity and reliability of this analysis, precautions have 
been made according to the methodological design referred to in chapter 
two. Discourse analysis has offered a useful way to examine securitisation 
and political constellations with its emphasis on language that brings social 
practices into a particular communicative institutional framework. However, 
discourse analysis does not try to uncover the objective reality, or the real 
motivation behind human action, and it therefore offers limited insight into 
social phenomena. These shortcomings, I have argued, are taken into 
account, and mitigated by limiting the focus of the study: the emphasis of the 
thesis is rather to examine how we create our reality, so that it becomes a 
matter of course to us. I have tried to avoid ‘reading too much into texts’, 
firstly by looking at the context in which speech acts are made, and secondly 
by examining the policy making that follows political declarations.  
Public documents are reliable sources, but do not necessarily capture all 
relevant representations. This can be the case because real motivations and 
agendas are hidden behind politically correct language, or because of dis-
agreement between member states on how to approach an issue. One ex-
ample is the different views of member states regarding eastward enlarge-
ment, depending on how exposed they think they are to immigration from 
the applicant countries. The EU institutions’ discussions on Islam are 
another. As earlier discussed, the intergovernmental nature of co-operation 
on asylum and immigration has led to most decision making taking place by 
the European Council. The consensus requirement in this forum has led to 
few common positions or actions in controversial cases. This points to a 
methodological weakness connected to discourse analysis that is based on 
official documents as a main source. Future studies could for example 
nuance the findings and discover more variations in representations through 
performing qualitative interviews in the different institutions. Although I 
tried to assure triangulation (i.e. relying on mutually independent sources), 
methodological triangulation could have been improved through performing 
interviews in addition to textual analysis. 
The area of asylum and immigration has recently been promoted as an 
element of the Union’s external relations. In analysing the functioning of this 
policy area, it became clear that the instruments developed so far have not 
adequately met the challenges that were pointed out in chapter four, in 
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particular in the field of refugee protection. It can be argued that asylum and 
immigration issues function as a mechanism of internal and external control. 
The development of asylum and immigration as internal control mechanisms 
in the Maastricht third pillar framed the issue as an element of a broader 
security strategy in the safeguarding of the Single Market. The EU is 
exercising external control of the migration phenomenon when 
institutionalising structures of co-operation with third countries, and is 
projected as a hegemonic actor and a role model through a process of 
adaptation and social learning. The joint declarations following the Seville 
European summit in June 2002 present co-operation and economic aid as a 
‘carrot’ to countries co-operating adequately in the fight against illegal 
immigration. In the field of eastward enlargement, predictability and control 
over migration flows are assured through readmission agreements and pre-
accession monitoring.  
The last part of the analysis saw that the common EU asylum and immi-
gration policy risks undermining international refugee protection standards. 
The Union portrays itself as a beacon of democratic principles and human 
rights values. A better public information campaign on the roots of persecu-
tion, and the relative insignificance of overall refugee numbers in the EU 
compared to world figures could perhaps help contain the reactions of ‘mass 
hysteria’ that most of the time characterise political discussions on asylum 
and immigration. To this end, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is a 
welcome first step, permanently adding a human rights dimension to the tra-
ditional economic one of the past. This should be followed by a more 
general debate about the political nature of the EU and the ethical principles 
that shape its foundations.  
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Abstract 
Increased immigration during the last few decades has coincided with 
increasing unemployment and economic restructuring in Western Europe. 
The issue of immigration became increasingly sensitive in the late 1980s 
after the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, when a tide 
of illegal immigrants was expected to inundate the West. Today, images of 
ships loaded with refugees off the shores of Italy, or of trucks filled with ille-
gal immigrants crossing the English Channel, have become disturbing, but 
no longer rare features of European newspaper headlines. The impression is 
that of Europe being ‘swamped’, and unable to deal with the hordes of 
people standing outside its gates wanting in.  
The purpose of this report is to discuss the extent to which immigration 
has come to be perceived as a security threat by European Union (EU) policy 
makers. The manner in which immigration issues are presented by policy 
makers at the European level is assumed to have substantive implications for 
the choice of instruments in the area. A second purpose is therefore to dis-
cuss the extent to which the development towards a common EU asylum and 
immigration policy could be interpreted as a security policy strategy.  
Under the pressure of events since 1989, many scholars argue that the 
security concept should be widened to encompass new security policy chal-
lenges that have arisen. The post-1989 situation has suggested new scenari-
os, such as the end of bipolarity and the redefinition of borders. The point of 
departure of the report is the changing perception of what constitutes secur-
ity threats, unravelled through an analysis of political discourse. Through a 
division of sectors, the so-called Copenhagen School offers a framework for 
analysis that structures the security debate, and that includes other referent 
objects than the state in security analysis. Asylum and immigration is regar-
ded as a societal security issue when it is staged as a threat to a community, 
and the very identity of that community. As the report will show, most pol-
icy initiatives dealing with asylum and immigration at the European level 
have been control-inspired, and take place within frameworks that link 
asylum and immigration with the fight against organised crime, human traf-
ficking and drugs control, such as the Schengen and Dublin frameworks. It 
appears that these aspects have by far prevailed over the need for stronger 
harmonisation and the creation of minimum protection standards in the com-
mon asylum and immigration policy.  
 
